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How Initial Accommodation Shapes Refugee Integration: Quasi-Experimental Evidence from the Ukrainian Displacement Crisis in Denmark

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Abstract

Sudden displacement crises strain reception systems and require rapid expansion of refugee accommodation beyond conventional channels. We study Denmark's 2022 reception of Ukrainian refugees and provide the first population-level analysis of two scalable strategies that expanded capacity outside standard public refugee housing: public "pop-up" shelters and private hosting in residents' homes. Using linked administrative registers covering the full arriving population, combined with a representative refugee survey, we classify each refugee's initial accommodation from address and co-residence records and track outcomes for 18 months. The majority of arrivals was absorbed in pop-up shelters (37%) and private hosting (43%). Both proved durable, with mean stays of about seven months and no indication that private hosting was less stable. Exploiting quasi-random assignment generated by within-municipality capacity and time constraints, we estimate effects of accommodation type while conditioning on locality, arrival timing, and sociodemographics. Relative to conventional public housing, private hosting led to higher early employment, higher earnings, persistently lower public-transfer receipt, and improved psychological well-being. Pop-up housing performed at least as well on labormarket outcomes and showed modest gains in social integration. By holding locality constant, we show that how refugees are housed within municipalities has an independent, first-order effect on integration—distinct from the well-studied importance of where they are placed. These findings highlight the potential for civic-led accommodation to complement public systems during displacement shocks and shape long-term refugee trajectories.

JEL Classification: J15, J61, J68, R31.

Keywords: Refugees; integration; public policy; housing provision.

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1 Introduction

Sudden displacement crises create acute logistical and institutional pressures for refugee receiving countries. European countries have faced several such crises in recent decades: the Yugoslav Wars (1992–1993), the Kosovo War (1999), the Syrian and Afghan crisis (2015–2016), and—most recently—Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine (2022). Similar rapid refugee arrivals can be observed worldwide, including the Rohingya displacement to Bangladesh, Venezuelan migration to Colombia, and South Sudanese refugee arrivals in Uganda (Shaver et al. 2025). A defining feature of these episodes is the swift arrival of large numbers of refugees—often tens or hundreds of thousands within weeks—which temporarily overwhelms steady-state asylum and accommodation systems designed for predictable arrival numbers and centralized reception.

European governments have historically expanded capacity for refugee housing through ad hoc public shelters—modular container units, repurposed hotels, and other temporary facilities (Kreichauf 2018; Brown, Gill, and Halsall 2022). During the Ukrainian crisis, another approach appeared alongside these at unprecedented scale: private hosting, in which residents voluntarily accommodate refugees in their homes (Haller et al. 2022; Bassoli and Luccioni 2024; Herpell et al. 2024). By leveraging existing housing stock and civic engagement at low fiscal cost, private hosting can complement strained public reception systems.

How are flexible accommodation strategies—public "pop-up" housing and private hosting—deployed during a major displacement shock? At what scale is each mobilized, and with what consequences for refugee integration? A priori, the effects are ambiguous. Pop-up housing centralizes services and enforces minimum standards under public control, but it is costly, space-constrained (especially in cities), and often crowded—conditions that may hinder integration and elevate stress. Private hosting can provide a softer landing through social support and local know-how, yet quality varies, oversight is limited, and arrangements may be unstable.

Despite the clear policy salience of scalable refugee accommodation strategies, population-level evidence on system-wide deployment and impacts remains scarce. A key constraint is data: linked administrative records that connect initial accommodation arrangements to subsequent integration outcomes are rarely available. Policymakers facing refugee inflows therefore lack systematic evidence on which strategies scale, under what conditions, and with what effects.

Prior research links residence in reception centers to weaker integration prospects. In the Netherlands, longer stays in reception centers are associated with lower refugee employment (Vroome and Tubergen 2010; Bakker, Dagevos, and Engbersen 2014). Similar patterns are observed in Switzerland (Hainmueller, Hangartner, and Lawrence 2016) and also have been documented for asylum seekers in Denmark, primarily operating through delayed labor-market access, since asylum seekers are required to live in reception centers (Hvidtfeldt et al. 2018). During Germany's 2014–15 crisis, Khalil and Tjaden (2025) find that especially long stays in reception centers are linked to lower language proficiency and fewer contacts with Germans. On accommodation choice, Bevelander, Mata, and Pendakur (2019) show that male asylum claimants in Sweden who could choose their own housing were more likely to be employed than comparable groups. For private hosting, existing work documents the scale-up and host motivations (Bassoli and Luccioni 2024) and host activities (Haller et al. 2022; Tomlinson et al. 2023; Forbes 1997), but evidence on refugee outcomes remains limited. To our knowledge, Herpell et al. (2024) provide the first causal estimates of private hosting, finding gains in psychological well-being among Ukrainian refugees in Germany, though the analysis is restricted to users of a single matching platform.

We contribute new evidence by providing the first comprehensive, population-level analysis of flexible accommodation strategies during the 2022 Ukrainian refugee crisis in Denmark, linking initial placements to administrative and survey data outcomes to assess scale, deployment, and integration effects.

Following the full scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, Denmark received roughly 40,000 arrivals in 2022—a tenfold increase over baseline flows (Figure 1)—requiring municipalities to rapidly expand reception capacity beyond conventional channels. Leveraging Denmark's linked administrative registers, we observe the full population and precisely track who lived at each address before and after refugee arrivals. This enables classification of each refugee's first accommodation into three mutually exclusive categories: (1) conventional public refugee housing, (2) public pop-up housing (e.g., temporary containers or repurposed hotels), and (3) private hosting (co-residence with established residents). Because these classifications are inferred from objective co-residence and building records rather than self-reports, they reduce measurement error and classification bias. We then quantify the prevalence of each initial accommodation type and follow refugees' integration trajectories over time using register outcomes, complemented by a representative refugee survey.

For causal identification, we exploit two distinctive features of the empirical setting: first, Denmark's centralized system for allocating refugees to municipalities based on a proportional distribution key; and second—more crucially—the capacity-driven assignment of refugees to accommodation types within municipalities. Arrivals were assigned to municipalities following pre-determined quotas and then placed in their initial accommodation under tight timing and capacity constraints using only arrival timing and a limited set of sociodemographic factors reported in application forms (household size/composition, gender, age). We observe these factors and adjust for them throughout—supporting a selection-on-observables design (Imbens and Rubin 2015). We exclude refugees who self-accommodated in private rentals, and refugees with prior migration spells in Denmark or family residing in Denmark. Additionally, we validate the design and causal interpretation of our results by showing that the cross-municipality distribution of placements closely matches the statutory population-based key, that refugees' characteristics are balanced across regions, and that pretreatment characteristics are balanced across accommodation types conditional on arrival timing, municipality, and sociodemographics. While not formally randomized, the quota-based allocation and capacity-driven placement leave limited scope for self-selection, enabling identification of the causal effect of accommodation type on integration outcomes.

Our empirical analysis yields five main findings. First, flexible accommodation strategies accounted for most initial placements of Ukrainian refugees in Denmark: only 21.8% entered conventional public refugee housing, while 35.6% were placed in ad hoc public pop-up housing, and 42.6% were privately hosted, underscoring the central role of flexible accommodation strategies in managing displacement crisis.

Second, while most municipalities used both flexible accommodation options, private hosting was more common in rural municipalities (notably in western and southern Denmark), whereas pop-up housing was more prevalent in urban municipalities; municipal shares in the two options are negatively correlated, consistent with this substitution.

Third, all three initial accommodation types are durable: average durations are 7.11 months in private hosting, 7.44 months in pop-up housing, and 7.56 months in conventional accommodation, and by 18 months roughly 25% of refugees remain in their initial arrangement. Initial placement is therefore a lasting intervention, and we find little evidence for the concern that that private hosting arrangements are less stable.

Fourth, over the first 18 months—conditioning on covariates, arrival timing, and municipality fixed effects—assignment to private hosting leads to initially higher employment and earnings and lower public transfer dependency relative to conventional public housing. Employment converges after about one year, yet privately hosted refugees still earn more (+6% after 18 months) and are less likely to receive transfers (-12pp after 18 months) at 18 months. We find no adverse effects of pop-up housing relative to conventional public refugee housing; if anything, pop-up housing performs at least as well.

Fifth, survey data from 18 months after arrival shows that private hosting improves both well-being and self-reliance: lower degrees of depression-related symptoms, lower PTSD scores, reduced loneliness, higher perceived economic stability, and easier perceived access to health care.

These patterns indicate that private hosting yields a "softer landing" and results in stronger social and navigational integration. Pop-up housing shows smaller, less precisely estimated gains—mainly reduced loneliness—but no effects on other outcomes. We find no accommodation effects on trust in Danish institutions, intentions to stay, or worries about family well-being abroad, and slightly lower self-reported Danish skills among privately hosted refugees that are in line with lower enrollment rates into Danish language classes, compared to refugees in publicly administered housing. Taken together, these results suggest that private hosting can absorb a substantial share of arrivals and is associated with better short-run integration outcomes than conventional public housing, while ad hoc pop-up housing performs at least as well as conventional public refugee housing.

Our findings contribute to several strands of research. First, we extend a growing literature on refugee placement showing how resettlement location shapes outcomes (Edin, Fredriksson, and Aslund 2003; Damm 2009; Damm 2014; Martén, Hainmueller, and Hangartner 2019; Beaman 2012; Cutler, Glaeser, and Vigdor 2008; Patacchini and Zenou 2012; Portes 1987). We shift the lens from where refugees live to how they are accommodated, holding location constant with address-linked data.

Second, we add to emerging research on private refugee hosting (Bassoli and Luccioni 2024; Haller et al. 2022; Tomlinson et al. 2023) and its consequences for integration (Herpell et al. 2024). Unlike studies based primarily on surveys or platform-specific samples, we leverage comprehensive administrative data to study accommodation form and integration at population scale.

Third, we contribute to evidence on the lasting effects of early interventions in the refugee experience. A growing body of work shows that initial policies at arrival can shape long-run integration trajectories (Hainmueller, Hangartner, and Lawrence 2016; Marbach, Hainmueller, and Hangartner 2018; Bansak et al. 2018; J. N. Arendt et al. 2020; Fasani, Frattini, and Minale 2021; Hvidtfeldt et al. 2018). We show that early accommodation arrangements—especially those involving direct interaction with host communities—can offer meaningful integration advantages.

Finally, our results speak to broader debates on government–civil society relations and crisis response. Private hosting reveals substantial latent civic capacity that can be mobilized rapidly in emergencies, but its long-term sustainability and implications for integration remain uncertain. More broadly, our findings show how informal and formal systems interact to shape early integration when institutions are under acute pressure (Feischmidt, Pries, and Cantat 2019).

2 Materials and Methods

2.1 Refugee Accommodation in Times of Crisis

During displacement shocks, receiving countries must rapidly expand accommodation capacity beyond what the conventional infrastructure can absorb. In the Ukrainian crisis, two key mechanisms emerged across Europe: public pop-up housing and private hosting. Both provide flexible responses to sudden surges, but they differ markedly in fiscal, logistical, and social implications.

Pop-up housing consists of temporary shelters—such as modular container units, repurposed hotels, military barracks, and other public buildings—that municipalities install or adapt to meet immediate accommodation needs. These facilities are relatively straightforward to monitor, can be deployed at scale, and enable centralized service provision. Because they remain under public control, authorities can secure minimum living standards and ensure access to professional caseworkers. Co-location may also facilitate access to co-ethnic networks that benefit early integration (Edin, Fredriksson, and Aslund 2003; Damm 2009; Martén, Hainmueller, and Hangartner 2019). At the same time, pop-up sites entail nontrivial setup and operating costs and are constrained by space—particularly in dense urban areas. As a result, they may be sited in disadvantaged or inconvenient locations (Brown, Gill, and Halsall 2022). Clustering can reduce privacy and heighten stress or security concerns (Foroutan et al. 2017; Gewalt et al. 2018; Walther et al. 2020; Bakker, Cheung, and Phillimore 2016), and may limit contact with the host population (Kreichauf 2018), with potential consequences for language acquisition and the development of bridging social capital (Bakker, Dagevos, and Engbersen 2014; Siegert 2021). Concentration can also render sites politically salient focal points for local opposition, though recent evidence documents more nuanced effects on natives' attitudes (Steinmayr 2021; Achard et al. 2025).

Private hosting—local residents voluntarily accommodating refugees in their homes—offers a highly decentralized, low-fiscal-cost way of expanding capacity by leveraging existing housing stock and civic engagement (Fratzke, Pulkkinen, and Ugolini 2023). Staying with private hosts can provide a "softer landing": immediate social support, personalized guidance, and help navigating local institutions (Palmgren et al. 2025). Hosts may also act as bridges to employment, education, and language learning, fostering early integration through direct interpersonal contact (Herpell et al. 2024; Bassoli and Luccioni 2024). These advantages, however, come with limits. Aggregate capacity may be modest if few households are willing to host; oversight is diffuse, generating variation in housing quality and host behavior (Palmgren et al. 2025); and arrangements can be unstable, eventually ending abruptly and disrupting integration trajectories (Herpell et al. 2024). Geographic dispersion of private hosts may further complicate centralized service delivery such as language classes, case management, or health support.

In many European countries, private hosting of Ukrainians was typically informal and rapidly mobilized: locals—often matched via platforms—offered short-term accommodation to refugees without prior ties or formal integration obligations (Herpell et al. 2024). This contrasts with regulated refugee sponsorship/cosponsorship models used in countries such as Canada, where vetted sponsors commit long-term support, usually name a specific refugee family to sponsor, and are accountable for financing, housing, and integration (Hyndman et al. 2021). The Danish arrangements we study follow this broader informal European hosting pattern.

2.2 The Ukrainian Displacement Crisis in Denmark

As shown in the top panel of Figure 1, Denmark has experienced multiple spikes of refugee arrivals over recent decades, similar to other European countries. The Ukrainian crisis was the largest of these, with more than four million Ukrainians seeking refuge across Europe. Most arrivals occurred in the second quarter of 2022, and Denmark was no exception. As shown in the bottom panel of Figure 1, entries to Denmark rose sharply following Russia's full-scale invasion on February 24, 2022, peaking at roughly 700 per day in March–April before stabilizing from July onward. Approximately 25,000 Ukrainians arrived between March and June 2022, and by the end of 2023 the cumulative number had reached about 40,000. This scale far exceeded Denmark's typical refugee intake: in the five years preceding the invasion, Denmark received on average roughly 1890 asylum applications annually (Statistics Denmark 2025), underscoring the unprecedented scale of the Ukrainian displacement.

The arrival of Ukrainian refugees marked a turning point in European and Danish responses to mass displacement. For the first time, the Council of the European Union activated the Temporary Protection Directive (2001/55/EC), granting immediate protection with rights to reside and work across member states (Council of the European Union 2001; Council of the European Union 2022). Building on a broad political agreement, the Danish Parliament enacted the Special Act on March 16, 2022 which closely mirrored the EU directive and provided Ukrainian refugees with temporary residence permits of up to two years including immediate access to housing, the labor market, and key welfare and health services (Pencheva, Engebretsen, and Ruhan 2023; Berlina 2022). This policy contrasted with Denmark's broader restrictive turn over the preceding years, which included tighter family reunification criteria, a valuables-seizure rule, lower benefits, stronger returns, and use of return centers for rejected asylum applicants (Sandberg 2025).

2.3 Assignment of Ukrainian Refugees to Accommodation

Denmark employed a centralized, two-stage allocation system to place refugees in initial accommodation. First, upon arrival, Ukrainian refugees applied for residence under the Special Act; applications were processed swiftly thanks to expanded administrative capacity and simplified procedures that did not require individual asylum assessments or protection determinations. Once granted, the Danish Immigration Service (DIS) allocated individuals across the 98 municipalities (Berlina 2022; Ministry of Immigration and Integration 2022a). Allocations occurred in tranches of 10,000 and were proportional to each municipality's share of the national population, adjusted for its share of non-Western immigrants (Danish Immigration Service 2022b). Municipalities could request higher quotas, and the distribution key was updated in April 2022 (Danish Immigration Service 2022a). The assigned municipality became the authority responsible for integration and was accountable for reception and accommodation (Ministry of Immigration and Integration 2022b). Refugees who self-accommodated (e.g., stayed with family or rented privately) were permitted to remain in those municipalities; we exclude this small subset from the analysis (see below).

Second, within the assigned municipality, refugees received an offer of one of three accommodation types: (i) conventional public/refugee housing, (ii) modular or pop-up housing, or (iii) a match with a private host. By regulation, an offer had to be made within four days of assignment—an ambitious target given the surge in demand (Local Government Denmark 2023a). Municipalities typically had little or no prior knowledge of the refugees allocated to them; they would simply receive an email from the

Danish Immigration Service stating that a person had been assigned to the municipality upon receiving a residence permit. As a result, they had to rely on the very limited sociodemographic information from application forms and, under considerable time pressure, had limited opportunity to screen cases in detail or optimize matches. Cases needed to be processed extremely quickly, and placements were therefore driven primarily by bed requirements and same-day availability. Municipalities were required to make only a single offer and had no obligation to provide additional options. Refugees typically accepted the first viable offer, yielding broadly similar composition across accommodation types conditional on observables and arrival timing (Local Government Denmark 2023a).

As existing stock was exhausted, municipalities rapidly expanded capacity via ad hoc pop-up solutions—hotels, repurposed schools and municipal buildings, container units, and sports facilities—financed through a mix of municipal budgets and national support. In parallel, civic-led initiatives recruited private hosts and facilitated matching between local residents and Ukrainian refugees (Carlsen, Gårdhus, and Toubøl 2024). These arrangements typically involved no prior personal connection, and most hosts offered rent-free accommodation without a fixed end date. Practices varied across municipalities: for example, Aarhus requested three-month commitments, whereas Copenhagen collected expressions of interest but could not always broker matches. Municipalities could also access funds to compensate private hosts; according to a survey, roughly 60% eventually did so (Local Government Denmark 2023b). Private hosts were somewhat more likely to accommodate singles or smaller households (likely due to space constraints) and, correspondingly, younger and older individuals. We observe these characteristics and explicitly adjust for them throughout the analysis.

These institutional features support plausibly exogenous accommodation assignment under a selection-on-observables framework (Imbens and Rubin 2015). Although the assignment process was not formally randomized, the quota-based municipal allocation and capacity-driven placement meant that, in practice, assignment depended primarily on arrival timing, municipality, and a limited set of sociodemographic characteristics used by municipalities when securing accommodation (household size and composition, gender, age). We adjust for these factors throughout, addressing the main channels through which non-random sorting could arise. Conditional on these covariates, we expect refugees assigned to different accommodation types to be similar on unobserved factors that might otherwise affect integration outcomes.

In the appendix, we provide several robustness checks and sensitivity analyses that lend further support to the causal interpretation of our results: First: the cross-municipality distribution of refugees in our sample closely follows the statutory distribution key (Figure A.1), indicating that centralized allocation—not strategic self-selection—drove geographic placement. Second: We see negligible differences in baseline socioeconomic characteristics across regions of first settlement, highlighting the limited self-selection into geographical areas (Table A.1). Third: conditional on arrival timing, municipality, and the sociodemographic controls, pretreatment characteristics are closely aligned across the three accommodation types (Figure A.3), consistent with as-if random assignment at the margin driven by contemporaneous capacity constraints. Fourth, we conduct a sensitivity analysis following Cinelli and Hazlett 2020 and show that unobserved confounders would need to be roughly forty times more influential—in terms of explaining variation in both treatment and outcome—than our most influential observed covariate to overturn the key finding. Given the rich set of covariates and fixed effects included in the model, the existence of such a confounder is unlikely (Figure A.10).

2.4 Data and Sample

Our main data source are Denmark's full-population linked administrative registers. These data provide individual-level information on demographics, complete residential histories, internal and international migration, labor-market outcomes (employment and earnings), public transfers, and detailed dwelling characteristics. Using personal and address identifiers, we (i) identify Ukrainian refugees granted protection under the Special Act, (ii) classify each household's initial accommodation type, and (iii) track integration outcomes monthly for the first 18 months after arrival.

Our core register-based analysis sample consists of 16,400 "trailblazers" which we define as the first adult (with priority to those between age 18 and 65) in each family who arrived from Ukraine and registered in Denmark in 2022. We apply three sample restrictions. First, we exclude trailblazers with preexisting ties to Denmark—either a prior migration history or close family links observed in the registers (n = 1,157). This group is small because, before the invasion, only 0.28% of Danish residents were from Ukraine. We exclude them to mitigate potential endogeneity concerns related to accommodation and outcomes: these refugees often stayed with relatives and likely possessed Denmark-specific knowledge that could influence integration trajectories. Second, we only keep refugees arriving within the first four months after the invasion to focus on the peak time of capacity constraints (see Figure 1, dropping n = 3,805). Third, we exclude refugees who self-accommodated in private rentals. This group is small (n = 1,089) and likely selected and atypical, as newly arrived refugees rarely had the resources to secure private leases in Denmark. This leaves us with a final sample of 10,349. Note that our main results are robust to including these excluded groups (see Appendix).

