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Discrimination Preferences*

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Abstract

We investigate preferences for engaging in or opposing discrimination, focusing on moral preferences beyond self-interest. Some individuals may oppose statistical discrimination on grounds of protected-group equality, while others may prefer it to reward groups with higher average merit. Likewise, individuals may oppose taste discrimination or assert their tastes for groups. We conduct incentivized online experiments to elicit discrimination preferences in three domains: ethnicity, gender, and LGBTQ+ status. Analyzing over 60,000 anonymous decisions about how to pay workers, we report highly heterogeneous preferences and a paradox of meritocracy—while merit may be a reason to reject discrimination, it also justifies discrimination. (*JEL*: D63, D90, J23, J31, J71, J78, K31, M52)

Keywords: Discrimination, Ethnicity, Gender, LGBTQ+, Moral principles, Experiments

*The analysis plans for the experiments in this article were pre-registered on the Open Science Framework website (osf.io/z8hwj, osf.io/fuwqc, and osf.io/gnhys), and the replication package with data and code will be made available upon journal acceptance. Denmark and Aarhus University exempt this type of research from ethical approval, but we obtained ethical approval for the design from the COBE Human Subjects Committee. We thank audiences in Aarhus, Bergen, Copenhagen, Innsbruck, Lund, Maastricht, Odense, Padova, Philadelphia, Stavanger, Stockholm, Tilburg, and Zurich for their valuable comments. We are also grateful to many individuals, among them Ingvild Almås, Kristof Bosmans, Pol Campos-Mercade, Alexander Cappelen, Elena Cettolin, Adam Dominiak, Catalina Franco, Simone Haeckl, Essi Kujansuu, Louis-Pierre Lepage, Elena Mattana, Giovanni Mellace, Arno Riedl, Evan Rose, Christina Rott, Florian Schneider, Sebastian Schweighofer-Kodritsch, Erik Sørensen, Bertil Tungodden, Haruka Uchida, and Huanren Zhang, for very useful discussions and suggestions for this article. The authors acknowledge funding from the European Union through the Marie Skłodowska-Curie Individual Fellowship (Nickolas Gagnon, Project 101058962), from the Aarhus Universitets Forskningsfond (Daniele Nosenzo, Starting Grant 36835), and from the Platform for Inequality Research at Aarhus University. Anda Codreanu provided excellent research assistance. Author Information: Nickolas Gagnon (lead and corresponding author): Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University, Universitetsbyen 51, 8000 Aarhus C, Denmark, nickolasgagnon@econ.au.dk; Daniele Nosenzo: Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University, Universitetsbyen 51, 8000 Aarhus C, Denmark, daniele.nosenzo@econ.au.dk.

I. Introduction

We study preferences for engaging in or opposing discrimination—what we refer to as discrimination preferences. We focus on moral discrimination preferences beyond self-interest. First, we consider discrimination motivated by tastes for protected groups (Becker, 1957; Goldberg, 1982). We study tastes as desires to favor specific groups over others because of a larger care for these groups' wellbeing, even when groups are otherwise identical (in similar ways to, e.g., Alesina et al., 2001; Luttmer, 2001; Fershtman and Gneezy, 2001; List, 2004; Hjort, 2014; Cettolin and Suetens, 2019; Alesina et al., 2023).[1] As counterparts, we introduce and investigate preferences against taste discrimination—a moral desire for equality between otherwise-identical protected groups. We base them on extensive evidence that many oppose (group-neutral) inequality, especially between individuals of equal merit (e.g., Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Konow, 2000; Cappelen et al., 2007; Almås et al., 2020). Preferences against discrimination provide a rationale to oppose discrimination that is separate from self-interest, e.g., standing up to workplace sexism, marching for LGBTQ+ equality, preventing algorithms from using ethnicity, or endorsing broad anti-discrimination policies.

Second, we consider statistical discrimination under incomplete information (Phelps, 1972; Arrow, 1973; Bohren et al., 2019), i.e., discrimination based on group characteristics when information is better known at the group than the individual level. The typical motive for statistical discrimination is profit maximization. In labor settings, for instance, individuals favor workers from a group when doing so is on average more profitable, and workers' productivity (i.e., how much work they carry out) is often taken as a measure of that profitability. We introduce another motive: merit-based preferences for statistical discrimination—a moral desire to reward a group with higher average merit (even though not all its members have high merit). This preference draws on widespread evidence that many prefer rewarding an individual's merit, and productivity is often taken to be a measure of that merit (e.g., Konow, 2000; Cappelen et al., 2007; Almås et al., 2020, 2025). When productivity and profitability are positively related, we can easily confound merit and profit motives. The merit motive also provides a reason for statistical discrimination without monetary incentives, e.g., teachers discriminating against students and jurors against defendants, and for citizens to balk at anti-discrimination policies. As counterparts, we introduce preferences against statistical discrimination—a moral desire for the equality of protected groups under incomplete information.