While the core economic integration outcomes are measured using register data, we also draw on two surveys of Ukrainian refugees to capture psychological, social, and navigational integration outcomes. First, we use a nationwide survey fielded by Denmark's Ministry of Immigration and Integration in October 2022. We use this survey to assess pretreatment balance of our sample across relevant socioeconomic covariates. Second, we use the second wave of the Danish Refugee Cohort (DARECO) survey fielded in October 2023 (Karstoft, Korchakova, et al. 2024; Karstoft, Bjørndal, et al. 2025). These data capture integration outcomes roughly 4–7 months post-arrival (October 2022 survey) and 16–19 months post-arrival (October 2023 survey). Both surveys were administered by Statistics Denmark via the government's digital mailbox system, with samples drawn from the population registers. Response rates were 44% for the Ministry's survey and 41% for the DARECO wave 2 survey. We link responses to the administrative registers and apply non-response weights. Overlap with our trailblazer population is substantial for both surveys (Ministry: 46%; DARECO wave 2: 41%). Balance checks show that respondents closely match population distributions on key demographic characteristics. For survey-based outcomes, sample sizes vary across items, but approximately 3,200 trailblazers provided complete responses in the DARECO wave 2 follow-up.

The Appendix provides further details on the register data (Table A.2), variable definitions (Table A.3), sample restrictions (Table A.4), response rates and overlap with the trailblazer population (Table A.5), and balance diagnostics. All analyses were conducted in a secure research environment under a data use agreement with Statistics Denmark; only anonymized aggregates left the data facility, in accordance with Danish data-protection regulations.

2.5 Identifying Accommodation Types

We classify each trailblazer's accommodation type based on their initial accommodation (lasting at least seven days) by leveraging building records, address histories, and pre-/post-arrival co-residence patterns. We focus on the three most common arrangements during the Ukrainian crisis: *conventional public refugee housing*, public *pop-up housing*, and *private hosting*.

Trailblazers are classified as living in conventional *public housing* if their initial address is owned by public authorities (e.g., residential institutions) or by a non-profit housing association for which municipalities have secured allocation rights over a share of units. Additionally, we require that either (i) all prior residents vacated before the refugee moved in, or (ii) all other residents moved out during the refugees' stay. These accommodations correspond to conventional refugee accommodation used in Denmark's reception system.

Refugees are classified as living in public *pop-up* housing if the initial address appears in 2022 in Denmark's address registry, and no observed residency in 2021, and no residents were registered in it at the time Ukrainians moved in.

Lastly, refugees are classified as *privately hosted* if they moved into an address already occupied by at least one resident who remained throughout the refugees' stay. We additionally require that the private host (i) was officially residing at the address on February 24, 2022, and (ii) appears in the population register as of December 2021–effectively excluding hosting by very recent immigrants. More details on classification procedures and housing types are provided in the Appendix.

2.6 Outcomes

Our analysis covers a broad set of integration outcomes. For economic integration, we use the administrative data to construct three monthly measures: (i) employment (positive labor income in the Danish tax records); (ii) log monthly earnings in Danish kroner (DKK), conditional on employment; and (iii) public-benefit receipt, measured as an indicator for receiving any cash assistance or other means-tested transfers. For well-being, psychological, and navigational integration (Harder et al. 2018), we leverage survey-based measures including score of severity of depression symptoms, PTSD symptom scores, a subjective assessment of economic stability, worries about family in Ukraine and in Denmark, intentions to stay, access to medical care, feelings of social isolation, trust in Danish institutions, and self-assessed Danish language skills. Last, we use data on enrollment from language schools in Denmark. Details on question wording, variable construction, and measurement are provided in the Appendix (Table A.6).

2.7 Statistical Analysis

To study the effects of initial accommodation on integration outcomes, we estimate

$$y_{i,t} = \beta_1 Pop-up \ housing_i + \beta_2 Private \ hosting_i + X_i' \gamma + \alpha_{m(i)} + \delta_{a(i)} + \varepsilon_{m(i),t}, \tag{1}$$

where $y_{i,t}$ is an outcome for refugee i measured t months after arrival; $Pop-up\ housing_i$ and $Private\ hosting_i$ are indicators for the initial accommodation type; X_i is a vector of refugee characteristics measured at arrival from the registers; $\alpha_{m(i)}$ are municipality fixed effects; and $\delta_{a(i)}$ are month of arrival fixed effects.

Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level, which is conservative given that housing assignment occurred at the individual level.

We are interested in the coefficients β_1 and β_2 , which capture differences relative to the omitted category of conventional public refugee housing. Thus, they measure the effects of the initial accommodation types on refugee integration, conditional on same arrival month, municipality of initial accommodation, and observed characteristics X_i at arrival.

Our baseline set of covariates X_i includes the following demographics and household composition measured at arrival, all specified as dummy-variables: age intervals for 18-29, 29-37, 37-44 (omitted in regressions), 44-57, and 57+, male, country of origin is Ukraine, household size from 1 (omitted in regressions), 2, 3 to 4+ persons, and household composition measures by 1 to 2+ child in family, 1+ senior in family. Summary statistics on all covariates are presented Table A.7. Details about all variables are provided in Appendix Table A.3. Depending on the specification, we estimate (1) separately for each month since migration t = 1, ..., 18 or for quarters since migration q = 1, ..., 6.

2.8 Descriptive Statistics

We report summary statistics on our sample of trailblazers in Appendix Table A.7. 95% are of Ukrainian origin, the remaining 5% are primarily Russian origin who have resided in Ukraine before coming to Denmark. Around 60% of trailblazers are at most 44 years old at immigration and average age is 43; 84% are female; 46% arrived without a partner or children, and 46% arrived with at least one child. The mean family size is 1.9 persons. Before moving to Denmark, 76% reported to have had formal employment, and 12% had no formal employment; the rest was retired (9%) or studying (3%). Regarding English proficiency, half of the population had elementary skills while 29% reported to have conversational English or higher. Education levels are also high: 20% completed short tertiary equal to junior-specialist or BA, and 40% have a master's degree or higher.

Table A.7 also includes characteristics of trailblazers by initial accommodation type. Even unconditionally, covariates are closely aligned across accommodation types (age, gender, language proficiency, and education). Two modest differences stand out: private hosting is slightly more common among the youngest (ages 18–29: 21% in private hosting vs. 14% in conventional public and pop-up housing) and the oldest (57+: 24% vs. 18% in conventional public and pop-up). Singles are also somewhat more prevalent in private hosting (53%) than in conventional public housing (43%) and pop-up housing (39%). We control for these covariates. Consistent with the age differences, refugees in private hosting were slightly less likely to have been working prior to arrival (71% vs. 79% in conventional public housing and pop-up housing), a pattern that—if anything—biases against finding positive employment effects of private hosting. All covariates are balanced once we condition on sociodemographics, arrival timing, and municipality (Figure A.3). Descriptive statistics for all outcomes are also provided in Appendix Table A.8.

3 Results

3.1 Distribution of Initial Accommodation Types

How common was each type of initial accommodation for Ukrainian refugees upon arrival in Denmark? We find that flexible accommodation strategies accounted for the large majority of placements: overall, only 21.8% of refugees entered conventional, existing public refugee housing, whereas 35.6% were placed in public pop-up housing and 42.6% were privately hosted. These shares underscore the centrality and scale of flexible strategies for managing this displacement crisis.

The top-left panel of Figure 2 shows the municipal shares of each accommodation type across Denmark's 98 municipalities. Most municipalities employed a mix of all three types, especially those receiving larger inflows. The composition varies substantially across municipalities. For example, in Copenhagen, 38% were privately hosted, 54% were placed in conventional refugee housing, and 8% in pop-up housing; in Aarhus, the second largest city, the corresponding shares were 27%, 30%, and 43%–implying a relatively larger reliance on pop-up housing. The top-right panel plots the municipal share of pop-up housing against the share of private hosting and reveals a clear negative relationship, consistent with the two flexible channels acting as substitutes: where private hosting was more prevalent, fewer pop-up units needed to be deployed.

The bottom-left panel of Figure 2 maps the municipal share of arrivals placed with private hosts; the bottom-right panel shows the share placed in pop-up housing. Both strategies were used nationwide, with modest spatial patterns: private hosting was slightly more common in rural municipalities (mostly in western and southern Denmark), whereas pop-up housing was somewhat more prevalent in urban areas (with Copenhagen as a prominent exception).

Taken together, these results indicate that all three accommodation types were widely used across the country rather than concentrated in a few localities. The observed substitution between private hosting and pop-up provision suggests a robust, context-responsive capacity: municipalities leveraged whichever flexible channel fit their local housing stock and civic engagement, thereby expanding surge accommodation without over-reliance on any single mechanism.

3.2 Durability of Initial Accommodation Types

How durable were the initial accommodation arrangements? Figure 3 plots Kaplan–Meier survival curves for months from move-in to move-out date of the initial accommodation. Across all three types—conventional public refugee housing, public pop-up housing, and private hosting—the curves indicate substantial durability. The survival profiles are very similar across the three types.

By month 18, roughly 25% of refugees remain in their initial accommodation, with comparable rates across the three types. The estimated mean duration over the first 18 months after arrival are 230 days for conventional public housing, 227 days for pop-up housing, and 217 days for private hosting. In the Appendix, we also report estimates from the specification in equation 1—regressing the duration in the initial accommodation on the baseline covariates and arrival-month and municipality fixed effects. The results confirm that there are no statistically significant differences in duration across accommodation types. We find a small coefficient for outmigration out of pop-up housing of 3.4 pp (95% CI: 0.5 pp,

6.3 pp) in quarter 6 after arrival. There is also no discernible effect of initial accommodation type on the number of residential moves during the observation window (Appendix Table A.9 and figure A.4).

Taken together, these results suggest that initial accommodation is not merely a short-term exposure but a lasting intervention that can plausibly shape subsequent integration trajectories. Importantly, we find no evidence that private hosting is less stable. In Denmark, its durability is not different from pop-up and conventional public refugee housing.

3.3 Effect of Initial Accommodation Types on Labor Market Integration

How did initial accommodation shape refugees' labor market integration? The top panel of Figure 4 plots the estimated employment effects of private hosting and pop-up housing relative to conventional public refugee housing (see Appendix Table A.10 for results at quarterly frequency). Private hosting results in higher employment in the first months after arrival: by the end of the first quarter, employment among those initially placed with private hosts is about 10 pp higher than among those in conventional refugee housing (95% CI: 6.6 pp, 13.8 pp, Table A.10 Column (1)). Relative to a mean employment rate of 35%, this is a roughly 29% increase. The effect remains statistically significant through approximately one year post-arrival, after which the groups converge. By 18 months since migration, there is no longer a statistically significant difference between private hosting and conventional housing. Pop-up housing also shows a potential initial employment advantage over conventional housing, though smaller in magnitude and statistically insignificant (2.8 pp; 95% CI: -0.8 pp, 6.5 pp, Table A.10 Column (1)), with faster convergence towards the levels of conventional refugee housing. Refugees' employment has generally been at high levels in Denmark during this time period (Foged, Zink, and J. Arendt 2024).

The middle panel of Figure 4 shows effects on log earnings, conditional on employment. We find that refugees initially assigned to private hosts earn higher earnings than those in conventional housing, with effects that attenuate yet persist through 18 months. At the end of the first quarter, earnings are about 17% higher (95% CI: 1.6%, 31.5%, Table A.10 Column (3)) for those initially hosted privately; by the end of the sixth quarter, the effect remains at roughly 6% (95% CI: -0.4%, 12.7%, Table A.10 Column (4)). Pop-up housing exhibits no significant earnings advantage over conventional housing, but does no worse.

The bottom panel of Figure 4 displays the effects on public transfer receipt. Refugees initially assigned to private hosts have substantially lower rates of transfer recipience than those in conventional housing, with effects that attenuate but remain evident through 18 months. At the end of the first quarter, transfer receipt rates are about 17 pp lower for those initially hosted privately (95% CI: 11.9 pp, 22.8 pp, Table A.10 Column (5)); by the end of the sixth quarter, the reduction is roughly 12 pp (95% CI: 8.5 pp, 14.7 pp, Table A.10 Column (6)). Relative to mean public transfer receipt rates of 90.5% (Q1) and 37.3% (Q6), these correspond to decreases of approximately 19% and 31%, respectively. Pop-up housing shows no discernible advantage in the form of lower transfer recipience compared to conventional housing. Additional analyses show that privately hosted refugees also secure better and faster employment. They enter the labor market in higher-ranked industries (based on average hourly wages at the 6-digit NACE level) relative to those in conventional public housing, and—six quarters after arrival and conditional on employment—they remain employed in higher-ranked industries. Privately hosted individuals also enter employment more quickly (see Table A.20 in the Appendix).

¹The Integration Allowance (integrationsydelse) is by far the largest category of public transfers received in our sample, accounting for between 93.5% and 99.9 of all transfers across the months following arrival.

The results are robust to various checks reported in the Appendix. In particular, estimates remain similar when we account for attrition using inverse probability weights (IPW) (see table A.11), restrict the analysis to a balanced panel (see table A.12, A.13 and A.14), omit covariates or fixed effects (see table A.12, A.13, and A.14), and include municipality-by-month-of-arrival fixed effects (see table A.12, A.13, A.14). Results for employment and public transfers are robust to excluding the largest municipalities, measured by population density or inflow, from the sample (see table A.15, A.16, A.17), whereas the effects on log-earnings are smaller in economic and statistical terms. In addition, a formal sensitivity analysis following Cinelli and Hazlett (2020) shows that an unobserved confounder would need to be many times more influential than the strongest observed covariates to overturn the estimated employment effects of private hosting, suggesting that the results are robust to omitted-variable bias (see Figure A.10). There are no strong indications of substantial heterogeneity in treatment effects across gender, age, or household size (see figure A.5, A.6, and A.7), aside from some indication of an even larger employment surplus for males who are privately hosted.

Taken together, the evidence indicates that private hosting accelerates economic integration: higher early employment and earnings alongside lower transfer receipt; employment converges over time, while differences in earnings and transfer receipt persist. Pop-up housing also yields short-run employment gains and, in the longer run, performs at least as well as conventional public refugee housing.

3.4 Effects of Initial Accommodation on Social, Psychological, and Navigational Integration

How did initial accommodation affect refugees' social, psychological, and navigational integration? Figure 5 presents effects for private hosting and pop-up housing relative to conventional public refugee housing approximately 18 months after arrival (quarter 6). All outcomes are scaled to [0, 1]. The estimated coefficients are reported in Appendix Table A.18.

Private hosting improves mental health; we see a significant reduction in both severity of depression symptoms by 0.028 (95% CI: -0.054, -0.002) and in the PTSD score by 0.028 (95% CI: -0.053, -0.005), corresponding to about an 8% decline from the mean of 0.30 for depression, and 7% decline from the mean of 0.35 for PTSD. It also increases not feeling lonely by 0.051 (95% CI: 0.020, 0.082), an 8.6% rise over the mean of 0.59. For pop-up housing, we find no effects on depression, PTSD or family well-being in Denmark, but a positive effect on not feeling lonely of 0.033 (95% CI: 0.002, 0.064), a 5.5% increase relative to the mean.

In terms of navigational integration, private hosting increases perceived economic stability by 0.046 (95% CI: 0.022–0.068)—a 6.3% rise relative to the mean of 0.76—and improves perceived access to health care by 0.047 (95% CI: 0.023–0.071), a 7.2% increase relative to the mean of 0.66. For pop-up housing, we find no statistically significant effects on economic stability or access to care. The higher access to care among privately hosted suggest that private host may help refugees overcome barriers to accessing health care. This finding is notable given evidence that Ukrainian refugees in Denmark cite difficulties obtaining health-care treatment as their greatest daily-life challenge (Institut for Psykologi, Københavns Universitet 2023; Castanèr, A.-M. Schönemann, and Nørredam 2023) and reports from Danish general practitioners that many initially lack the competencies needed to navigate the system effectively (A. M. Schönemann et al. 2025).

For both accommodation types, we find no differences in worries family well-being in Ukraine, trust in

Danish institutions, or intentions to stay. However, privately hosted refugees report slightly lower self-assessed Danish language skills than those in conventional public housing, with a reduction of 0.021 (95% CI: –0.036, –0.004), corresponding to a 7.6% decrease relative to the mean of 0.27. For residents of pop-up housing, the estimate is also negative (–0.014) but not statistically significant.

One interpretation of the negative effect on Danish language skills is that reliance on private hosts for integration support or the higher rates of initial job placements may reduce refugees' incentives to invest in language learning. In addition, private hosts may be less likely than caseworkers to assist refugees with enrollment in language classes. We find that assignment to private hosting—compared with conventional public refugee housing—reduces enrollment in Danish language classes by 9.66 pp (95% CI: –13.6, –5.70) during the first nine months after arrival, whereas no discernible effect is observed for pop-up housing (see Appendix Figure A.9).

Overall, initial placement with private hosts yields modest but consistent gains on social and navigational dimensions by 18 months—lower loneliness, less severe depression symptoms, reduced PTSD symptoms, greater perceived economic stability, and improved access to care—whereas pop-up housing delivers smaller, less precisely estimated advantages and performs at least as well as conventional public housing. These private-hosting results are consistent with (Herpell et al. 2024), who find similar improvements in social, psychological, and navigational outcomes for Ukrainian refugees in Germany matched to private hosts via a non-profit platform. Estimates remain similar when we apply weights to account for attrition using inverse probability weights (IPW) (see table A.19). There no indications of significant heterogeneity in treatment effects across gender, age, or household size (see figure A.8).

4 Conclusion

This paper provides the first population-level evidence on the employment and integration effects of flexible refugee accommodation strategies during a major displacement shock. Using rich administrative data from Denmark's response to the 2022 Ukrainian refugee crisis, we show that private hosting and public pop-up housing absorbed the majority of arrivals (almost 80%) and served as durable initial placements. Crucially, private hosting resulted in improved integration outcomes—higher employment, earnings, and psychological well-being—relative to conventional public housing, while pop-up housing performed at least as well, measured up to 18 months after arrival.

The findings contribute to both theory and policy. On the theoretical side, they highlight the importance of the *form* of accommodation in shaping refugees' integration trajectories—not just their *location*, which has dominated prior work (Edin, Fredriksson, and Aslund 2003; Damm 2009; Damm 2014; Martén, Hainmueller, and Hangartner 2019; Beaman 2012; Cutler, Glaeser, and Vigdor 2008; Patacchini and Zenou 2012; Portes 1987). Beyond asking *where* refugees live, our results show that it is equally crucial to assess *how* they are accommodated, holding location constant while varying accommodation type. The findings also add to a growing literature showing that initial conditions shortly after arrival can shape long-run integration paths (Hainmueller, Hangartner, and Lawrence 2016; Marbach, Hainmueller, and Hangartner 2018; Bansak et al. 2018; J. N. Arendt et al. 2020). In particular, early accommodation arrangements that foster direct interaction with host communities can generate meaningful and lasting integration gains.

From a policy perspective, the results demonstrate that civic-led accommodation can be mobilized at scale

and deliver measurable integration benefits even under institutional duress. Private hosting emerges not merely as a temporary stopgap but as a viable complement to public reception systems—combining logistical flexibility with social and psychological support as well as tangible economic benefits. It appears to offer a cost-effective, scalable alternative to conventional and pop-up housing during sudden inflows. That said, we also document a modest downside: privately hosted refugees exhibit lower self-assessed Danish language skills and lower enrollment in language classes relative to those in conventional public housing. This gap could be mitigated by training and guiding hosts to proactively support course enrollment and by formal coordination mechanisms between municipalities, language providers, and host households. Host households appear effective at helping refugees to access and navigate the health care system. More broadly, private hosting reveals latent civic capacity that can be activated in times of crisis, though questions about its sustainability, equity, and governance remain open.

How generalizable are these findings? First, they align with Herpell et al. (2024), who report similar social, psychological, and navigational benefits—but no significant economic effects—for a subset of Ukrainian refugees in Germany matched to private hosts via a nonprofit platform. Second, in comparative perspective, Denmark sits in the middle range on immigrant integration: the Migration Policy Group's MIPEX index scores Denmark at 49 out of 100—below the EU average (54) and well below the EU-14 average of 63 for long-standing member states (Yavçan and Gorgerino 2025). Although Danish policies have become more restrictive in recent years (Sandberg 2025), evidence suggests that Ukrainian refugees were received with broad support and public sympathy, in contrast to earlier arrivals from the Middle East and North Africa (Blinkenberg and Øland 2025; Carlsen, Gårdhus, and Toubøl 2024). This combination—a relatively restrictive general policy environment but a favorable reception for Ukrainians—implies that our estimates are unlikely to be driven simply by an unusually welcoming or hostile context, but rather reflect the effects of accommodation form within a moderately supportive setting.

Our study also has several limitations. First, the evidence is drawn from a single context, and the findings may therefore not generalize to other refugee groups and host countries. Second, we observe integration outcomes only over the first 18 months after arrival and cannot assess whether the advantages of private hosting persist in the longer run. Third, our identification strategy relies on selection on observables and capacity-driven placement; while extensive balance checks, robustness tests, and sensitivity analyses reduce concerns about bias, the study remains observational, and future work should therefore complement our findings with randomized controlled trials of private hosting interventions. Finally, our classification of accommodation types, though based on high-quality register data, may still be subject to some measurement error, which would tend to attenuate estimated effects toward zero. These limitations suggest that our estimates should be interpreted as context-specific and as short- to medium-run effects, and underscore the value of complementary studies in other settings and over longer time horizons.

More broadly, this study advances our understanding of how early interventions in the refugee experience can have lasting effects and how civic capacity can be harnessed in times of crisis. As displacement shocks become more frequent and complex, designing resilient and equitable reception systems will require not only institutional innovation but also meaningful collaboration with civil society.

Figures






Figure 1: Refugee arrivals in Europe and Denmark



Notes: The top panel shows annual counts of asylum applications and applications under the EU's Temporary Protection Directive (TPD) and analogous national schemes for Europe and Denmark. The European series are based on UNHCR data compiled by Shaver et al. 2025. Danish sources: Statistics Denmark 2025 and the Ministry of Immigration and Integration 2025's statistics on the Special Law for people displaced from Ukraine. The bottom panel shows daily arrivals of Ukrainians in Denmark from 2021 to 2024 from the Migration Register.

Figure 2: Distribution of initial accommodation types



Notes: Panel (a) displays the municipal-level composition of initial accommodation types in a ternary plot. Panel (b) plots municipal shares of private hosting against pop-up housing. Panels (c) and (d) map, respectively, the prevalence of private hosting and pop-up housing as shares of total initial accommodation placements in each municipality.





Figure 3: Duration in Initial Accommodation

Notes: Unconditional Kaplan-Meier survival curves showing the proportion of refugees remaining in their initial accommodation over time (months since move-in), by accommodation type.

Figure 4: Effect of initial accommodation on labor market outcomes



Notes: The figure presents monthly cross-sectional regressions of labor market outcomes on indicators for residing in either popup housing or private hosting as the initial accommodation, with conventional public housing as the omitted reference category. Covariates from Panel A in Table A.7 are included as controls as well as municipality and month-of-arrival fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. 95-percent confidence intervals are shown as error bars.


Pop-up housing

10 11 12 13

15 16

2 3

Figure 5: Effect of initial accommodation on psychological and navigational integration



Notes: The figure presents regression coefficients for each survey index measured approximately six quarters after arrival, regressed on indicators for residing in either pop-up housing or private hosting as the initial accommodation, with conventional public housing as the omitted reference category. Covariates from Panel A in Table A.7 are included as controls as well as municipality and month-of-arrival fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. 95-percent confidence intervals are shown as error bars. Reported means are estimated for the omitted reference category (conventional public housing).

Appendix

A Data and Sample

A.1 Register Data

This study draws on Denmark's system of linked administrative registers, which cover the entire resident population and are maintained by Statistics Denmark. The registers provide longitudinal, individual-level data on demographics, education, employment, earnings, public transfers, addresses, migration histories, and dwelling characteristics. Individuals are tracked over time through unique personal and address identifiers, allowing linkage across datasets and the construction of household-, municipal-, and regional-level measures. These data enable high-resolution analyses of refugee accommodation, mobility, and integration outcomes. All analyses were conducted on secure servers within Statistics Denmark in compliance with national data protection regulations.

Table A.2 provides an overview of the datasets used and their specific role in the analysis, while Table A.3 lists all variables constructed from the register- and survey data.

For the primary labor market outcomes of interest, namely employment, earnings, and public transfer recipiency, we present detailed description on how they are constructed. For survey outcomes, we refer to the section below.

Employment rates: We measure refugee employment using the BFL (Employment Register), which is constructed from SKAT's (Danish Tax Agency) elncome registry that records, on a monthly basis, all employer-reported earnings and hours for each employee. We classify a refugee as employed in a given post-migration month if the elncome registry reports positive paid hours and positive earnings from an employment spell in that month.

Log-earnings: We measure earnings using the "broad" earnings, stated in the monthly BFL. The broad earnings definition encompasses salary, some contribution to pensions, and taxable amenities like employer-paid phones. We summarize all earnings across employments for the given month, e.g. if a person is employed multiple places.

Public transfer recipiency: To measure public transfers, we utilize the longitudinal The Register-Based Evaluation of Marginalization-dataset, DREAM, which records any public transfer ranging from student grants to pensions on a weekly basis to individuals. We are agnostic in our categorization, and include any public transfer received in the relevant week of observation after arrival, and classify it according to the month. It is important to note that while we include any public transfer, the Integration Allowance (integrationsydelse) is by far the largest category of public transfers received in our sample, accounting for 99.9% at the first month of all transfers received for our sample, and declines to 93.5% at the eighteenth month after arrival.

When we estimate labor market outcomes on a quarterly basis, we aggregate the underlying data to present relevant quarterly variation. For employment, we categorize the individual as being employed, if at any point during the three corresponding months, were employed, hence we take the "max" over months to get the quarter. This is the same procedure we utilize when handling public transfer recipiency. For log-earnings, we take the month with the highest recorded earnings during that quarter. For robustness, it does not appear that taking the average of log-earnings across the month alters our results in any significant way.

In general, when examining the labor market outcomes, we disregard the fifth age quintile from our sample, namely those aged 57 or above upon arrival, due to limited employment rates in this quintile. This restriction has slight impact on results of labor market outcomes, where the surplus employment rates of privately hosted drops from 10.2% (column (1) in A.10) to 8.0%, which is within the 95% confidence interval. However, employment rates for pop-up housing, at sixth quarter follow-up and corresponding results of log-earnings and public transfer recipiency shows no discernible differences.

A.2 Sample

Table A.4 outlines our sample construction procedure. Using immigration registers, we first identify all individuals who entered Denmark after February 24, 2022. We then restrict the sample to the 38,875 individuals who (i) hold Ukrainian citizenship, (ii) immigrated from Ukraine, (iii) reported Ukraine as their country of origin, or (iv) received a residence permit under the Special Act (from March 16, 2022).

Next, we exclude cases without an initial accommodation lasting at least seven days to exclude short-term stays where Denmark served primarily as a transit country. We further retain only refugees who arrived within the first four months after February 24, 2022, to focus on those who entered during the peak displacement period when arrivals exceeded existing capacity. We also exclude refugees with preexisting ties to Denmark—either prior migration history or close register-identified family links—as well as those whose initial placement was a private rental.

Finally, we restrict the analysis to "trailblazers," defined as the first adult aged 18–65 in each family to arrive in Denmark. In the case of multiple adults aged 18-65 entering the same day, we select the oldest among them. Family ties are constructed via an undirected graph whose nodes represent individuals and whose edges encode partner/spouse, sibling, and parent—child relations. Each connected component defines a family within our refugee sample. Given the comprehensive linkage structure, this yields the broadest feasible definition of a family.

The final analysis sample consists of 10,349 trailblazers.

A.3 Survey Data

In addition to the registers, we draw on two Statistics Denmark surveys of Ukrainian refugees: (i) a nation-wide survey commissioned by the Ministry of Immigration and Integration (fielded October–November 2022) and (ii) wave 2 of the Danish Refugee Cohort (DARECO) survey (fielded October 2023–January 2024; see (Karstoft, Korchakova, et al. 2024)). The first survey provides pre-arrival characteristics for balance checks; the second captures integration outcomes. Both surveys were administered via *e-Boks*, Denmark's secure digital mailbox, with response options in Ukrainian and Russian. Repeated items were kept identical across waves to ensure comparability. Survey responses were linked to the administrative registers, and we apply nonresponse weights.

For the Ministry's survey (drawn September 18, 2022), Statistics Denmark targeted individuals admitted under the Special Act, aged at least 18, and resident in Denmark on that date. For DARECO wave 2 (drawn July 1, 2023), the frame comprised Ukrainian citizens who immigrated on/after February 24, 2022, had not emigrated by July 1, 2023, and were at least 18 years old as of February 1, 2023.

Response rates were 44% (Ministry survey) and 41% (DARECO wave 2) (Table A.5). Overlap with our trailblazer population is substantial with 92% of our trailblazer sample got an invite to the ministry, and nearly everybody got invited for the DARECO wave 2. Response rates in trailblazers are a little above the general response rates (Ministry: 46%; DARECO wave 2: 42%). Balance checks indicate close alignment with population distributions on key demographics (See Figure A.3). For survey-based outcomes, sample sizes vary by item; approximately 3,200 trailblazers provided complete responses in the DARECO wave 2 follow-up.

Table A.3 lists the individual survey questions used in our analysis, while Table A.6 details how these questions were combined into outcome variables. The survey indices presented in Figure 5 are constructed according to the coding scheme outlined in Table A.6. The first column of that table defines each survey index, the second column specifies the corresponding survey question answered by respondents, the third column lists the available response categories (respondents saw descriptive labels, not the numerical codes shown, which generally follows standard Likert-scale conventions), and the fourth column describes how these Likert-scale responses were transformed into normalized values.

Each survey index is calculated as the mean of the normalized responses for all survey items included within that index. In cases where a respondent did not provide an answer to a particular item, the index is

computed as the average of the remaining available items for that respondent.

To verify the robustness of our index construction, we also conducted a polychoric principal component analysis of the underlying survey items. The loadings from the first polychoric component confirmed that all items within a given index load in the same conceptual direction, supporting validity of our measure.

A.4 Classification of Accommodation Types

We classify each trailblazer's accommodation type from their initial accommodation (lasting at least seven days) using building records, address histories, and pre/post-arrival co-residence patterns. Our focus is on the three dominant arrangements during the Ukrainian crisis: conventional *public housing*, public *pop-up* housing, and *private hosting*.

Public refugee housing: assigned when the initial address is a public-housing unit or publicly owned dwelling and either (i) all prior residents vacated before the refugee moved in or (ii) remaining residents moved out while Ukrainians were in residence. We allow for some overlap if refugees are co-residing with other residents for a brief period. This category correspond to established reception facilities in Denmark that at any point in time can be utilized to host refugees.²

Pop-up housing: assigned when the initial address appears in the registers in 2022, but did not appear in 2021, and no resident were registered living at the address. This is due to one of two reasons: (i) the dwelling did not exist in the housing stock previous to the to displacement crisis of Ukrainians. This captures new facilities, such as container-housing that "pop-up" in the given municipality, or repurposed buildings not previously suited or used for permanent residence, such as hotels where residents likely will not have their official residency address registered. There is also the possibility of it simply being new "regular" housing that was not built before 2022, and Ukrainians were the first tenants. Or (ii) the dwelling did not have a permanent resident in 2021, but had in previous years, but due to shortage of demand for that unit it was not utilized in 2021. Pop-up housing as a category captures how the housing stock in use expands as a result of accommodating refugees.

Private hosting: assigned when the refugee moves into an address already occupied by at least one resident who remains throughout the refugee's stay. We additionally require that the host (i) is officially registered at the address on February 24, 2022, and (ii) appears in the population register by end-2021. These restrictions reduce the risk of misclassifying contemporaneous migrants as hosts and ensure that we capture pre-existing local residents who provide civic buffer capacity during the crisis. There are several reasons to believe that we correctly identify cases of private hosting. (i) When refugees register their address with the authorities, the owner of the dwelling receives a notification through Digital Post (the secure digital communication channel between citizens and public authorities) informing them that someone has registered an address at their property, and they are asked to confirm this. (ii) We restrict private hosts to those who are recorded as residing at the same address for the entire duration of the refugee's stay, which minimizes the risk of overlap due to delayed address updates. (iii) In Denmark, keeping one's official address up to date is generally incentivized, as it affects access to general practitioners, schooling, housing subsidies, and other public services.

Note that we do not observe the specific nature of the hosting arrangements—whether refugees stay free of charge, pay rent, or compensate hosts through household production. Likewise, if a refugee is registered at a different address (for instance, a neighboring dwelling) but interacts closely with a local host, such cases are not captured. Conversely, if individuals share an address but have limited interaction—such as when refugees subrent separate units on the same address, or a basement—these situations are still classified as private hosting.

²Note that we refer to the Danish non-profit housing sector (almen boligsektor) as "public," even though it is not legally part of the public sector. Municipalities hold allocation rights for a share of vacant units, which they can assign to households in urgent need; they also cover the rent—directly if the unit is empty, or indirectly through the allocated tenants. The remaining units are distributed through waiting lists. The sector's finances operate as a closed system administered by the National Building Fund (Landsbyggefonden); see Billings, Hoekstra, and Rotger (2024) for details.

B Descriptive Statistics

Table A.7 reports descriptive statistics on arrival characteristics for our trailblazer sample, both overall and by initial accommodation type. Panel A presents register-based covariates that enter our regression analyses. Given the richness of the administrative data, we restrict attention to information plausibly available to authorities, municipalities, private hosts, or landlords at the pre-treatment stage—namely, basic demographics at move-in. Panel B draws on the Ministry's survey (see section above) to provide descriptive evidence on self-reported pre-displacement socioeconomic status in Ukraine.

Descriptive statistics for all outcomes appear in Table A.8. Although our regressions use monthly data from months 1–18 after arrival, we report a concise set of summary statistics at months 1, 12, and 18. Panel A covers migration-related outcomes—out-migration rates, duration in the initial accommodation, and the number of residential moves over the period—and our core labor-market measures: employment (any paid work), earnings conditional on employment, and receipt of public transfers. Panel B reports psychological and navigational integration outcomes from the DARECO wave-2 survey, including symptoms of depression, PTSD symptoms, intentions to stay, self-assessed Danish language skills, and perceived economic stability. See the preceding section for details on the construction of survey items.

C Additional Results

Geographic distribution of refugees: The left panel of Figure A.2(a) maps the municipal distribution of Ukrainian arrivals. The four largest cities—Copenhagen, Aarhus, Odense, and Aalborg—received the highest absolute numbers, while rural municipalities across Denmark also received arrivals, albeit in smaller counts. The right panel of Figure A.2(b) scales by population and shows that per-capita arrival rates were highest in more rural areas. Overall, arrivals per capita were fairly evenly distributed across the country, reflecting adherence to the proportional allocation key.

Figure A.1 documents the strong correspondence between actual settlement patterns and the prescribed municipal quotas. The prescribed allocations derive from an orientation letter issued by the DIS (within the Ministry of Immigration and Integration) immediately after enactment of the Special Act. Under this key, each municipality's target share is proportional to its population, with an adjustment subtracting its stock/share of non-Western immigrants. We are able to replicate the key using administrative data. For the line of best fit in Figure A.1, we estimate we estimate a simple regression of

Share of trailblazer sample_m = $\beta_0 + \beta_1$ share prescribed by dispersal key_m + ϵ_m

And obtain the following estimates, with coefficients reported and confidence intervals in parentheses. For both regression models we get a R^2 of 0.86. Notably, when excluding Copenhagen, the intercept is

Model	$\hat{oldsymbol{eta}}_0$	$\hat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}_1$
Line of best fit	-0.217 (95% CI: -0.352, -0.081)	1.209 (95% CI: 1.109, 1.310)
Line of best fit, excl. Copenhagen	-0.013 (95% CI: -0.115, 0.090)	0.978 (95% CI: 0.894, 1.061)

not significantly different from zero, and we cannot reject the null of a slope of 1.

Table A.1 reports balance checks comparing descriptive statistics for refugees across the five main regions of Denmark. The characteristics of refugees are very similar across regions, which is consistent with limited self-selection into municipalities and the central allocation of refugees to municipalities.

Balance checks: Figure A.3, presents balance checks where we regress pretreatment characteristics on accommodation types and fixed effects for arrival month, municipality, and also the sociodemographic controls from Panel A of Table A.7. We find that conditional on arrival timing, municipality, and sociodemographic controls, pretreatment characteristics are closely aligned across the three accommodation types, consistent with as-if random assignment at the margin driven by contemporaneous capacity constraints.

Effect of initial accommodation on outmigration: Table A.9 reports regression estimates of the effects of private hosting and pop-up housing—relative to conventional public housing—on outmigration, residency duration, and residency switches. Monthly estimates are shown in Figure A.4. Largely, there are no differences in migration-related outcomes, besides a larger migration of privately hosted in the first quarter (2.4%-points), and pop-up housing in the sixth quarter (3.4%-points), compared to conventional public housing.

Effect of initial accommodation on economic integration: Table A.10 reports regression estimates of the effects of private hosting and pop-up housing—relative to conventional public housing—on economic integration, measured by employment, log earnings (conditional on employment), and transfer recipiency. Monthly estimates are shown in Figure 4. We see an employment surplus for the privately hosted initially (10.2%-points), which converges to conventional public housing over the time horizon of analysis. Private hosts are also off to a better start initially in terms of earnings for the employed (16.6% in the 1st quarter), but this effect persists over the 18 months analysis window (6.2% in the 6th quarter). Privately hosted are additionally less reliant of public transfers (-17.3%-points in the 1st quarter, and 11.6%-points in the 6th quarter). In general, we see no discernible differences between pop-up housing and conventional public housing.

Effect of initial accommodation on psychological and navigational integration: Table A.18 and Figure 5 reports regression estimates of the effects of private hosting and pop-up housing—relative to conventional public housing—on social, psychological, and navigational integration. For the privately hosted relative to conventional public housing, we see decreased self-reported symptoms of depression (-0.028), decreased self-reported PTSD symptoms (-0.028), less feeling of loneliness (0.051), larger sense of economic stability (0.046), patterns of less concerns about family's well-being in Denmark (0.019), less concerns about getting access to necessary health care (0.047), and interestingly, lower reported self-assessment of danish language skills (-0.021). All of these indicate a softer landing in Denmark, with higher psychological and navigational integration outcomes for the privately hosted. In general, we find no differences in outcomes across pop-up and conventional public housing, besides less feeling of loneliness (0.033), which can be rationalized since many accommodated in pop-up housing live among a large number of co-nationals.

Effect of initial accommodation on enrollment in Danish language classes: Figure A.9 reports effects of initial accommodation type on monthly enrollment in Danish language classes. Privately hosted refugees are about 10 percentage points less likely to enroll between months 3 and 9 after arrival (relative to those in conventional public housing), helping to explain the survey-based differences in self-assessed Danish skills.

Accounting for attrition: Tables A.11 and A.19 replicate the estimated effects of initial accommodation on (i) economic integration and (ii) social, psychological, and navigational integration while controlling for attrition via inverse probability weights (IPWs). The IPWs are obtained in a first stage using a logit model for being observed at follow-up, conditional on our covariates and fixed effects. The findings are robust to this correction. This is consistent with the fact that attrition is similar across accommodation types.

Unbalanced and balanced samples, covariates, interacted fixed effects: Tables A.12, A.13, and A.14 replicate the estimated effects of initial accommodation on economic integration using additional robustness checks. Panel A reports results for the unbalanced panel under three specifications: (i) no covariates, (ii) with covariates plus municipality and month-of-arrival fixed effects, and (iii) with covariates plus arrival-month-by-municipality fixed effects (interacted FEs). The last specification is particularly stringent, as identification comes only from variation among refugees in the same municipality and arrival month. Panel B presents the analogous specifications for the balanced panel. Results are robust across these specifications.

Excluding larger municipalities: Tables A.15, A.16, and A.17 re-estimate the effects of initial accommodation on economic integration while sequentially excluding the largest municipalities (ranked by population density or by the inflow of Ukrainian refugees). Results are robust across these exclusion rules, with one exception: the effect on log earnings conditional on employment is no longer statistically significant when the municipalities with the largest refugee inflows are excluded.

Sensitivity to unobserved confounding: We assess how sensitive our estimates are to potential omitted-variable bias following the approach of Cinelli and Hazlett 2020. In this analysis, we ask how strongly, conditional on the observed covariates and the arrival- and municipality-by-arrival fixed effects, an unobserved confounder would have to be correlated with both the treatment (private hosting) and the outcome (employment in the first quarter after arrival, as in column (1) of Table A.10) in order to overturn our results. The results of this sensitivity analysis are shown in Figure A.10.

To benchmark the strength of a plausible unobserved confounder, we compute the partial R^2 of each observed covariate with respect to both treatment and outcome, and identify the "most powerful" observed confounders as those that jointly explain the most variation in D and Y. In our data, the strongest observed confounder is the dummy for the fourth age quintile (ages 44–57), second-most is having a family size four of larger, and third-most is the male dummy. We present results for the first, due to its placement, and third due to its interpretability. We find that, in order to eliminate our estimated effect of a 10.2 percentage point increase in employment due to private hosting, an unobserved confounder would have to be more than forty times as influential as our most powerful observed covariate, or equivalently more than forty times as influential as the male dummy. Given the rich set of controls and the strong balance documented in Table A.7 and Figure A.3, such an omitted variable appears implausible, which suggests that our results are robust to unobserved confounding.

Subgroup effects on economic integration: Figures A.5, A.6, and A.7 re-estimate the effects of initial accommodation on employment, public transfers, and log earnings across subsamples stratified by sex, age (18–37 vs. 37–57), and family status (singleton vs. non-singleton). We find little systematic heterogeneity across these splits. The main exception is a larger employment advantage for men in private hosting. Signs are consistent and effect sizes are broadly similar across groups.


Subgroup effects on psychological and navigational integration: Figure A.8 re-estimates effects across subsamples by sex, age (18–37 vs. 37–57), and family status (singleton vs. non-singleton). We find little systematic heterogeneity; signs are consistent and magnitudes similar across groups. One notable exception is that among younger adults (18–37 at arrival), reported stay intention is lower in pop-up housing. Given qualitative reports of tight quarters, shared facilities, and limited privacy in some container sites, this pattern is plausibly consistent with dissatisfaction with accommodation conditions.

Job-quality and industry-ladder: Table A.20 examines whether initial accommodation is associated with higher job quality in the labor market, proxied by individuals' placement on the industry-ladder. We observe that privately hosted individuals enter the labor market in higher-ranked industries relative to those in conventional public housing. At entry, private hosting is associated with a 0.033 increase in industry-rank (95% CI: 0.006–0.060). Privately hosted individuals also enter the labor market faster, taking 1.071 fewer months after arrival to obtain employment (95% CI: –1.504 to –0.638). Six quarters after arrival and conditional on employment, they continue to be employed in higher-ranked industries, with an industry-rank difference of 0.045 (95% CI: 0.018–0.072). We find similar patterns, but roughly half the magnitude for pop-up housing relative to public housing.

To compute the industry-ladder measure, we group observed industries into the 86-level NACE aggregation, next we rank industries by their average hourly wage observed in 2021, and after normalize the resulting ranking to the unit interval. While occupational codes would offer a more direct job-quality measure, approximately 35% of observations lack occupation information. We therefore rely on industry information, which is available for all formally employed individuals.

Appendix Figures

Figure A.1: Correlation between prescribed municipal shares (dispersal key) and actual settlements of Ukrainian refugees



Notes: The figure shows the municipal-level correlation between the share of Ukrainian refugees each municipality was prescribed to take in per the March 17, 2022 orientation letter (Danish Immigration Service 2022b) and the actual settlements observed in our data. The dispersal key, described in the Ministerial Order of March 16, 2022 (Ministry of Immigration and Integration 2022a), is approximately equal to the municipality's share of Denmark's population minus its share of non-Western immigrants. We are able to replicate the dispersal key. 96 of the 98 municipalities are shown. 2 are excluded from the graph since they received below 5 Ukrainian refugees.

1000 0.0040 0.0035 800 0.0030 0.0025 600 0.0020 400 0.0015 0.0010 200 0.0005 0.0000 (a) Number of arrivals (b) Arrivals as a share of municipal population

Figure A.2: Geographic distribution of Ukrainian arrivals

Notes: Panels (a) and (b) depict, respectively, the absolute number of Ukrainian arrivals and arrivals as a share of municipal population. Population shares use end-2021 municipal population counts.

Pop-up housing Private hosting None/missing English proficiency Flementary Conversational Fluent/professional Activity status No formal job Retired Studying Working Primary or lower Secondary Vocational Short tertiary Long tertiary -.2 -.2 -.1

Figure A.3: Balance of Socioeconomic Covariates Across Initial Accommodation Types

Notes: The figure plots coefficients from bivariate regressions of each covariate on indicators for pop-up housing and private hosting, with conventional public housing as the omitted reference category. 95-percent confidence intervals are shown as error bars. All regressions control for the demographic covariates reported in Panel A of Table A.7; the covariates examined are listed in Panel B of Table A.7. Circles show estimates for the full 2022 trailblazer sample, squares for trailblazers arriving in the first four months after the full-scale invasion, and triangles for the latter sample when additionally controlling for municipality and month-of-migration fixed effects.

Restrict to early arrivals


Estimates (95% CI)

▲ + Fixed Effects

Estimates (95% CI)


2022 sample

Figure A.4: Effect of initial accommodation on outmigration, secondary migration, and residential switches




Notes: Each panel presents monthly cross-sectional regressions of migration outcomes on indicators for initial residence in pop-up housing or private hosting, with conventional public housing as the omitted reference category. All models include the covariates listed in Panel A of Table A.7, as well as municipality and month-of-arrival fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level, and 95% confidence intervals are shown as error bars. Panel (a) corresponds to columns (1)–(2) of Table A.9, Panel (b) to columns (3)–(4), and Panel (c) to column (6).

Figure A.5: Heterogeneity in effects of initial accommodation on employment




Notes: Each panel reports monthly cross-sectional regressions of employment on indicators for initial residence in pop-up housing or private hosting, with conventional public housing as the omitted reference category. All models include the covariates listed in Panel A of Table A.7, plus municipality and month-of-arrival fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level, and 95% confidence intervals are shown as error bars. This figure corresponds to the employment panel of Figure 4.

Figure A.6: Heterogeneity in effects of initial accommodation on log earnings




Notes: Each panel presents monthly cross-sectional regressions of log earnings (conditional on employment) on indicators for initial residence in pop-up housing or private hosting, with conventional public housing as the omitted reference category. All models include the covariates listed in Panel A of Table A.7, as well as municipality and month-of-arrival fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level, and 95% confidence intervals are displayed as error bars. This figure corresponds to the log-earnings panel of Figure 4.

Figure A.7: Heterogeneity in effects of initial accommodation on public-transfer receipt



Notes: Each panel presents monthly cross-sectional regressions of an indicator for public-transfer receipt on indicators for initial residence in pop-up housing or private hosting, with conventional public housing as the omitted reference category. All models include the covariates listed in Panel A of Table A.7, as well as municipality and month-of-arrival fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level, and 95% confidence intervals are displayed as error bars. This figure corresponds to the transfer panel of Figure 4.

Figure A.8: Heterogeneity in effects of initial accommodation on psychological and navigational integration



Notes: Each panel reports regression coefficients for survey-based indices of psychological and navigational integration measured roughly six quarters after arrival. Coefficients are estimated from regressions on indicators for initial residence in pop-up housing or private hosting, with conventional public housing as the omitted reference category. All models include the covariates listed in Panel A of Table A.7, as well as municipality and month-of-arrival fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level, and 95% confidence intervals are shown as error bars. Reported means refer to the omitted reference group (conventional public housing). For details on the construction of survey indices, see the Appendix. This figure corresponds to Figure 5.

Figure A.9: Effect of initial accommodation on enrollment in Danish language classes

Notes: The figure presents monthly cross-sectional regressions of enrollment in Danish language classes on indicators for initial residence in pop-up housing or private hosting, with conventional public housing as the omitted reference category. All models include the covariates listed in Panel A of Table A.7, as well as municipality and month-of-arrival fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level, and 95% confidence intervals are shown as error bars.

Private hosting

Pop-up housing




Figure A.10: Sensitivity analysis of private hosting on employment in the first quarter after arrival

Notes: Panels (a) and (b) report sensitivity analyses following Cinelli and Hazlett 2020. The baseline estimate of the effect of private hosting on employment is 0.102 (Table A.10). Contour lines display the treatment effect that would be obtained if an unobserved confounder with given partial R^2 values for the treatment and outcome was included, conditional on the observed baseline covariates and arrival-month and municipality fixed effects. The red dashed line marks the combinations of partial R^2 values required for an unobserved confounder to attenuate the treatment effect to zero. In panel (a), benchmarked against the most influential observed covariate—the fourth—age—quintile indicator—an omitted variable would need to be more than forty times as influential to fully explain away the estimate. Panel (b) shows the analogous comparison using the male indicator, the third most influential observed covariate. Across both panels, the degree of confounding required to overturn the estimate substantially exceeds that of any observed covariate.

Appendix Tables

Table A.1: Summary statistics of refugees by administrative region (NUTS2)

	(1) North Jutland	(2) Central Denmark	(3) Southern Denmark	(4) Capital Region	(5) Zealand
	Panel A: Admin			Region	
Demography variables					
Age, 18-29	0.198 (0.399)	0.186 (0.390)	0.168 (0.374)	0.160 (0.367)	0.163 (0.370)
Age, 29-37	0.215 (0.411)	0.221 (0.415)	0.238 (0.426)	0.213 (0.410)	0.216 (0.411)
A ~ 27 44					
Age, 37-44	0.195 (0.397)	0.199 (0.399)	0.203 (0.402)	0.202 (0.401)	0.224 (0.417)
Age, 44-57	0.191 (0.393)	0.188 (0.391)	0.182 (0.386)	0.208 (0.406)	0.188 (0.391)
Age, 57+	0.200	0.205	0.210	0.217	0.209
	(0.400)	(0.404)	(0.408)	(0.412)	(0.407)
Male	0.141 (0.348)	0.140 (0.347)	0.150 (0.357)	0.180 (0.384)	0.199 (0.399)
Country of origin, Ukraine	0.964 (0.187)	0.956 (0.204)	0.952 (0.213)	0.928 (0.258)	0.937 (0.243)
Family variables	(0.107)	(0.201)	(0.213)	(0.230)	(0.213)
1 person in family	0.431 (0.495)	0.438 (0.496)	0.435 (0.496)	0.497 (0.500)	0.454 (0.498)
2 person in family	0.294	0.312	0.300	0.276	0.274
	(0.456)	(0.463)	(0.458)	(0.447)	(0.446)
3 person in family	0.198 (0.399)	0.179 (0.384)	0.194 (0.395)	0.147 (0.354)	0.182 (0.386)
4+ person in family	0.077	0.071	0.072	0.080	0.090
	(0.267)	(0.257)	(0.258)	(0.271)	(0.287)
1 child in family	0.269 (0.444)	0.280 (0.449)	0.282 (0.450)	0.254 (0.435)	0.260 (0.439)
2+ child in family	0.215	0.196	0.199	0.165	0.196
1	(0.411)	(0.397)	(0.399)	(0.371)	(0.397)
1+ senior in family	0.044 (0.205)	0.057 (0.231)	0.056 (0.230)	0.049 (0.217)	0.044 (0.204)
N Share of sample	1188 0.115	2596 0.251	2291 0.221	2878 0.278	1396 0.135
Panel B:	Ministry of Immigra	tion and Inte	gration Surve	y	
English proficiency					
None/missing	0.226 (0.419)	0.247 (0.431)	0.229 (0.420)	0.183 (0.387)	0.197 (0.398)
Elementary	0.520	0.494	0.502	0.457	0.494
	(0.500)	(0.500)	(0.500)	(0.498)	(0.500)
Conversational	0.176 (0.381)	0.199 (0.399)	0.196 (0.397)	0.240 (0.427)	0.230 (0.421)
Fluent/professional	0.078 (0.268)	0.060 (0.238)	0.073 (0.261)	0.121 (0.326)	0.080 (0.271)
Activity status	(0.200)	(0.200)	(0.201)	(0.520)	(0.271)
No formal job	0.128 (0.334)	0.125 (0.331)	0.111 (0.314)	0.107 (0.309)	0.117 (0.322)
Retired	0.094	0.086	0.103	0.096	0.074
	(0.293)	(0.281)	(0.304)	(0.295)	(0.262)
Studying	0.036 (0.186)	0.042 (0.201)	0.034 (0.181)	0.033 (0.179)	0.032 (0.175)
Working	0.742	0.746	0.752	0.764	0.777
Educational attainment	(0.438)	(0.435)	(0.432)	(0.425)	(0.416)
Primary or lower	0.042	0.039	0.054	0.034	0.071
	(0.201)	(0.195)	(0.227)	(0.181)	(0.256)
Secondary	0.086 (0.281)	0.064 (0.245)	0.095 (0.293)	0.066 (0.248)	0.083 (0.277)
Vocational	0.134	0.171	0.152	0.154	0.152
Short tertiary	(0.341) 0.203	(0.377) 0.203	(0.359) 0.189	(0.361) 0.204	(0.359)
	(0.403)	(0.403)	(0.392)	(0.403)	(0.416)
Long tertiary	0.405 (0.491)	0.383 (0.486)	0.401 (0.490)	0.432	0.340 (0.474)
N	477	1191	940	(0.495)	539
Share of sample	0.103	0.258	0.203	0.320	0.117

Notes: Table presents summary statistics for our sample. Cells presents means and standard deviations in parentheses. Panel A presents covariates found in register data, whereas panel B presents covariates for the subsample, that answered the UIM survey. If trailblazer is a singleton family, then family covariates are left missing and therefore does not affect estimated means.

 Table A.2: Register data sources

Register	Content	Description
VNDS	Immigration	Records international in- and out-migration to/from Denmark
BEF	Demographics an population	d Core demographics (sex, age), address IDs, family links
BEFBOP	Residency spells	Histories of who lived where and when, incl. initial residence of refugees
BEFADR	Address register	Address information and identifiers used to link across registers
BBR_enh	Buildings an	d Link from BEFADR to BBR unit records
	dwellings-unit	
	link	
BBREnhed	Buildings an	d Dwelling characteristics (e.g., ownership type)
	dwellings-unit	
	info	
BFL	Employment	Job-related income and industry codes
DREAM	Public transfers	Weekly information on public-benefit receipt
Danskundervisnings-	Danish languag	e Enrollment in Danish language education
databasen	classes	

Table A.3: Variable list

Variable	Source	Description
	Panel A	: Treatment status variables
Public housing	Register	Indicator for living in public housing or publicly-owned accommodation as initial accommodation.
Pop-up housing	Register	Indicator for living in pop-up accommodation as initial accommodation.
Private hosting	Register	Indicator for living with other non-refugee family residents on the same address as initial accommodation.
	Pan	el B : Outcome variables
Outmigration	Register	Indicator for having outmigrated at follow-up.
Any migration (out- or internal)	Register	Indicator for having outmigrated or changed address of residency internally in Denmark at follow-up.
Duration	Register	Days living at the given accommodation. For those not moving in the first 18 months, we replace missing with 540 days.
Residency switches	Register	Count of how many address switches that has been observed, either outmigration or internally, at follow-up.
Employment	Register	Indicator for being in employment and having positive labor market earnings at follow-up.
Log-earnings	Register	Log-values of labor market earnings, for the employed, at follow-up.
Receipt of public transfers	Register	Indicator for being recipient of public transfers at follow-up.
Depression score, Normalized	DARECO2	Survey indice, ranging 0 to 1, that captures then intensity of self-reported symptoms associated with Depression. original scale goes from 0 to 24. Based on PHQ-8.
PTSD score, Normalized	DARECO2	Survey indice, ranging 0 to 1, that captures the intensity of self-reported symptoms associated with PTSD. Original scale goes from 0 to 24. Based on the ITQ.
Not feeling lonely	DARECO2	Survey indice, ranging from 0 to 1, that captures if the respondent does
Economic stability	DARECO2	not have feelings of loneliness. Survey indice, ranging from 0 to 1, that captures feelings of economic stability for the respondent.
Family's well-being in UKR	DARECO2	Survey indice, ranging from 0 to 1, that captures if the person is not worried about the well-being of family in Ukraine.
Family's well-being in DK	DARECO2	
Stay intention	DARECO2	
Access to care	DARECO2	Survey indice, ranging from 0 to 1, that captures individuals assessment of ease of access to health care services.

	C	ontinuation of table A.3
Variable	Source	Description
Danish institutional trust	DARECO2	Survey indice, ranging from 0 to 1, that captures how much trust the
	5.55604	respondent has in danish public institutions.
Danish skills	DARECO2	Survey indice, ranging from 0 to 1, that captures the respondents self-
Enrollment into Danish Class	Dogistor	assessment of danish skills. Indicator for ever been enrolled into a Danish language class.
Emonment into Danish Class	Register	
		Panel C : Covariates
Age, 18-29	Register	Indicator for being between 18 and 29 years of age at point of in- migration.
Age, 29-37	Register	Indicator for being between 29 and 37 years of age at point of in-
1180, 27 07	register	migration.
Age, 37-44	Register	Indicator for being between 37 and 44 years of age at point of in-
_	_	migration.
Age, 44-57	Register	Indicator for being between 44 and 57 years of age at point of in-
		migration.
Age, 57+	Register	Indicator for being above 57 years of age at point of in-migration.
Male	Register	Indicator for being registered as a male.
Country of origin, Ukraine	Register	Indicator for Ukraine being country of origin.
1 person in family	Register	Indicator for being 1 person in family (singleton).
2 person in family	Register	Indicator for being 2 persons in family.
3 person in family	Register	Indicator for being 3 persons in family.
4+ person in family	Register	Indicator for being 4+ persons in family.
1 child in family	Register	Indicator for having 1 child in family.
2+ child in family	Register	Indicator for having 2+ child in family.
1+ senior in family	Register	Indicator for having 1+ seniors in family.
English Proficiency:	_	
None/Missing	Ministry Survey	Indicator for respondents self-assessment of english skill is "None/Missing".
Elementary	Ministry	Indicator for respondents self-assessment of english skill is "Elemen-
	Survey	tary".
Conversational	Ministry	Indicator for respondents self-assessment of english skill is "Conversa-
	Survey	tional".
Fluent/professional	Ministry	Indicator for respondents self-assessment of english skill is "Flu-
	Survey	ent/Professional".
Activity status:		
No formal job	Ministry	Indicator for respondents self-reported primary activity prior to migrat-
	Survey	ing was "No formal job".
Retired	Ministry	Indicator for respondents self-reported primary activity prior to migrat-
	Survey	ing was "Retired".
Studying	Ministry	Indicator for respondents self-reported primary activity prior to migrat-
	Survey	ing was "Studying".
Working	Ministry	Indicator for respondents self-reported primary activity prior to migrat-
	Survey	ing was "Working".
Educational attainment:		
Primary or lower	Ministry	Indicator for respondents self-reported educational attainment is pri-
	Survey	mary school or lower.
Secondary	Ministry	Indicator for respondents self-reported educational attainment is equal
	Survey	to upper-secondary, high school equivalent.
Vocational	Ministry	Indicator for respondents self-reported educational attainment is voca-
	Survey	tional.
Short tertiary	Ministry	Indicator for respondents self-reported educational attainment is junior-
	Survey	specialist level or bachelors degree.
Long tertiary	Ministry	Indicator for respondents self-reported educational attainment is equal
	Survey	to a masters degree or higher.

 Table A.4: Sample Selection Procedure

Sample criteria	Count	Percent
Ukrainian refugees Merge immigrations (VNDS) to permits (OPHG) such that for each immigration spell there we have the corresponding permit assigned to it. This includes non-refugees.		
entered Denmark after February 24, 2022	200,519	1.0
can be found in BEF (effectively excluding very short stays) either Ukrainian citizens, immigrated from Urkaine (VNDS), Ukraine as country of origin (opr_land in BEF), or special law permit.	198,855 38,857	0.99 0.19
For who had date of entry in 2022	30,925	1.00
and has an accommodation that lasted atleast 7 days	30,784	1.00
who are trailblazer migrants	16,400	0.53
and did not have an immigration record with or family in Denmark	15,243	0.49
and arrived in the first 4 months	11,438	0.37
and did not live in private accommodation as initial accommodation	10,349	0.34

Table A.5: Survey Response Rates

Survey	N invited	% started	% full responses
	Panel .	A : Survey ta	rget population
Ministry of Immigration and Integration	17,175	45.64%	43.77%
DARECO wave 2	16,916	45.00%	40.78%
	Panel B:	Sample of an	alysis - trailblazers
Ministry of Immigration and Integration	9,578	48.29%	46.39%
DARECO wave 2	7,599	46.48%	42.36%

Table A.6: Mapping of survey items to indices and normalization scheme

Survey index	Survey item	Answer categories	Normalized values
Depression score,	Over the last 2 weeks, how often have	0 = Not at all	$0 \to 0.00$
normalized	you been bothered by any of the follow-	1 = Several days	$1 \to 0.33$
	ing problems?: Little interest or pleasure	2 = More than half the days	$2 \to 0.66$
	in doing things.	3 = Nearly every day	$3 \rightarrow 1.00$
	Over the last 2 weeks, how often have	0 = Not at all	$0 \rightarrow 0.00$
	you been bothered by any of the follow-	1 = Several days	$1 \rightarrow 0.33$
	ing problems?: Feeling down, depressed,	2 = More than half the days	$2 \rightarrow 0.66$
	or hopeless.	3 = Nearly every day	$3 \rightarrow 1.00$
	Over the last 2 weeks, how often have	0 = Not at all	$0 \rightarrow 0.00$
	you been bothered by any of the follow-	1 = Several days	$1 \rightarrow 0.33$
	ing problems?: Trouble falling or staying	2 = More than half the days	$2 \rightarrow 0.66$
	asleep, or sleeping too much.	3 = Nearly every day	$3 \rightarrow 1.00$
	Over the last 2 weeks, how often have	0 = Not at all	$0 \rightarrow 0.00$
	you been bothered by any of the follow-	1 = Several days	$1 \rightarrow 0.33$
	ing problems?: Feeling tired or having	2 = More than half the days	$2 \rightarrow 0.66$
	little energy.	3 = Nearly every day	$3 \rightarrow 1.00$
	Over the last 2 weeks, how often have	0 = Not at all	$0 \rightarrow 0.00$
	you been bothered by any of the follow-	1 = Several days	$1 \rightarrow 0.33$
	ing problems?: Poor appetite or overeat-	2 = More than half the days	$2 \rightarrow 0.66$
	ing.	3 = Nearly every day	$3 \rightarrow 1.00$

Survey index	Survey item	Answer categories	Normalized values
	Over the last 2 weeks, how often have	0 = Not at all	$0 \to 0.00$
	you been bothered by any of the follow-	1 = Several days	$1 \rightarrow 0.33$
	ing problems?: Feeling bad about your-	2 = More than half the days	$2 \rightarrow 0.66$
	self — or that you are a failure or have let yourself or your family down.	3 = Nearly every day	$3 \rightarrow 1.00$
	Over the last 2 weeks, how often have	0 = Not at all	$0 \rightarrow 0.00$
	you been bothered by any of the follow-	1 = Several days	$1 \rightarrow 0.33$
	ing problems?: Trouble concentrating on things, such as reading the newspaper or watching television.	2 = More than half the days 3 = Nearly every day	$2 \rightarrow 0.66$ $3 \rightarrow 1.00$
	Over the last 2 weeks, how often have	0 = Not at all	$0 \rightarrow 0.00$
	you been bothered by any of the follow-	1 = Several days	$1 \rightarrow 0.33$
	ing problems?: Moving or speaking so	2 = More than half the days	$2 \to 0.66$
	slowly that other people could have noticed? Or the opposite — being so fidgety or restless that you have been moving around a lot more than usual.	3 = Nearly every day	3 → 1.00
PTSD score,	Keeping your worst traumatic event in	0 = Not at all	$0 \to 0.00$
normalized	mind, please read each item carefully,	1 = A little Bit	$1 \rightarrow 0.25$
	then circle one of the numbers to the	2 = Moderately	$2 \rightarrow 0.50$
	right to indicate how much you have	3 = Quite a bit	$3 \rightarrow 0.75$
	been bothered by that problem in the past month.: Having upsetting dreams that re- play part of the experience or are clearly related to the experience?	4 = Extremely	4 → 1.00
	Keeping your worst traumatic event in	0 = Not at all	$0 \rightarrow 0.00$
	mind, please read each item carefully,	1 = A little Bit	$1 \rightarrow 0.25$
	then circle one of the numbers to the	2 = Moderately	$2 \rightarrow 0.50$
	right to indicate how much you have been bothered by that problem in the past month.: Having powerful images or memories that sometimes come into your mind in which you feel the experience is happening again in the here and now?	3 = Quite a bit 4 = Extremely	$3 \rightarrow 0.75$ $4 \rightarrow 1.00$
	Keeping your worst traumatic event in	0 = Not at all	$0 \rightarrow 0.00$
	mind, please read each item carefully,	1 = A little Bit	$0 \rightarrow 0.00$ $1 \rightarrow 0.25$
	then circle one of the numbers to the	2 = Moderately	$2 \rightarrow 0.50$
	right to indicate how much you have	3 = Quite a bit	$3 \rightarrow 0.75$
	been bothered by that problem in the past month.: Avoiding internal reminders of the experience (for example, thoughts, feelings, or physical sensations)?	4 = Extremely	4 → 1.00
	Keeping your worst traumatic event in	0 = Not at all	$0 \rightarrow 0.00$
	mind, please read each item carefully,	1 = A little Bit	$1 \rightarrow 0.25$
	then circle one of the numbers to the	2 = Moderately	$2 \rightarrow 0.50$
	right to indicate how much you have	3 = Quite a bit	$3 \rightarrow 0.75$
	been bothered by that problem in the past month.: Avoiding external reminders of the stressful experience (for example, people, places, conversations, activities,	4 = Extremely	$4 \rightarrow 1.00$

Survey index	Survey item	Answer categories	Normalized
			values
	Keeping your worst traumatic event in	0 = Not at all	$0 \to 0.00$
	mind, please read each item carefully,	1 = A little Bit	$1 \to 0.25$
	then circle one of the numbers to the	2 = Moderately	$2 \to 0.50$
	right to indicate how much you have	3 = Quite a bit	$3 \to 0.75$
	been bothered by that problem in the past month.: Being "superalert" or watchful or on guard?	4 = Extremely	$4 \rightarrow 1.00$
	Keeping your worst traumatic event in	0 = Not at all	$0 \rightarrow 0.00$
	mind, please read each item carefully,	1 = A little Bit	$1 \to 0.25$
	then circle one of the numbers to the	2 = Moderately	$2 \to 0.50$
	right to indicate how much you have	3 = Quite a bit	$3 \to 0.75$
	been bothered by that problem in the past month.: Feeling jumpy or easily startled?	4 = Extremely	4 → 1.00
Economic stability	Please rate the following statements by	1 = No problem	1 → 1.00
	telling me how much of a problem it is	2 = A little problem	$2 \rightarrow 0.75$
	in your daily life: Conflicts with social	3 = Somewhat of a problem	$3 \rightarrow 0.50$
	services	4 = A fairly big problem	$4 \rightarrow 0.25$
	Services	5 = Serious problem	$5 \rightarrow 0.00$
	Please rate the following statements by	1 = No problem	$1 \rightarrow 1.00$
	telling me how much of a problem it is	2 = A little problem	$2 \to 0.75$
	in your daily life: Not enough money for	3 = Somewhat of a problem	$3 \to 0.50$
	basic needs (food, clothing etc.)	4 = A fairly big problem	$4 \to 0.25$
		5 = Serious problem	$5 \rightarrow 0.00$
	Please rate the following statements by	1 = No problem	$1 \rightarrow 1.00$
	telling me how much of a problem it is	2 = A little problem	$2 \rightarrow 0.75$
	in your daily life: Being unable to find	3 = Somewhat of a problem	$3 \to 0.50$
	work	4 = A fairly big problem	$4 \rightarrow 0.25$
		5 = Serious problem	$5 \rightarrow 0.00$
Family's	Please rate the following statements by	1 = No problem	1 → 1.00
well-being in UKR	telling me how much of a problem it is	2 = A little problem	$2 \to 0.75$
Ü	in your daily life: Worries about family	3 = Somewhat of a problem	$3 \to 0.50$
	back home	4 = A fairly big problem	$4 \to 0.25$
		5 = Serious problem	$5 \rightarrow 0.00$
	Please rate the following statements by	1 = No problem	$1 \rightarrow 1.00$
	telling me how much of a problem it is	2 = A little problem	$2 \rightarrow 0.75$
	in your daily life: Separation from family	3 = Somewhat of a problem	$3 \rightarrow 0.50$
		4 = A fairly big problem	$4 \rightarrow 0.25$
		5 = Serious problem	$5 \rightarrow 0.00$
	Please rate the following statements by	1 = No problem	$1 \rightarrow 1.00$
	telling me how much of a problem it is	2 = A little problem	$2 \rightarrow 0.75$
	in your daily life: Unable to return home	3 = Somewhat of a problem	$3 \rightarrow 0.50$
	in an emergency	4 = A fairly big problem 5 = Serious problem	$4 \rightarrow 0.25$ $5 \rightarrow 0.00$
		5 = Serious problem	5 → 0.00
Family's	Please rate the following statements by	1 = No problem	1 → 1.00
well-being in DK	telling me how much of a problem it is in	2 = A little problem	$2 \rightarrow 0.75$
	your daily life: Concern about your chil-	3 = Somewhat of a problem	$3 \rightarrow 0.50$
	dren's well-being in Denmark	4 = A fairly big problem 5 = Serious problem	$4 \rightarrow 0.25$
			$5 \rightarrow 0.00$

Survey index	Survey item	Answer categories	Normalized values
	Please rate the following statements by	1 = No problem	1 → 1.00
	telling me how much of a problem it is	2 = A little problem	$2 \rightarrow 0.75$
	in your daily life: Finding it hard to bal-	3 = Somewhat of a problem	$3 \rightarrow 0.50$
	ance job and family life	4 = A fairly big problem	$4 \rightarrow 0.25$
	ance job and jamily life	5 = Serious problem	$5 \rightarrow 0.00$
Stay Intention	Do you wish to stay in Denmark in the	1 = Yes, as long as my home	1 → 1.00
•	long run?	town is not safe	$2 \to 0.50$
		2 = Yes, I would like to stay even after the war is no longer a threat to my home town 3 = No, I wish to go back home	$3 \rightarrow 0.00$
		now	
	Please rate the following statements by	1 = No problem	$1 \rightarrow 0.00$
	telling me how much of a problem it is in	2 = A little problem	$2 \rightarrow 0.25$
	your daily life: Fears of being sent back	3 = Somewhat of a problem	$3 \rightarrow 0.50$
	to country of origin	4 = A fairly big problem	$4 \rightarrow 0.75$
		5 = Serious problem	$5 \rightarrow 1.00$
Access to care	Please rate the following statements by	1 = No problem	1 → 1.00
	telling me how much of a problem it is in	2 = A little problem	$2 \rightarrow 0.75$
	your daily life: Worries about not getting	3 = Somewhat of a problem	$3 \rightarrow 0.50$
	treatment for health problems	4 = A fairly big problem	$4 \rightarrow 0.25$
		5 = Serious problem	$5 \rightarrow 0.00$
	Please rate the following statements by	1 = No problem	$1 \rightarrow 1.00$
	telling me how much of a problem it is	2 = A little problem	$2 \rightarrow 0.75$
	in your daily life: Poor access to medical	3 = Somewhat of a problem	$3 \rightarrow 0.50$
	care	4 = A fairly big problem	$4 \rightarrow 0.25$
		5 = Serious problem	$5 \rightarrow 0.00$
	Please rate the following statements by	1 = No problem	$1 \rightarrow 1.00$
	telling me how much of a problem it is	2 = A little problem	$2 \rightarrow 0.75$
	in your daily life: Poor access to dental	3 = Somewhat of a problem	$3 \rightarrow 0.50$
	care	4 = A fairly big problem	$4 \rightarrow 0.25$
		5 = Serious problem	$5 \rightarrow 0.00$
	Please rate the following statements by	1 = No problem	$1 \rightarrow 1.00$
	telling me how much of a problem it is	2 = A little problem	$2 \rightarrow 0.75$
	in your daily life: Poor access to psycho-	3 = Somewhat of a problem	$3 \rightarrow 0.50$
	logical counseling	4 = A fairly big problem	$4 \rightarrow 0.25$
		5 = Serious problem	$5 \to 0.00$
Not feeling lonely	The next few questions are about your	1 = Yes, often	$1 \to 0.00$
	social network and trust in Danish insti-	2 = Yes, once in a while	$2 \rightarrow 0.33$
	tutions: Are you ever alone even though	3 = Yes, but rarely	$3 \rightarrow 0.67$
	you really wish to be with someone else?	4 = No	$4 \rightarrow 1.00$
	The next few questions are about your so-	1 = Yes, always	$1 \rightarrow 1.00$
	cial network and trust in Danish institu-	2 = Yes, most of the time	$2 \rightarrow 0.67$
	tions: Do you have someone to talk to if	3 = Yes, sometimes	$3 \rightarrow 0.33$
	you are in trouble or need support?	4 = No, never or almost never	$4 \rightarrow 0.00$
Danish	Please indicate your level of trust for each	1 = Very high level of trust	1 → 1.00
institutional trust	of the below listed institutions. How high	2 = High level of trust	$2 \to 0.67$
	is your level of trust to: Danish au-	3 = Low level of trust	$3 \rightarrow 0.33$
	thorities in general?	4 = No trust at all	$4 \to 0.00$

	Continuation of tab	ole A.6	
Survey index	Survey item	Answer categories	Normalized values
Danish skills	Please indicate your level of trust for each of the below listed institutions. How high is your level of trust to: <i>The Job center in your municipality?</i> How well do you speak and understand	1 = Very high level of trust 2 = High level of trust 3 = Low level of trust 4 = No trust at all 1 = I cannot at all understand	$ \begin{array}{c} 1 \to 1.00 \\ 2 \to 0.67 \\ 3 \to 0.33 \\ 4 \to 0.00 \end{array} $ $ \begin{array}{c} 1 \to 1.00 \\ 1 \to 0.00 \end{array} $
	Danish?	Danish 2 = Novice (I know elementary phrases, such as greeting, asking for directions, prices in shops) 3 = Easily practiced (I can carry on uncomplicated conversation and make myself fairly understandable) 4 = Practiced (I am able to hold a conversation, e.g. telephone conversation, but the conversation is still relatively simple) 5 = Experienced (I can, for example, participate in most conversations and can give a presentation.) 6 = Fluent (I speak and write the language independently and confidently)	$2 \rightarrow 0.20$ $3 \rightarrow 0.40$ $4 \rightarrow 0.60$ $5 \rightarrow 0.80$ $6 \rightarrow 1.00$

Table A.7: Summary statistics of refugees by initial accommodation

	(1) All	(2) Public	(3) Pop-up	(4) Private
n1	A: Administratrive da	housing	housing	hosting
Demography variables - Trailblazer	A. Aummstratrive da	ıa		
Age, 18-29	0.173	0.145	0.143	0.212
	(0.378)	(0.352)	(0.350)	(0.409)
Age, 29-37	0.221	0.217	0.234	0.213
-	(0.415)	(0.412)	(0.423)	(0.409)
Age, 37-44	0.203	0.229	0.234	0.165
-	(0.403)	(0.420)	(0.423)	(0.371)
Age, 44-57	0.193	0.225	0.205	0.166
	(0.394)	(0.418)	(0.404)	(0.372)
Age, 57+	0.210	0.184	0.184	0.244
	(0.407)	(0.388)	(0.388)	(0.429)
Male	0.161	0.163	0.174	0.150
	(0.368)	(0.369)	(0.379)	(0.357)
Country of origin, Ukraine	0.946	0.943	0.945	0.948
, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	(0.226)	(0.232)	(0.227)	(0.223)
Family variables	_			
1 person in family	0.455	0.425	0.385	0.530
	(0.498)	(0.494)	(0.487)	(0.499)
2 person in family	0.292	0.297	0.305	0.279
	(0.455)	(0.457)	(0.461)	(0.448)
3 person in family	0.176	0.190	0.207	0.143
	(0.381)	(0.392)	(0.406)	(0.350)
4+ person in family	0.077	0.089	0.103	0.049
	(0.267)	(0.285)	(0.304)	(0.216)
1 child in family	0.269	0.290	0.294	0.238
	(0.444)	(0.454)	(0.456)	(0.426)
2+ child in family	0.190	0.199	0.236	0.147
	(0.392)	(0.400)	(0.424)	(0.355)
1+ senior in family	0.051	0.054	0.047	0.054
	(0.220)	(0.226)	(0.211)	(0.225)
N	10349	2258	3687	4404
Share of sample	1.000	0.218	0.356	0.426
Share of sample Panel B: Ministry of		0.218	0.356	
Share of sample Panel B: Ministry of English proficiency	1.000	0.218	0.356	
Share of sample Panel B: Ministry of	1.000 f Immigration and Inte	0.218 egration Surv	0.356 ey	0.426
Panel B: Ministry of English proficiency None/missing	1.000 f Immigration and Inte 0.215	0.218 egration Surv 0.198 (0.398)	0.356 ey 0.206 (0.404)	0.426 0.234 (0.423)
Share of sample Panel B: Ministry of English proficiency	1.000 f Immigration and Inte 0.215 (0.411)	0.218 egration Surv 0.198	0.356 ey 0.206	0.426 0.234 (0.423) 0.454
Panel B: Ministry of English proficiency None/missing Elementary	1.000 f Immigration and Inte 0.215 (0.411) 0.486 (0.500)	0.218 egration Surv 0.198 (0.398) 0.506 (0.500)	0.356 ey 0.206 (0.404) 0.507 (0.500)	0.426 0.234 (0.423) 0.454 (0.498)
Panel B: Ministry of English proficiency None/missing	1.000 f Immigration and Inte 0.215 (0.411) 0.486	0.218 egration Surv 0.198 (0.398) 0.506	0.356 ey 0.206 (0.404) 0.507	0.426 0.234 (0.423) 0.454 (0.498) 0.215
Panel B: Ministry of English proficiency None/missing Elementary Conversational	1.000 f Immigration and Inter- 0.215 (0.411) 0.486 (0.500) 0.213 (0.409)	0.218 egration Surv 0.198 (0.398) 0.506 (0.500) 0.207 (0.405)	0.356 ey 0.206 (0.404) 0.507 (0.500) 0.214 (0.410)	0.426 0.234 (0.423) 0.454 (0.498) 0.215 (0.411)
Panel B: Ministry of English proficiency None/missing Elementary	1.000 f Immigration and Inte 0.215 (0.411) 0.486 (0.500) 0.213	0.218 egration Surv 0.198 (0.398) 0.506 (0.500) 0.207	0.356 ey 0.206 (0.404) 0.507 (0.500) 0.214	0.426 0.234 (0.423) 0.454 (0.498) 0.215 (0.411) 0.098
Panel B: Ministry of English proficiency None/missing Elementary Conversational Fluent/professional Activity status	1.000 f Immigration and Interest (0.411) 0.486 (0.500) 0.213 (0.409) 0.086 (0.281)	0.218 egration Surv 0.198 (0.398) 0.506 (0.500) 0.207 (0.405) 0.089 (0.285)	0.356 ey 0.206 (0.404) 0.507 (0.500) 0.214 (0.410) 0.073 (0.261)	0.426 0.234 (0.423) 0.454 (0.498) 0.215 (0.411) 0.098 (0.297)
Panel B: Ministry of English proficiency None/missing Elementary Conversational Fluent/professional	1.000 f Immigration and Interest (0.411) 0.486 (0.500) 0.213 (0.409) 0.086 (0.281) 0.116	0.218 egration Surv 0.198 (0.398) 0.506 (0.500) 0.207 (0.405) 0.089 (0.285) 0.111	0.356 ey 0.206 (0.404) 0.507 (0.500) 0.214 (0.410) 0.073 (0.261) 0.108	0.426 0.234 (0.423) 0.454 (0.498) 0.215 (0.411) 0.098 (0.297) 0.126
Panel B: Ministry of English proficiency None/missing Elementary Conversational Fluent/professional Activity status No formal job	1.000 f Immigration and Interest (0.411) 0.486 (0.500) 0.213 (0.409) 0.086 (0.281) 0.116 (0.320)	0.218 egration Surv 0.198 (0.398) 0.506 (0.500) 0.207 (0.405) 0.089 (0.285) 0.111 (0.314)	0.356 ey 0.206 (0.404) 0.507 (0.500) 0.214 (0.410) 0.073 (0.261) 0.108 (0.310)	0.426 0.234 (0.423) 0.454 (0.498) 0.215 (0.411) 0.098 (0.297) 0.126 (0.332)
Panel B: Ministry of English proficiency None/missing Elementary Conversational Fluent/professional Activity status	1.000 f Immigration and Interest (0.411) 0.486 (0.500) 0.213 (0.409) 0.086 (0.281) 0.116 (0.320) 0.092	0.218 egration Surv 0.198 (0.398) 0.506 (0.500) 0.207 (0.405) 0.089 (0.285) 0.111 (0.314) 0.065	0.356 ey 0.206 (0.404) 0.507 (0.500) 0.214 (0.410) 0.073 (0.261) 0.108 (0.310) 0.076	0.426 0.234 (0.423) 0.454 (0.498) 0.215 (0.411) 0.098 (0.297) 0.126 (0.332) 0.126
Panel B: Ministry of English proficiency None/missing Elementary Conversational Fluent/professional Activity status No formal job Retired	1.000 f Immigration and Interest (0.411) 0.486 (0.500) 0.213 (0.409) 0.086 (0.281) 0.116 (0.320) 0.092 (0.290)	0.218 egration Surv 0.198 (0.398) 0.506 (0.500) 0.207 (0.405) 0.089 (0.285) 0.111 (0.314) 0.065 (0.246)	0.356 ey 0.206 (0.404) 0.507 (0.500) 0.214 (0.410) 0.073 (0.261) 0.108 (0.310) 0.076 (0.264)	0.426 0.234 (0.423) 0.454 (0.498) 0.215 (0.411) 0.098 (0.297) 0.126 (0.332) 0.126 (0.331)
Panel B: Ministry of English proficiency None/missing Elementary Conversational Fluent/professional Activity status No formal job	1.000 f Immigration and Interest (0.411) 0.486 (0.500) 0.213 (0.409) 0.086 (0.281) 0.116 (0.320) 0.092 (0.290) 0.036	0.218 egration Surv 0.198 (0.398) 0.506 (0.500) 0.207 (0.405) 0.089 (0.285) 0.111 (0.314) 0.065 (0.246) 0.030	0.356 ey 0.206 (0.404) 0.507 (0.500) 0.214 (0.410) 0.073 (0.261) 0.108 (0.310) 0.076 (0.264) 0.032	0.426 0.234 (0.423) 0.454 (0.498) 0.215 (0.411) 0.098 (0.297) 0.126 (0.332) 0.126 (0.331) 0.043
Panel B: Ministry of English proficiency None/missing Elementary Conversational Fluent/professional Activity status No formal job Retired	1.000 f Immigration and Interest (0.411) 0.486 (0.500) 0.213 (0.409) 0.086 (0.281) 0.116 (0.320) 0.092 (0.290)	0.218 egration Surv 0.198 (0.398) 0.506 (0.500) 0.207 (0.405) 0.089 (0.285) 0.111 (0.314) 0.065 (0.246)	0.356 ey 0.206 (0.404) 0.507 (0.500) 0.214 (0.410) 0.073 (0.261) 0.108 (0.310) 0.076 (0.264)	0.426 0.234 (0.423) 0.454 (0.498) 0.215 (0.411) 0.098 (0.297) 0.126 (0.332) 0.126 (0.331) 0.043
Panel B: Ministry of English proficiency None/missing Elementary Conversational Fluent/professional Activity status No formal job Retired	1.000 f Immigration and Interest (0.411) 0.486 (0.500) 0.213 (0.409) 0.086 (0.281) 0.116 (0.320) 0.092 (0.290) 0.036 (0.186) 0.756	0.218 egration Surv 0.198 (0.398) 0.506 (0.500) 0.207 (0.405) 0.089 (0.285) 0.111 (0.314) 0.065 (0.246) 0.030 (0.171) 0.794	0.356 ey 0.206 (0.404) 0.507 (0.500) 0.214 (0.410) 0.073 (0.261) 0.108 (0.310) 0.076 (0.264) 0.032 (0.175) 0.785	0.426 0.234 (0.423) 0.454 (0.498) 0.215 (0.411) 0.098 (0.297) 0.126 (0.332) 0.126 (0.331) 0.043 (0.203) 0.705
Panel B: Ministry of English proficiency None/missing Elementary Conversational Fluent/professional Activity status No formal job Retired Studying Working	1.000 f Immigration and Interest (0.411) 0.486 (0.500) 0.213 (0.409) 0.086 (0.281) 0.116 (0.320) 0.092 (0.290) 0.036 (0.186)	0.218 egration Surv 0.198 (0.398) 0.506 (0.500) 0.207 (0.405) 0.089 (0.285) 0.111 (0.314) 0.065 (0.246) 0.030 (0.171)	0.356 ey 0.206 (0.404) 0.507 (0.500) 0.214 (0.410) 0.073 (0.261) 0.108 (0.310) 0.076 (0.264) 0.032 (0.175)	0.426 0.234 (0.423) 0.454 (0.498) 0.215 (0.411) 0.098 (0.297) 0.126 (0.332) 0.126 (0.331) 0.043 (0.203) 0.705
Panel B: Ministry of English proficiency None/missing Elementary Conversational Fluent/professional Activity status No formal job Retired Studying Working Educational attainment	1.000 f Immigration and Interest (0.411) 0.486 (0.500) 0.213 (0.409) 0.086 (0.281) 0.116 (0.320) 0.092 (0.290) 0.036 (0.186) 0.756 (0.429)	0.218 egration Surv 0.198 (0.398) 0.506 (0.500) 0.207 (0.405) 0.089 (0.285) 0.111 (0.314) 0.065 (0.246) 0.030 (0.171) 0.794 (0.404)	0.356 ey 0.206 (0.404) 0.507 (0.500) 0.214 (0.410) 0.073 (0.261) 0.108 (0.310) 0.076 (0.264) 0.032 (0.175) 0.785 (0.411)	0.426 0.234 (0.423) 0.454 (0.498) 0.215 (0.411) 0.098 (0.297) 0.126 (0.332) 0.126 (0.331) 0.043 (0.203) 0.705 (0.456)
Panel B: Ministry of English proficiency None/missing Elementary Conversational Fluent/professional Activity status No formal job Retired Studying Working	1.000 f Immigration and Interest (0.411) 0.486 (0.500) 0.213 (0.409) 0.086 (0.281) 0.116 (0.320) 0.092 (0.290) 0.036 (0.186) 0.756 (0.429) 0.045	0.218 egration Surv 0.198 (0.398) 0.506 (0.500) 0.207 (0.405) 0.089 (0.285) 0.111 (0.314) 0.065 (0.246) 0.030 (0.171) 0.794 (0.404) 0.037	0.356 ey 0.206 (0.404) 0.507 (0.500) 0.214 (0.410) 0.073 (0.261) 0.108 (0.310) 0.076 (0.264) 0.032 (0.175) 0.785 (0.411) 0.055	0.426 0.234 (0.423) 0.454 (0.498) 0.215 (0.411) 0.098 (0.297) 0.126 (0.332) 0.126 (0.331) 0.043 (0.203) 0.705 (0.456)
Panel B: Ministry of English proficiency None/missing Elementary Conversational Fluent/professional Activity status No formal job Retired Studying Working Educational attainment Primary or lower	1.000 f Immigration and Interest (0.411) 0.486 (0.500) 0.213 (0.409) 0.086 (0.281) 0.116 (0.320) 0.092 (0.290) 0.036 (0.186) 0.756 (0.429) 0.045 (0.206)	0.218 egration Surv 0.198 (0.398) 0.506 (0.500) 0.207 (0.405) 0.089 (0.285) 0.111 (0.314) 0.065 (0.246) 0.030 (0.171) 0.794 (0.404) 0.037 (0.190)	0.356 ey 0.206 (0.404) 0.507 (0.500) 0.214 (0.410) 0.073 (0.261) 0.108 (0.310) 0.076 (0.264) 0.032 (0.175) 0.785 (0.411) 0.055 (0.229)	0.426 0.234 (0.423) 0.454 (0.498) 0.215 (0.411) 0.098 (0.297) 0.126 (0.332) 0.126 (0.331) 0.043 (0.203) 0.705 (0.456) 0.039 (0.192)
Panel B: Ministry of English proficiency None/missing Elementary Conversational Fluent/professional Activity status No formal job Retired Studying Working Educational attainment	1.000 f Immigration and Interest (0.411) 0.486 (0.500) 0.213 (0.409) 0.086 (0.281) 0.116 (0.320) 0.092 (0.290) 0.036 (0.186) 0.756 (0.429) 0.045 (0.206) 0.075	0.218 egration Surv 0.198 (0.398) 0.506 (0.500) 0.207 (0.405) 0.089 (0.285) 0.111 (0.314) 0.065 (0.246) 0.030 (0.171) 0.794 (0.404) 0.037 (0.190) 0.091	0.356 ey 0.206 (0.404) 0.507 (0.500) 0.214 (0.410) 0.073 (0.261) 0.108 (0.310) 0.076 (0.264) 0.032 (0.175) 0.785 (0.411) 0.055 (0.229) 0.078	0.426 0.234 (0.423) 0.454 (0.498) 0.215 (0.411) 0.098 (0.297) 0.126 (0.332) 0.126 (0.331) 0.043 (0.203) 0.705 (0.456) 0.039 (0.192) 0.063
Panel B: Ministry of English proficiency None/missing Elementary Conversational Fluent/professional Activity status No formal job Retired Studying Working Educational attainment Primary or lower Secondary	1.000 f Immigration and Interest (0.411) 0.486 (0.500) 0.213 (0.409) 0.086 (0.281) 0.116 (0.320) 0.092 (0.290) 0.036 (0.186) 0.756 (0.429) 0.045 (0.206) 0.075 (0.264)	0.218 egration Surv 0.198 (0.398) 0.506 (0.500) 0.207 (0.405) 0.089 (0.285) 0.111 (0.314) 0.065 (0.246) 0.030 (0.171) 0.794 (0.404) 0.037 (0.190) 0.091 (0.288)	0.356 ey 0.206 (0.404) 0.507 (0.500) 0.214 (0.410) 0.073 (0.261) 0.108 (0.310) 0.076 (0.264) 0.032 (0.175) 0.785 (0.411) 0.055 (0.229) 0.078 (0.268)	0.426 0.234 (0.423) 0.454 (0.498) 0.215 (0.411) 0.098 (0.297) 0.126 (0.332) 0.126 (0.331) 0.043 (0.203) 0.705 (0.456) 0.039 (0.192) 0.063 (0.243)
Panel B: Ministry of English proficiency None/missing Elementary Conversational Fluent/professional Activity status No formal job Retired Studying Working Educational attainment Primary or lower	1.000 f Immigration and Interest (0.411) 0.486 (0.500) 0.213 (0.409) 0.086 (0.281) 0.116 (0.320) 0.092 (0.290) 0.036 (0.186) 0.756 (0.429) 0.045 (0.206) 0.075 (0.264) 0.156	0.218 egration Surv 0.198 (0.398) 0.506 (0.500) 0.207 (0.405) 0.089 (0.285) 0.111 (0.314) 0.065 (0.246) 0.030 (0.171) 0.794 (0.404) 0.037 (0.190) 0.091 (0.288) 0.153	0.356 ey 0.206 (0.404) 0.507 (0.500) 0.214 (0.410) 0.073 (0.261) 0.108 (0.310) 0.076 (0.264) 0.032 (0.175) 0.785 (0.411) 0.055 (0.229) 0.078 (0.268) 0.173	0.426 0.234 (0.423) 0.454 (0.498) 0.215 (0.411) 0.098 (0.297) 0.126 (0.332) 0.126 (0.331) 0.043 (0.203) 0.705 (0.456) 0.063 (0.243) 0.140
Panel B: Ministry of English proficiency None/missing Elementary Conversational Fluent/professional Activity status No formal job Retired Studying Working Educational attainment Primary or lower Secondary Vocational	1.000 f Immigration and Interest (0.411) 0.486 (0.500) 0.213 (0.409) 0.086 (0.281) 0.116 (0.320) 0.092 (0.290) 0.036 (0.186) 0.756 (0.429) 0.045 (0.206) 0.075 (0.264) 0.156 (0.363)	0.218 egration Surv 0.198 (0.398) 0.506 (0.500) 0.207 (0.405) 0.089 (0.285) 0.111 (0.314) 0.065 (0.246) 0.030 (0.171) 0.794 (0.404) 0.037 (0.190) 0.091 (0.288) 0.153 (0.360)	0.356 ey 0.206 (0.404) 0.507 (0.500) 0.214 (0.410) 0.073 (0.261) 0.108 (0.310) 0.076 (0.264) 0.032 (0.175) 0.785 (0.411) 0.055 (0.229) 0.078 (0.268) 0.173 (0.379)	0.426 0.234 (0.423) 0.454 (0.498) 0.215 (0.411) 0.098 (0.297) 0.126 (0.332) 0.126 (0.331) 0.043 (0.203) 0.705 (0.456) 0.039 (0.192) 0.063 (0.243) 0.140 (0.347)
Panel B: Ministry of English proficiency None/missing Elementary Conversational Fluent/professional Activity status No formal job Retired Studying Working Educational attainment Primary or lower Secondary	1.000 f Immigration and Interest (0.411) 0.486 (0.500) 0.213 (0.409) 0.086 (0.281) 0.116 (0.320) 0.092 (0.290) 0.036 (0.186) 0.756 (0.429) 0.045 (0.206) 0.075 (0.264) 0.156 (0.363) 0.203	0.218 egration Surv 0.198 (0.398) 0.506 (0.500) 0.207 (0.405) 0.089 (0.285) 0.111 (0.314) 0.065 (0.246) 0.030 (0.171) 0.794 (0.404) 0.037 (0.190) 0.091 (0.288) 0.153 (0.360) 0.206	0.356 ey 0.206 (0.404) 0.507 (0.500) 0.214 (0.410) 0.073 (0.261) 0.108 (0.310) 0.076 (0.264) 0.032 (0.175) 0.785 (0.411) 0.055 (0.229) 0.078 (0.268) 0.173 (0.379) 0.203	0.426 0.234 (0.423) 0.454 (0.498) 0.215 (0.411) 0.098 (0.297) 0.126 (0.332) 0.126 (0.331) 0.043 (0.203) 0.705 (0.456) 0.039 (0.192) 0.063 (0.243) 0.140 (0.347) 0.201
Panel B: Ministry of English proficiency None/missing Elementary Conversational Fluent/professional Activity status No formal job Retired Studying Working Educational attainment Primary or lower Secondary Vocational Short tertiary	1.000 f Immigration and Interest (0.411) 0.486 (0.500) 0.213 (0.409) 0.086 (0.281) 0.116 (0.320) 0.092 (0.290) 0.036 (0.186) 0.756 (0.429) 0.045 (0.206) 0.075 (0.264) 0.156 (0.363) 0.203 (0.402)	0.218 egration Surv 0.198 (0.398) 0.506 (0.500) 0.207 (0.405) 0.089 (0.285) 0.111 (0.314) 0.065 (0.246) 0.030 (0.171) 0.794 (0.404) 0.037 (0.190) 0.091 (0.288) 0.153 (0.360) 0.206 (0.404)	0.356 ey 0.206 (0.404) 0.507 (0.500) 0.214 (0.410) 0.073 (0.261) 0.108 (0.310) 0.076 (0.264) 0.032 (0.175) 0.785 (0.411) 0.055 (0.229) 0.078 (0.268) 0.173 (0.379) 0.203 (0.402)	0.426 0.234 (0.423) 0.454 (0.498) 0.215 (0.411) 0.098 (0.297) 0.126 (0.332) 0.126 (0.331) 0.043 (0.203) 0.705 (0.456) 0.039 (0.192) 0.063 (0.243) 0.140 (0.347) 0.201 (0.401)
Panel B: Ministry of English proficiency None/missing Elementary Conversational Fluent/professional Activity status No formal job Retired Studying Working Educational attainment Primary or lower Secondary Vocational	1.000 f Immigration and Interest (0.411) 0.486 (0.500) 0.213 (0.409) 0.086 (0.281) 0.116 (0.320) 0.092 (0.290) 0.036 (0.186) 0.756 (0.429) 0.045 (0.206) 0.075 (0.264) 0.156 (0.363) 0.203 (0.402) 0.399	0.218 egration Surv 0.198 (0.398) 0.506 (0.500) 0.207 (0.405) 0.089 (0.285) 0.111 (0.314) 0.065 (0.246) 0.030 (0.171) 0.794 (0.404) 0.037 (0.190) 0.091 (0.288) 0.153 (0.360) 0.206 (0.404) 0.399	0.356 ey 0.206 (0.404) 0.507 (0.500) 0.214 (0.410) 0.073 (0.261) 0.108 (0.310) 0.076 (0.264) 0.032 (0.175) 0.785 (0.411) 0.055 (0.229) 0.078 (0.268) 0.173 (0.379) 0.203 (0.402) 0.385	0.426 0.234 (0.423) 0.454 (0.498) 0.215 (0.411) 0.098 (0.297) 0.126 (0.332) 0.126 (0.331) 0.043 (0.203) 0.705 (0.456) 0.039 (0.192) 0.063 (0.243) 0.140 (0.347) 0.201 (0.401) 0.414
Panel B: Ministry of English proficiency None/missing Elementary Conversational Fluent/professional Activity status No formal job Retired Studying Working Educational attainment Primary or lower Secondary Vocational Short tertiary	1.000 f Immigration and Interest (0.411) 0.486 (0.500) 0.213 (0.409) 0.086 (0.281) 0.116 (0.320) 0.092 (0.290) 0.036 (0.186) 0.756 (0.429) 0.045 (0.206) 0.075 (0.264) 0.156 (0.363) 0.203 (0.402)	0.218 egration Surv 0.198 (0.398) 0.506 (0.500) 0.207 (0.405) 0.089 (0.285) 0.111 (0.314) 0.065 (0.246) 0.030 (0.171) 0.794 (0.404) 0.037 (0.190) 0.091 (0.288) 0.153 (0.360) 0.206 (0.404)	0.356 ey 0.206 (0.404) 0.507 (0.500) 0.214 (0.410) 0.073 (0.261) 0.108 (0.310) 0.076 (0.264) 0.032 (0.175) 0.785 (0.411) 0.055 (0.229) 0.078 (0.268) 0.173 (0.379) 0.203 (0.402)	0.426 0.234 (0.423) 0.454 (0.498) 0.215 (0.411) 0.098 (0.297) 0.126 (0.332) 0.126 (0.331) 0.043 (0.203) 0.705 (0.456) 0.039 (0.192) 0.063 (0.243) 0.140 (0.347) 0.201 (0.401)

Notes: Table presents summary statistics for our sample. Cells presents means and standard deviations in parentheses. Panel A presents covariates found in register data, whereas panel B presents covariates for the subsample, that answered the UIM survey. If trailblazer is a singleton family, then family covariates are left missing and therefore does not affect estimated means.

Table A.8: Summary statistics of refugee integration outcomes

	(1) All	(2) Public housing	(3) Pop-up housing	(4) Private hosting
Panel A: Admini	istratrive data			
igration outcomes	0.013	0.011	0.013	0.015
Outmigrated, 1 month after arrival	(0.114)	(0.103)	0.013 (0.115)	0.015 (0.120)
	[10349]	[2258]	[3687]	[4404]
Outmigrated, 12 month after arrival	0.227	0.190	0.231	0.242
	(0.419)	(0.392)	(0.422)	(0.429)
	[10349]	[2258]	[3687]	[4404]
Outmigrated, 18 month after arrival	0.273	0.230	0.290	0.279
	(0.445) [10349]	(0.421) [2258]	(0.454) [3687]	(0.449) [4404]
Out and internal migration 1 month after arrival				
Out- and internal migration, 1 month after arrival	0.152 (0.359)	0.168 (0.374)	0.145 (0.352)	(0.356)
	[10349]	[2258]	[3687]	[4404]
Out- and internal migration, 12 month after arrival	0.707	0.690	0.704	0.718
	(0.455)	(0.462)	(0.457)	(0.450)
	[10349]	[2258]	[3687]	[4404]
Out- and internal migration, 18 month after arrival	0.787	0.779	0.795	0.784
	(0.410)	(0.415)	(0.404)	(0.411)
	[10349]	[2258]	[3687]	[4404]
Duration in days of initial accommodation	223.090	230.247	226.507	216.559
	(203.252) [10349]	(206.400) [2258]	(201.644) [3687]	(202.819) [4404]
Count of residency switches, 18 month after arrival	1.096	1.097	1.129	1.067
count of residency switches, 10 month after arrival	(0.834)	(0.831)	(0.846)	(0.824)
	[10349]	[2258]	[3687]	[4404]
bor market outcomes	0		0.4	
Employed, 1 month after arrival	0.198	0.143	0.172	0.253
	(0.399) [8073]	(0.351) [1826]	(0.377) [2970]	(0.435)
Employed, 12 month after arrival	0.592	0.550	0.580	0.628
Employed, 12 month after arrival	(0.492)	(0.498)	(0.494)	(0.483)
	[6253]	[1503]	[2286]	[2464]
Employed, 18 month after arrival	0.657	0.627	0.657	0.675
1 3,	(0.475)	(0.484)	(0.475)	(0.469)
	[5872]	[1428]	[2103]	[2341]
Log-earnings, 1 month after arrival	9.668	9.608	9.674	9.683
	(0.852)	(0.872)	(0.818)	(0.866)
	[1604]	[262]	[512]	[830]
Log-earnings, 12 month after arrival	9.829	9.804	9.796	9.870
	(0.699) [3742]	(0.707) [835]	(0.734) [1343]	(0.662) [1564]
Ii 10i1	9.916	9.865	9.921	9.940
Log-earnings, 18 month after arrival	(0.616)	(0.621)	(0.597)	(0.629)
	[3904]	[903]	[1401]	[1600]
Public transfer recipiency, 1 month after arrival	0.788	0.883	0.852	0.678
X 2.	(0.409)	(0.322)	(0.355)	(0.467)
	[8073]	[1826]	[2970]	[3277]
Public transfer recipiency, 12 month after arrival	0.356	0.425	0.416	0.258
	(0.479)	(0.495)	(0.493)	(0.437)
	[6253]	[1503]	[2286]	[2464]
Public transfer recipiency, 18 month after arrival	0.256	0.319	0.296	0.182 (0.386)
	(0.436) [5872]	(0.466) [1428]	(0.456) [2103]	[2341]
Panel B: DARECO 2 Survey F			,	,
			0.340	0.325
PTSD score, normalized	0.336 (0.244)	0.351 (0.249)	0.340 (0.248)	(0.236)
	[3126]	[717]	[1094]	[1315]
Not feeling lonely			0.635	0.646
Not feeling lonely	[3126]	[717]		
Not feeling lonely	[3126] 0.630	[717] 0.594	0.635	0.646
Not feeling lonely Economic stability	[3126] 0.630 (0.284) [3387] 0.756	[717] 0.594 (0.295) [768] 0.724	0.635 (0.282) [1186] 0.745	0.646 (0.279) [1433] 0.783
	[3126] 0.630 (0.284) [3387] 0.756 (0.222)	[717] 0.594 (0.295) [768] 0.724 (0.232)	0.635 (0.282) [1186] 0.745 (0.224)	0.646 (0.279) [1433] 0.783 (0.212)
Economic stability	[3126] 0.630 (0.284) [3387] 0.756 (0.222) [2760]	[717] 0.594 (0.295) [768] 0.724 (0.232) [645]	0.635 (0.282) [1186] 0.745 (0.224) [983]	0.646 (0.279) [1433] 0.783 (0.212) [1132]
	[3126] 0.630 (0.284) [3387] 0.756 (0.222) [2760] 0.470	[717] 0.594 (0.295) [768] 0.724 (0.232) [645] 0.467	0.635 (0.282) [1186] 0.745 (0.224) [983] 0.459	0.646 (0.279) [1433] 0.783 (0.212) [1132] 0.481
Economic stability	[3126] 0.630 (0.284) [3387] 0.756 (0.222) [2760] 0.470 (0.264)	[717] 0.594 (0.295) [768] 0.724 (0.232) [645] 0.467 (0.279)	0.635 (0.282) [1186] 0.745 (0.224) [983] 0.459 (0.261)	0.646 (0.279) [1433] 0.783 (0.212) [1132] 0.481 (0.259)
Economic stability Family's well-being in UKR	[3126] 0.630 (0.284) [3387] 0.756 (0.222) [2760] 0.470 (0.264) [2759]	[717] 0.594 (0.295) [768] 0.724 (0.232) [645] 0.467 (0.279) [645]	0.635 (0.282) [1186] 0.745 (0.224) [983] 0.459 (0.261) [982]	0.646 (0.279) [1433] 0.783 (0.212) [1132] 0.481 (0.259) [1132]
Economic stability	[3126] 0.630 (0.284) [3387] 0.756 (0.222) [2760] 0.470 (0.264) [2759] 0.767	[717] 0.594 (0.295) [768] 0.724 (0.232) [645] 0.467 (0.279) [645] 0.742	0.635 (0.282) [1186] 0.745 (0.224) [983] 0.459 (0.261) [982] 0.749	0.646 (0.279) [1433] 0.783 (0.212) [1132] 0.481 (0.259) [1132] 0.797
Economic stability Family's well-being in UKR	[3126] 0.630 (0.284) [3387] 0.756 (0.222) [2760] 0.470 (0.264) [2759] 0.767 (0.254)	[717] 0.594 (0.295) [768] 0.724 (0.232) [645] 0.467 (0.279) [645] 0.742 (0.265)	0.635 (0.282) [1186] 0.745 (0.224) [983] 0.459 (0.261) [982]	0.646 (0.279) [1433] 0.783 (0.212) [1132] 0.481 (0.259) [1132] 0.797 (0.239)
Economic stability Family's well-being in UKR Family's well-being in DK	[3126] 0.630 (0.284) [3387] 0.756 (0.222) [2760] 0.470 (0.264) [2759] 0.767 (0.254) [2753]	[717] 0.594 (0.295) [768] 0.724 (0.232) [645] 0.467 (0.279) [645] 0.742 (0.265) [643]	0.635 (0.282) [1186] 0.745 (0.224) [983] 0.459 (0.261) [982] 0.749 (0.261) [980]	0.646 (0.279) [1433] 0.783 (0.212) [1132] 0.481 (0.259) [1132] 0.797 (0.239) [1130]
Economic stability Family's well-being in UKR	[3126] 0.630 (0.284) [3387] 0.756 (0.222) [2760] 0.470 (0.264) [2759] 0.767 (0.254)	[717] 0.594 (0.295) [768] 0.724 (0.232) [645] 0.467 (0.279) [645] 0.742 (0.265)	0.635 (0.282) [1186] 0.745 (0.224) [983] 0.459 (0.261) [982] 0.749 (0.261)	0.646 (0.279) [1433] 0.783 (0.212) [1132] 0.481 (0.259) [1132] 0.797 (0.239)
Economic stability Family's well-being in UKR Family's well-being in DK	[3126] 0.630 (0.284) [3387] 0.756 (0.222) [2760] 0.470 (0.264) [2759] 0.767 (0.254) [2753] 0.638	[717] 0.594 (0.295) [768] 0.724 (0.232) [645] 0.467 (0.279) [645] 0.742 (0.265) [643] 0.655	0.635 (0.282) [1186] 0.745 (0.224) [983] 0.459 (0.261) [982] 0.749 (0.261) [980] 0.636	0.646 (0.279) [1433] 0.783 (0.212) [1132] 0.481 (0.259) [1132] 0.797 (0.239) [1130] 0.631
Economic stability Family's well-being in UKR Family's well-being in DK	[3126] 0.630 (0.284) [3387] 0.756 (0.222) [2760] 0.470 (0.264) [2759] 0.767 (0.254) [2753] 0.638 (0.280)	[717] 0.594 (0.295) [768] 0.724 (0.232) [645] 0.467 (0.279) [645] 0.742 (0.265) [643] 0.655 (0.274)	0.635 (0.282) [1186] 0.745 (0.224) [983] 0.459 (0.261) [982] 0.749 (0.261) [980] 0.636 (0.283)	0.646 (0.279) [1433] 0.783 (0.212) [1132] 0.481 (0.259) [1132] 0.797 (0.239) [1130] 0.631 (0.281)
Economic stability Family's well-being in UKR Family's well-being in DK Stay intention	[3126] 0.630 (0.284) [3387] 0.756 (0.222) [2760] 0.470 (0.264) [2759] 0.767 (0.254) [2753] 0.638 (0.280) [3308] 0.656 (0.243)	[717] 0.594 (0.295) [768] 0.724 (0.232) [645] 0.467 (0.279) [645] 0.742 (0.265) [643] 0.655 (0.274) [751]	0.635 (0.282) [1186] 0.745 (0.224) [983] 0.459 (0.261) [982] 0.749 (0.261) [980] 0.636 (0.283) [1157] 0.652 (0.246)	0.646 (0.279) [1433] 0.783 (0.212) [1132] 0.481 (0.259) [1132] 0.797 (0.239) [1130] 0.631 (0.281) [1400]
Economic stability Family's well-being in UKR Family's well-being in DK Stay intention	[3126] 0.630 (0.284) [3387] 0.756 (0.222) [2760] 0.470 (0.264) [2759] 0.767 (0.254) [2753] 0.638 (0.280) [3308] 0.656	[717] 0.594 (0.295) [768] 0.724 (0.232) [645] 0.467 (0.279) [645] 0.742 (0.265) [643] 0.655 (0.274) [751]	0.635 (0.282) [1186] 0.745 (0.224) [983] 0.459 (0.261) [982] 0.749 (0.261) [980] 0.636 (0.283) [1157] 0.652	0.646 (0.279) [1433] 0.783 (0.212) [1132] 0.481 (0.259) [1132] 0.797 (0.239) [1130] 0.631 (0.281) [1400]
Economic stability Family's well-being in UKR Family's well-being in DK Stay intention	[3126] 0.630 (0.284) [3387] 0.756 (0.222) [2760] 0.470 (0.264) [2759] 0.767 (0.254) [2753] 0.638 (0.280) [3308] 0.656 (0.243)	[717] 0.594 (0.295) [768] 0.724 (0.232) [645] 0.467 (0.279) [645] 0.742 (0.265) [643] 0.655 (0.274) [751] 0.619 (0.254)	0.635 (0.282) [1186] 0.745 (0.224) [983] 0.459 (0.261) [982] 0.749 (0.261) [980] 0.636 (0.283) [1157] 0.652 (0.246)	0.646 (0.279) [1433] 0.783 (0.212) [1132] 0.481 (0.259) [1132] 0.797 (0.239) [1130] 0.631 (0.281) [1400] 0.6679 (0.232)
Economic stability Family's well-being in UKR Family's well-being in DK Stay intention Access to care	[3126] 0.630 (0.284) [3387] 0.756 (0.222) [2760] 0.470 (0.264) [2759] 0.767 (0.254) [2753] 0.638 (0.280) [3308] 0.656 (0.243) [2770] 0.687 (0.206)	[717] 0.594 (0.295) [768] 0.724 (0.232) [645] 0.467 (0.279) [645] 0.742 (0.265) [643] 0.655 (0.274) [751] 0.619 (0.254) [644] 0.675 (0.206)	0.635 (0.282) [1186] 0.745 (0.224) [983] 0.459 (0.261) [982] 0.749 (0.261) [980] 0.636 (0.283) [1157] 0.652 (0.246) [988] 0.681 (0.215)	0.646 (0.279) [1433] 0.783 (0.212) [1132] 0.481 (0.259) [1132] 0.797 (0.239) [1130] 0.631 (0.281) [1400] 0.6679 (0.232) [1138] 0.699 (0.138)
Economic stability Family's well-being in UKR Family's well-being in DK Stay intention Access to care Danish institutional trust	[3126] 0.630 (0.284) [3387] 0.756 (0.222) [2760] 0.470 (0.264) [2759] 0.767 (0.254) [2753] 0.638 (0.280) [3308] 0.656 (0.243) [2770] 0.687 (0.206) [3382]	[717] 0.594 (0.295) [768] 0.724 (0.232) [645] 0.467 (0.279) [645] 0.742 (0.265) [643] 0.655 (0.274) [751] 0.619 (0.254) [644] 0.675 (0.206) [768]	0.635 (0.282) [1186] 0.745 (0.224) [983] 0.459 (0.261) [982] 0.749 (0.261) [980] 0.636 (0.283) [1157] 0.652 (0.246) [988] 0.681 (0.215) [1185]	0.646 (0.279) [1433] 0.783 (0.212) [1132] 0.481 (0.259) [1132] 0.797 (0.239) [1130] 0.631 (0.281) [1400] 0.679 (0.232) [1138] 0.699 (0.197) [1429]
Economic stability Family's well-being in UKR Family's well-being in DK Stay intention Access to care	[3126] 0.630 (0.284) [3387] 0.756 (0.222) [2760] 0.470 (0.264) [2759] 0.767 (0.254) [2753] 0.638 (0.280) [3308] 0.656 (0.243) [2770] 0.687 (0.206) [33882] 0.264	[717] 0.594 (0.295) [768] 0.724 (0.232) [645] 0.467 (0.279) [645] 0.742 (0.265) [643] 0.655 (0.274) [751] 0.619 (0.254) [644] 0.675 (0.206) [768]	0.635 (0.282) [1186] 0.745 (0.224) [983] 0.459 (0.261) [982] 0.749 (0.261) [980] 0.636 (0.283) [1157] 0.652 (0.246) [988] 0.681 (0.215) [1185]	0.646 (0.279) [1433] 0.783 (0.212) [1132] 0.481 (0.259) [1130] 0.631 (0.281) [1400] 0.699 (0.197) (0.197) (0.197) (1429]
Economic stability Family's well-being in UKR Family's well-being in DK Stay intention Access to care Danish institutional trust	[3126] 0.630 (0.284) [3387] 0.756 (0.222) [2760] 0.470 (0.264) [2759] 0.767 (0.254) [2753] 0.638 (0.280) [3308] 0.656 (0.243) [2770] 0.687 (0.206) [3382] 0.264 (0.167)	[717] 0.594 (0.295) [768] 0.724 (0.232) [645] 0.467 (0.279) [645] 0.742 (0.265) [643] 0.655 (0.274) [751] 0.619 (0.254) [644] 0.675 (0.206) [768] 0.273 (0.166)	0.635 (0.282) [1186] 0.745 (0.224) [983] 0.459 (0.261) [982] 0.749 (0.261) [980] 0.636 (0.283) [1157] 0.652 (0.246) [988] 0.681 (0.215) [1185] 0.269 (0.157)	0.646 (0.279) [1433] 0.783 (0.212) [1132] 0.481 (0.259) [1132] 0.797 (0.239) [1130] 0.631 (0.281) [1400] 0.679 (0.232) [1138] 0.699 (0.197) [1429]
Economic stability Family's well-being in UKR Family's well-being in DK Stay intention Access to care Danish institutional trust	[3126] 0.630 (0.284) [3387] 0.756 (0.222) [2760] 0.470 (0.264) [2759] 0.767 (0.254) [2753] 0.638 (0.280) [3308] 0.656 (0.243) [2770] 0.687 (0.206) [33882] 0.264	[717] 0.594 (0.295) [768] 0.724 (0.232) [645] 0.467 (0.279) [645] 0.742 (0.265) [643] 0.655 (0.274) [751] 0.619 (0.254) [644] 0.675 (0.206) [768]	0.635 (0.282) [1186] 0.745 (0.224) [983] 0.459 (0.261) [982] 0.749 (0.261) [980] 0.636 (0.283) [1157] 0.652 (0.246) [988] 0.681 (0.215) [1185]	0.646 (0.279) [1433] 0.783 (0.212) [1132] 0.481 (0.259) [1130] 0.631 (0.281) [1400] 0.673 (0.232) [1138] 0.699 (0.197) [1429]

Notes: Table presents summary statistics for out administrative register- and survey-based outcomes. Cells presents means, standard deviations in parentheses and observation count with non-missing values in square parentheses. Panel A presents outcomes found in register data, whereas panel B presents outcomes for the subsample, that answered the DARECO 2 survey.

Table A.9: Effect of initial accommodation on outmigration, secondary migration, and residency switches

	Outmi	gration	Out- and inte	rnal migration	Duration	Residency switches
	1st Quarter (1)	6th Quarter (2)	1st Quarter (3)	6th Quarter (4)	Days (5)	Count (6)
Pop-up housing	0.010	0.034**	-0.035	0.006	9.863	-0.021
	(0.009)	(0.014)	(0.033)	(0.020)	(12.192)	(0.048)
Private hosting	0.024***	0.015	0.025	0.004	-11.567	0.004
	(0.008)	(0.016)	(0.040)	(0.023)	(15.343)	(0.053)
Mean of dep. var. Observations R^2	0.057	0.230	0.387	0.779	230.247	1.097
	10,349	10,349	10,349	10,349	10,349	10,349
	0.037	0.057	0.119	0.085	0.130	0.130
Covariates	√	✓	√	√	√	√
Fixed Effects		✓	√	√	√	√

Notes: Tables presents quarterly cross-sectional regressions of migration outcomes on indicators for residing in either pop-up housing or private hosting as the initial accommodation, with conventional public housing as the omitted reference category. Column (1) and (2) presents a linear prediction model of a binary outmigration-indicator. Column (3) and (4) presents a linear prediction model of a binary indicator for having changed address from initial address, either due to outmigration or moving to another address. Column (5) estimates a regression of the duration measured in days of initial accommodation. If the person has not changed address after 18 months, we top-encode the missing with 540 days. Column (6) estimates a regression of the number of residency switches in the first in the first 18 months after arrival. Address switches internally or outmigration counts towards this. Covariates from Panel A in A.7 are included as controls, and municipality and month-of-arrival fixed effects are implemented. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Mean of dep. var. is reported for the ommitted category, conventional public housing.

Table A.10: Effect of initial accommodation on economic integration

	Employ	ment rate	Log-e	arnings	Public transf	er recipiency
	1st Quarter (1)	6th Quarter (2)	1st Quarter (3)	6th Quarter (4)	1st Quarter (5)	6th Quarter (6)
Pop-up housing	0.028	0.006	-0.002	0.047	-0.028	-0.012
	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.074)	(0.033)	(0.022)	(0.017)
Private hosting	0.102***	0.023	0.166**	0.062*	-0.173***	-0.116***
-	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.075)	(0.033)	(0.028)	(0.016)
Mean of dep. var.	0.348	0.672	9.768	9.999	0.905	0.373
Mean of dep. var. (levels, DKK)			22,286.2	24,988.9		
Observations	7,553	5,871	3,196	4,119	7,553	5,871
R^2	0.094	0.048	0.100	0.076	0.197	0.095
Covariates	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
Fixed Effects	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark

Notes: Tables presents quarterly cross-sectional regressions of labor market outcomes on indicators for residing in either pop-up housing or private hosting as the initial accommodation, with conventional public housing as the omitted reference category. Outmigrated are exlcuded at follow-up. Column (1) and (2) presents a linear prediction model of a binary employment-indicator. Column (3) and (4) presents a regression of log-earnings for the employed. Column (5) and (6) presents a linear prediction model of a binary indicator for receiving public transfers. Covariates from Panel A in A.7 are included as controls, and municipality and month-of-arrival fixed effects are implemented. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. * p<0.010, ** p<0.05, **** p<0.01. Mean of dep. var. is reported for the ommitted category, conventional public housing.

Table A.11: Effect of initial accommodation on economic integration (IPW correction for attrition)

	Employ	ment rate	Log-ea	arnings	Public transf	er recipiency
	1st Quarter (1)	6th Quarter (2)	1st Quarter (3)	6th Quarter (4)	1st Quarter (5)	6th Quarter (6)
Pop-up housing	0.029	0.005	-0.005	0.044	-0.024	-0.007
	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.070)	(0.032)	(0.022)	(0.018)
Private hosting	0.099***	0.018	0.168**	0.055*	-0.168***	-0.112***
	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.072)	(0.033)	(0.027)	(0.017)
Mean of dep. var.	0.348	0.672	9.768	9.999	0.905	0.373
Mean of dep. var. (levels, DKK)			22,286.2	24,988.9		
Observations	7,553	5,871	3,196	4,119	7,553	5,871
R^2	0.093	0.049	0.099	0.073	0.193	0.098
Covariates	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
Fixed Effects	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark

Notes: Tables presents quarterly cross-sectional regressions of labor market outcomes on indicators for residing in either pop-up housing or private hosting as the initial accommodation, with conventional public housing as the omitted reference category. Outmigrated are exlcuded at follow-up. Column (1) and (2) presents a linear prediction model of a binary employment-indicator. Column (3) and (4) presents a regression of log-earnings for the employed. Column (5) and (6) presents a linear prediction model of a binary indicator for receiving public transfers. Covariates from Panel A in A.7 are included as controls, and municipality and month-of-arrival fixed effects are implemented. Inverse-probability Weights are used in the second-stage to adjust for attrition. IPWs are estimated in the first-stage using a simple logit model of being present at follow-up on our covariates and fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. * p<0.10, *** p<0.05, **** p<0.01. Mean of dep. var. is reported for the omitted category, conventional public housing.

Table A.12: Effect of initial accommodation on employment outcomes (unbalanced and balanced sample, covariates, interacted fixed-effects)

		Panel A	: Unbalan	ced sample	;			
		1st Q	uarter			6th Q	uarter	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Pop-up housing	0.037** (0.018)	0.037** (0.017)	0.028 (0.018)	0.024 (0.019)	0.033 (0.028)	0.024 (0.025)	0.006 (0.017)	0.007 (0.018)
Private hosting	0.154*** (0.017)	0.139*** (0.018)	0.102*** (0.018)	0.099*** (0.019)	0.047** (0.023)	0.047** (0.023)	0.023 (0.019)	0.018 (0.020)
Mean of dep. var. Observations R^2	0.348 7,554 0.018	0.348 7,554 0.047	0.348 7,553 0.094	0.348 7,529 0.133	0.672 5,872 0.002	0.672 5,872 0.015	0.672 5,871 0.048	0.671 5,839 0.095
Covariates Fixed Effects Fixed Effects, interacted		✓	√ ✓	√ √		✓	√ √	√ √
			B: Balance	ed sample		6th Q	uarter	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Pop-up housing	0.046** (0.018)	0.043** (0.017)	0.024 (0.018)	0.020 (0.019)	0.033 (0.028)	0.024 (0.025)	0.006 (0.017)	0.007 (0.018)
Private hosting	0.166*** (0.020)	0.145*** (0.019)	0.106*** (0.022)	0.106*** (0.024)	0.047** (0.023)	0.047** (0.023)	0.023 (0.019)	0.018 (0.020)
Mean of dep. var. Observations R^2	0.375 5,872 0.020	0.375 5,872 0.049	0.375 5,871 0.096	0.374 5,839 0.142	0.672 5,872 0.002	0.672 5,872 0.015	0.672 5,871 0.048	0.671 5,839 0.095
Covariates Fixed Effects Fixed Effects, interacted		✓	√ ✓	√ √		√	√ ✓	√ √

Notes: Tables presents quarterly cross-sectional regressions of a linear prediction model of a binary employment-indicator on residing in either pop-up housing or private hosting as the initial accommodation, with conventional public housing as the omitted reference category. In Panel A, outmigrated are excluded at follow-up. In Panel B we restrict on having a balanced sample, hence we only estimate the model for people in Denmark for 18 months after arrival. Column (1) estimates the LPM on the indicators. Column (2) adds covariates from panel A in A.7 as controls. Column (3), which is our main specification, introduces fixed effects in municipality and month-of-arrival dimensions. Column (4) interacts and uses fixed effects in the cross-section of municipality-by-month-of-arrival dimensions. Column (1) through (4) estimates employment in the 1st quarter after in-migration, and column (5) through (8) estimates the LPM in the 6th quarter after in-migration and repeats the model-building procedure. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Mean of dep. var. is reported for the omitted category, conventional public housing.

Table A.13: Effect of initial accommodation on log-earnings (unbalanced and balanced sample, covariates, interacted fixed-effects)

		Panel A 1st Qu		iced samp	le	6th Qu	ıarter	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Pop-up housing	0.043	0.032	-0.002	0.022	0.058**	0.048**	0.047	0.038
	(0.054)	(0.056)	(0.074)	(0.080)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.033)	(0.035)
Private hosting	0.187***	0.177***	0.166**	0.175**	0.078***	0.075***	0.062*	0.049
C	(0.059)	(0.060)	(0.075)	(0.080)	(0.028)	(0.026)	(0.033)	(0.036)
Mean of dep. var.	9.768	9.768	9.768	9.766	9.999	9.999	9.999	9.998
Observations	3,196	3,196	3,196	3,157	4,121	4,121	4,119	4,080
R^2	0.010	0.048	0.100	0.171	0.003	0.043	0.076	0.135
Covariates		\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark		\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
Fixed Effects			\checkmark				\checkmark	
Fixed Effects, interacted				\checkmark				\checkmark
		Panel	B: Balanc	ed sample	<u> </u>			
		1st Qu	ıarter			6th Qu	ıarter	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Pop-up housing	0.062	0.047	0.027	0.073	0.058**	0.048**	0.047	0.038
	(0.058)	(0.059)	(0.083)	(0.088)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.033)	(0.035)
Private hosting	0.179***	0.162***	0.138*	0.163**	0.078***	0.075***	0.062*	0.049
-	(0.060)	(0.061)	(0.080)	(0.082)	(0.028)	(0.026)	(0.033)	(0.036)
Mean of dep. var.	9.782	9.782	9.782	9.776	9.999	9.999	9.999	9.998
Observations	2,685	2,685	2,684	2,641	4,121	4,121	4,119	4,080
R^2	0.009	0.049	0.107	0.193	0.003	0.043	0.076	0.135
Covariates		\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark		\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
Fixed Effects			\checkmark				\checkmark	

Notes: Tables presents quarterly cross-sectional regressions of a regression of log-earnings for the employed on residing in either pop-up housing or private hosting as the initial accommodation, with conventional public housing as the omitted reference category. In Panel A, outmigrated are excluded at follow-up. In Panel B we restrict on having a balanced sample, hence we only estimate the model for people in Denmark for 18 months after arrival. Column (1) estimates the regression model on the indicators. Column (2) adds covariates from panel A in A.7 as controls. Column (3), which is our main specification, introduces fixed effects in municipality and month-of-arrival dimensions. Column (4) interacts and uses fixed effects in the cross-section of municipality-by-month-of-arrival dimensions. Column (1) through (4) estimates the regression in the 1st quarter after inmigration, and column (5) through (8) estimates the regression model in the 6th quarter after in-migration and repeats the model-building procedure. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Mean of dep. var. is reported for the omitted category, conventional public housing.

Fixed Effects, interacted

Table A.14: Effect of initial accommodation on public transfer recipiency (unbalanced and balanced sample, covariates, interacted fixed-effects)

		Pane	el A: Unbal	anced samp	le				
		1st Q	uarter		6th Quarter				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	
Pop-up housing	-0.028**	-0.030**	-0.028	-0.034	-0.015	-0.014	-0.012	-0.021	
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.022)	(0.024)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.017)	
Private hosting	-0.208***	-0.181***	-0.173***	-0.170***	-0.158***	-0.137***	-0.116***	-0.117***	
_	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.017)	
Mean of dep. var.	0.905	0.905	0.905	0.904	0.373	0.373	0.373	0.374	
Observations	7,554	7,554	7,553	7,529	5,872	5,872	5,871	5,839	
R^2	0.058	0.130	0.197	0.245	0.025	0.060	0.095	0.131	
Covariates		\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark		\checkmark	\checkmark	✓	
Fixed Effects			\checkmark				\checkmark		
Fixed Effects, interacted				\checkmark				\checkmark	

		Par	nel B: Balaı	nced sample	2			
		1st Q	uarter			6th Q	uarter	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Pop-up housing	-0.030**	-0.031**	-0.029	-0.035	-0.015	-0.014	-0.012	-0.021
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.024)	(0.026)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Private hosting	-0.224***	-0.189***	-0.174***	-0.172***	-0.158***	-0.137***	-0.116***	-0.117***
	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.028)	(0.030)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.017)
Mean of dep. var.	0.906	0.906	0.906	0.907	0.373	0.373	0.373	0.374
Observations	5,872	5,872	5,871	5,839	5,872	5,872	5,871	5,839
R^2	0.066	0.148	0.217	0.266	0.025	0.060	0.095	0.131
Covariates		\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark		\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
Fixed Effects			\checkmark				\checkmark	
Fixed Effects, interacted				\checkmark				\checkmark

Notes: Tables presents quarterly cross-sectional regressions of a linear prediction model of a binary public transfer recipiency-indicator on residing in either pop-up housing or private hosting as the initial accommodation, with conventional public housing as the omitted reference category. In Panel A, outmigrated are excluded at follow-up. In Panel B we restrict on having a balanced sample, hence we only estimate the model for people in Denmark for 18 months after arrival. Column (1) estimates the LPM on the indicators. Column (2) adds covariates from panel A in A.7 as controls. Column (3), which is our main specification, introduces fixed effects in municipality and month-of-arrival dimensions. Column (4) interacts and uses fixed effects in the cross-section of municipality-by-month-of-arrival dimensions. Column (1) through (4) estimates the LPM in the 1st quarter after in-migration, and column (5) through (8) estimates the LPM in the 6th quarter after in-migration and repeats the model-building procedure. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Mean of dep. var. is reported for the omitted category, conventional public housing.

Table A.15: Effect of initial accommodation on employment (removing largest municipalities)

	Panel	A: Remov	al of larges	st municipa	lities by p	opulation	density				
		1st Quarter						6th Quarter			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	
Pop-up housing	0.035* (0.020)	0.037* (0.021)	0.035* (0.021)	0.042* (0.022)	0.051** (0.024)	0.006 (0.019)	0.006 (0.020)	0.008 (0.020)	0.015 (0.021)	0.014 (0.024)	
Private hosting	0.108*** (0.022)	0.110*** (0.022)	0.110*** (0.023)	0.116*** (0.023)	0.122*** (0.026)	0.022 (0.022)	0.024 (0.022)	0.028 (0.023)	0.032 (0.023)	0.017	
Mean of dep. var. Observations	0.426 6.693	0.426 6.486	0.428 6.346	0.427 6.136	0.435 5,512	0.716 5.118	0.717 4.943	0.718 4.827	0.718 4.656	0.718 4,136	
Number of municipalities R^2	94 0.099	91 0.101	86 0.101	81 0.105	76 0.108	94 0.045	91 0.046	86 0.046	81 0.046	76 0.050	
Covariates Fixed Effects	0.099 √ √	0.101 ✓ ✓	0.101 √	0.105 ✓ ✓	0.108 √	0.043 ✓	0.040 ✓ ✓	0.040 ✓ ✓	0.040 ✓	0.030 √	

Panel B: Removal of largest municipalities by inflow of Ukrainian refugees 6th Quarter 1st Quarter (1) (2) (3) (4) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)0.042** 0.055** 0.051° 0.0560.040 -0.0010.006 0.025 0.029 0.012 Pop-up housing (0.021)(0.021)(0.025)(0.029)(0.031)(0.022)(0.023)(0.024)(0.027)(0.028)0.109*** 0.117*** 0.104*** 0.104*** 0.099*** Private hosting 0.004 0.009 0.025 0.017 0.001 (0.023)(0.023)(0.034)(0.025)(0.029)(0.027)(0.031)(0.022)(0.027)(0.029)0.431 0.447 0.453 0.452 0.714 0.712 0.708 Mean of dep. var. 0.462 0.715 0.713 6,414 4,390 3,922 4,392 5.700 4.971 4.880 3.820 3,038 Observations 3.389 Number of municipalities 94 91 86 81 76 94 91 86 81 76 0.099 0.096 0.099 0.101 0.103 0.046 0.048 0.053 0.057 0.055 Covariates Fixed Effects

Notes: Tables presents quarterly cross-sectional regressions of a linear prediction model of a binary employment-indicator on residing in either popup housing or private hosting as the initial accommodation, with conventional public housing as the omitted reference category. Panel A examines sensitivity to removal of the largest municipalities in the sample, ranked and measured by population density. Panel B examines the sensitivity of results to removal of municipalities who had the largest inflow of Ukrainian refugees. Column (1) removes the 2 largest municipalities, column (2) removes 5, column (3) removes 10, column (4) removes 15, and column (5) removes 20. Column (1) through (5) estimates the LPM in the 1st quarter after arrival, and column (6) through (10) repeats this, but does it for 6th quater after arrival. Covariates from Panel A in A.7 are included as controls, and municipality and month-of-arrival fixed effects are implemented. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Mean of dep. var. is reported for the omitted category, conventional public housing.

Table A.16: Effect of initial accommodation on log-earnings (removing largest municipalities)

	Panel A	: Remova	l of larges	st municip	alities by	populatio	n density			
		6th Quarter								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Pop-up housing	-0.045	-0.041	-0.026	-0.019	-0.079	0.021	0.025	0.031	0.041	0.023
	(0.075)	(0.076)	(0.074)	(0.078)	(0.060)	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.034)
Private hosting	0.114	0.120	0.147*	0.169**	0.113*	0.037	0.040	0.048	0.059*	0.043
Tivate nosting	(0.077)	(0.079)	(0.075)	(0.078)	(0.062)	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.037)
Mean of dep. var.	9.869	9.866	9.865	9.870	9.873	10.053	10.052	10.052	10.050	10.053
Observations	2,849	2,764	2,715	2,618	2,395	3,662	3,542	3,466	3,344	2,970
Number of municipalities	94	91	86	81	76	93	90	86	81	76
R^2	0.107	0.106	0.103	0.106	0.111	0.080	0.080	0.079	0.079	0.079
Covariates	\checkmark									
Fixed Effects	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	✓	\checkmark	\checkmark	✓	✓	\checkmark

P	anel B: Re	moval of la	argest mu	nicipalitie	s by inflov	w of Ukrai	inian refu	gees		
		1	st Quarter			6th Quarter				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Pop-up housing	-0.113**	-0.103*	-0.093	-0.069	-0.102	0.010	0.018	0.025	0.037	0.008
	(0.056)	(0.058)	(0.064)	(0.070)	(0.070)	(0.031)	(0.034)	(0.039)	(0.045)	(0.040)
Private hosting	0.051	0.065	0.075	0.093	0.070	0.025	0.036	0.054	0.071	0.047
	(0.060)	(0.061)	(0.072)	(0.080)	(0.086)	(0.033)	(0.036)	(0.044)	(0.050)	(0.049)
Mean of dep. var.	9.874	9.883	9.880	9.884	9.895	10.055	10.062	10.068	10.068	10.072
Observations	2,767	2,547	2,254	2,030	1,774	3,488	3,137	2,720	2,417	2,150
Number of municipalities	94	91	86	81	76	93	90	85	80	75
R^2	0.111	0.115	0.126	0.128	0.140	0.083	0.087	0.092	0.095	0.099
Covariates	\checkmark									
Fixed Effects	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	✓	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark

Notes: Tables presents quarterly cross-sectional regressions of a regression of log-earnings for the employed on residing in either pop-up housing or private hosting as the initial accommodation, with conventional public housing as the omitted reference category. Panel A examines sensitivity to removal of the largest municipalities in the sample, ranked and measured by population density. Panel B examines the sensitivity of results to removal of municipalities who had the largest inflow of Ukrainian refugees. Column (1) removes the 2 largest municipalities, column (2) removes 5, column (3) removes 10, column (4) removes 15, and column (5) removes 20. Column (1) through (5) estimates the regression model in the 1st quarter after arrival, and column (6) through (10) repeats this, but does it for 6th quater after arrival. Covariates from Panel A in A.7 are included as controls, and municipality and month-of-arrival fixed effects are implemented. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. * p<0.10, *** p<0.05, **** p<0.01. Mean of dep. var. is reported for the omitted category, conventional public housing.

Table A.17: Effect of initial accommodation on public transfer recipiency (removing largest municipalities)

Panel A: Removal of largest municipalities by population density											
			1st Quarter			6th Quarter					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	
Pop-up housing	-0.004	-0.003	-0.006	-0.011	-0.006	-0.005	-0.003	-0.007	-0.014	-0.005	
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.023)	
Private hosting	-0.143***	-0.144***	-0.148***	-0.150***	-0.148***	-0.111***	-0.114***	-0.119***	-0.125***	-0.117***	
_	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.025)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.023)	
Mean of dep. var.	0.814	0.817	0.817	0.817	0.813	0.305	0.304	0.304	0.305	0.301	
Observations	6,693	6,486	6,346	6,136	5,512	5,118	4,943	4,827	4,656	4,136	
Number of municipalities	94	91	86	81	76	94	91	86	81	76	
R^2	0.204	0.204	0.204	0.202	0.209	0.099	0.101	0.099	0.099	0.100	
Covariates	\checkmark	✓									
Fixed Effects	\checkmark	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	

	Panel B: Removal of largest municipalities by inflow of Ukrainian refugees									
	1st Quarter					6th Quarter				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Pop-up housing	-0.003	-0.018	-0.008	-0.010	-0.004	0.000	-0.005	-0.011	-0.011	0.021
	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.021)	(0.024)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.024)	(0.026)	(0.023)
Private hosting	-0.144***	-0.159***	-0.146***	-0.144***	-0.141***	-0.106***	-0.114***	-0.115***	-0.112***	-0.082***
	(0.023)	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.025)	(0.027)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.026)	(0.029)	(0.027)
Mean of dep. var.	0.811	0.809	0.804	0.802	0.803	0.298	0.294	0.301	0.297	0.300
Observations	6,414	5,700	4,971	4,390	3,922	4,880	4,392	3,820	3,389	3,038
Number of municipalities	94	91	86	81	76	94	91	86	81	76
R^2	0.205	0.220	0.226	0.229	0.236	0.100	0.106	0.110	0.107	0.111
Covariates	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	\checkmark	✓	✓
Fixed Effects	\checkmark	✓	✓	\checkmark	\checkmark	✓	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	✓

Notes: Tables presents quarterly cross-sectional regressions of a linear prediction model of a binary public transfer recipiency-indicator on residing in either pop-up housing or private hosting as the initial accommodation, with conventional public housing as the omitted reference category. Panel A examines sensitivity to removal of the largest municipalities in the sample, ranked and measured by population density. Panel B examines the sensitivity of results to removal of municipalities who had the largest inflow of Ukrainian refugees. Column (1) removes the 2 largest municipalities, column (2) removes 5, column (3) removes 10, column (4) removes 15, and column (5) removes 20. Column (1) through (5) estimates the LPM in the 1st quarter after arrival, and column (6) through (10) repeats this, but does it for 6th quater after arrival. Covariates from Panel A in A.7 are included as controls, and municipality and month-of-arrival fixed effects are implemented. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Mean of dep. var. is reported for the omitted category, conventional public housing.

Table A.18: Effect of initial accommodation on psychosocial and navigational integration

	Depression score, normalized	PTSD score, normalized	Not feeling lonely	Economic stability	Family's well-being in UKR	Family's well-being in DK	Stay intention	Access to care	Danish institutional trust	Danish skills
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Pop-up housing	-0.003 (0.013)	0.000 (0.015)	0.033** (0.016)	0.018 (0.014)	-0.018 (0.014)	0.005 (0.013)	-0.018 (0.014)	0.022 (0.016)	-0.006 (0.011)	-0.014 (0.009)
Private hosting	-0.028** (0.013)	-0.028** (0.012)	0.051*** (0.016)	0.046*** (0.012)	0.008 (0.013)	0.019* (0.011)	-0.002 (0.012)	0.047*** (0.012)	0.008 (0.009)	-0.021** (0.008)
Mean of dep. var.	0.301	0.351	0.594	0.725	0.468	0.742	0.655	0.620	0.675	0.274
Observations	3,206	3,124	3,385	2,759	2,758	2,753	3,306	2,769	3,380	3,221
\mathbb{R}^2	0.085	0.072	0.069	0.069	0.090	0.176	0.085	0.077	0.080	0.128
Covariates	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Notes: Tables presents various survey-based outcome regressions on indicators for residing in either pop-up housing or private hosting as the initial accommodation, with conventional public housing as the omitted reference category. Outmigrated and non-responses are excluded at follow-up. Outcomes are measured approximately 18 months, or 6 quarters, after in-migration. For details on construction of outcomes, please see appendix. All outcomes are normalized. Column (1) shows self-reported symptoms of depression. Column (2) shows self-reported PTSD symptoms. Column (3) shows whether the survey respondent feels lonely. Column (4) captures economic stability. Column (5) and (6) captures sense of family's well-being in Ukraine and Denmark. Column (7) captures intent-to-stay in Denmark. Column (8) captures feeling of access to (health-)care. Column (9) captures sense of trust in Danish institutions. Column (10) captures self-reported assessment of Danish skills. Covariates from Panel A in A.7 are included as controls, and municipality and month-of-arrival fixed effects are implemented. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Mean of dep. var. is reported for the omitted category, conventional public housing.

Table A.19: Effect of initial accommodation on psychosocial and navigational integration (IPW correction for attrition)

	Depression score,	PTSD score, normalized	Not feeling lonely	Economic stability	Family's well-being in	Family's well-being in	Stay intention	Access to care	Danish institutional	Danish skills
	normalized (1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	UKR (5)	DK (6)	(7)	(8)	trust (9)	(10)
Pop-up housing	-0.005 (0.014)	0.002 (0.015)	0.034** (0.016)	0.014 (0.014)	-0.025* (0.015)	0.002 (0.013)	-0.022 (0.016)	0.020 (0.018)	-0.011 (0.013)	-0.014 (0.009)
Private hosting	-0.025* (0.015)	-0.023* (0.013)	0.056*** (0.016)	0.046*** (0.012)	0.009 (0.015)	0.018* (0.011)	-0.005 (0.015)	0.048*** (0.014)	0.005 (0.011)	-0.025*** (0.009)
Mean of dep. var.	0.301	0.351	0.594	0.725	0.468	0.742	0.655	0.620	0.675	0.274
Observations	3,204	3,122	3,383	2,759	2,758	2,753	3,304	2,769	3,378	3,219
R^2	0.093	0.078	0.070	0.074	0.104	0.187	0.094	0.091	0.088	0.146
Covariates	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Notes: Tables presents various survey-based outcome regressions on indicators for residing in either pop-up housing or private hosting as the initial accommodation, with conventional public housing as the omitted reference category. Outmigrated and non-responses are excluded at follow-up. Outcomes are measured approximately 18 months, or 6 quarters, after in-migration. For details on construction of outcomes, please see appendix. All outcomes are normalized. Column (1) shows self-reported symptoms of depression. Column (2) shows self-reported PTSD symptoms. Column (3) shows whether the survey respondent feels lonely. Column (4) captures economic stability. Column (5) and (6) captures sense of family's well-being in Ukraine and Denmark. Column (7) captures intent-to-stay in Denmark. Column (8) captures feeling of access to (health-)care. Column (9) captures sense of trust in Danish institutions. Column (10) captures self-reported assessment of Danish skills. Covariates from Panel A in A.7 are included as controls, and municipality and month-of-arrival fixed effects are implemented. Inverse-probability Weights are used in the second-stage to adjust for attrition. IPWs are estimated in the first-stage using a simple logit model of being present at follow-up on our covariates and fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Mean of dep. var. is reported for the omitted category, conventional public housing.

Table A.20: Effect of initial accommodation on placement on industry-ladder

	Entry industry-rank	Labor market entrace	Industry-Rank		
	(1)	months after arrival (2)	1st Quarter (3)	6th Quarter (4)	
Pop-up housing	0.022 (0.013)	-0.432** (0.195)	0.030 (0.021)	0.026* (0.013)	
Private hosting	0.033** (0.014)	-1.071*** (0.221)	0.034 (0.021)	0.045*** (0.014)	
Mean of dep. var.	0.213	5.368	0.224	0.229	
Observations	5,509	5,509	3,190	4,115	
R^2	0.066	0.100	0.091	0.073	
Covariates	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	
Fixed Effects	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	

Notes: Tables presents cross-sectional regressions of employment-related outcomes on indicators for residing in either pop-up housing or private hosting as the initial accommodation, with conventional public housing as the omitted reference category. Column (1) presents a regression of first observed industry-rank, namely where our sample enters the labor market. Column (2) presents a regression of duration in months it takes to enter the labor market after arrival. Column (3) and (4) presents which industry-rank the employed is observed to be working in in the 1st and 6th quarter after arrival. Industry-rank is measured by the average hourly wage in 2021 at the 86-level industry-aggregation. After ranking industries, we rescale into the unit-interval. Covariates from Panel A in A.7 are included as controls, and municipality and month-of-arrival fixed effects are implemented. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Mean of dep. var. is reported for the omitted category, conventional public housing.

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