We study discrimination preferences—moral ones alongside tastes—across three discrimination domains central to debates and policies: ethnicity, gender, and LGBTQ+ status. This allows us to examine our conceptualization of moral discrimination preferences as sharing a common root across domains, but also being domain specific. To do so, we collected over

[1] We focus on this version of tastes, even though the literature primarily treats them as dislike for interactions (for earlier versions similar to ours, see Becker (1957)'s take on tastes and governmental policies and Orr (1976)). Considering interactions may reveal more tastes (e.g., survey data from our participants suggest this could be the case, with 22%, 4%, 6%, 4%, 8%, and 10% preferring a workplace with a larger share of women, men, Black individuals, White individuals, LGBTQ+ individuals, and non-LGBTQ+ individuals, respectively), but incentivizing interactions on large scales is beyond our scope. We acknowledge that, although we place individuals on an equal footing in the experiments, tastes may also capture historical or current group inequality.

60,000 anonymous decisions about how to pay workers in incentivized online experiments with 3,537 individuals representative of UK adults in terms of age, ethnicity, and sex. We focus on UK adults in general because many are decision makers regarding discrimination, such as citizens supporting policies, jurors rendering court verdicts, clients selecting sellers, teachers grading students, managers evaluating workers, and workers affecting their co-workers.[2] To cleanly identify preferences, we designed a controlled environment with protected groups in which an individual makes a series of real decisions about which workers receive a bonus for having previously worked on the same individual assignment. Workers' productivity (i.e., merit) and the profitability of selecting them for the individual are known at the group rather than the worker level. Our design isolates preferences from beliefs by exogenously setting productivity and profitability, and a key advantage is that we can set the two independently to decompose merit vs. profit motives for discrimination.

In two main experiments, for each decision, an individual must select six workers from a pool of typically 12 workers. The pool is unique to that decision and contains an equal share of two protected groups from only one domain at a time: (1) men and women for gender, or (2) Black and White workers for ethnicity, or (3) LGBTQ+ and non-LGBTQ+ workers for LGBTQ+ status. Rather than selecting specific workers, the individual selects either the number of workers from the two groups or a random draw of six workers. That is, one may select two men and four women, who would then be randomly selected from the men and women in the pool, or select a random draw of six workers from the pool. The individual discriminates when selecting more than three workers from a group, rather than choosing three from each group or a random draw. In our setting, productivity is the fraction of the previous assignment that workers have completed. We show the productivity distributions for the two groups in the pool, and the distributions overlap, so a worker from a more productive-on-average group may not be highly productive. In turn, profitability is the amount an individual is paid for selecting workers from each group; we can make it related or unrelated to productivity. After their decisions in one domain, some individuals make decisions in another, so we observe decisions across domains.

We identify tastes for groups and preferences against taste discrimination using decisions in which groups have equal average productivity (equal merit): they completed, on average, the same share of the assignment. In some decisions, discrimination is without monetary stakes for the individual allocating bonuses (the profitability of the two groups is identical), such that an individual favors a group if they prefer it and chooses equality of protected groups if they are against taste discrimination. In other decisions, we vary the profitability of taste discrimination, so that we observe an individual engaging in taste discrimination or refusing to do so when those choices are financially costly. We identify merit-based preferences for statistical discrimination and preferences against statistical discrimination through decisions where groups have unequal average productivity (unequal merit). In some decisions, statistical discrimination is without monetary stakes for the individual allocating bonuses, so that we measure statistical discrimination when the only reason to engage in it is to reward average productivity. In other decisions, the individual receives more for selecting from the more productive-on-average

[2]This wide focus aligns, for instance, with Becker (1957)'s concerns with multitudes, e.g., clients, co-workers, managers, and voters. We also compare individuals with and without management experience.

group, so that we measure statistical discrimination when both merit and profits can drive it, and opposition to such discrimination when refusing to engage in it is financially costly.

The two main results are as follows. First, when we vary groups' average productivity while keeping the two groups equally profitable, we find that preferences are highly heterogeneous and the moral discrimination preferences we introduce are widespread. We identify minorities of individuals with tastes varying in size across the three domains—from 2% with a taste for men to 6% with a taste for non-LGBTQ+ workers—and large majorities with preferences against taste discrimination—from 89% for LGBTQ+ status to 95% for ethnicity. In contrast, we find substantial shares with merit-based preferences for statistical discrimination—from a low of 39% for LGBTQ+ to a high of 58% for gender—as well as against statistical discrimination—from 37% for gender to 50% for LGBTQ+ status.

Second, varying group profitability, we report that discrimination is sensitive to profitability, but only 21% of individuals are pure profit maximizers on average, and moral preferences remain highly relevant. When taste discrimination becomes profitable, a sizable minority is swayed to engage in it—from 18% for ethnicity to 21% for gender—but 75% forgo earnings by refusing to engage in it. When instead it becomes profitable to engage in statistical discrimination, most are enticed to engage in it—ranging from 56% for LGBTQ+ status to 71% for gender. Nevertheless, 32% forgo earnings by refusing to engage in statistical discrimination. The bulk of statistical discrimination with monetary incentives here stems from merit concerns rather than profit maximization. This is because about half of individuals statistically discriminate on merit grounds even without monetary incentives to do so.

Armed with our core data, four variations of the main experiments, and workplace survey questions, we then refine our understanding of discrimination preferences. First, we confirm that moral discrimination preferences share a common root across the three domains but also differ by domain. Second, we evaluate who is more likely to hold certain preferences by examining rich socio-economic heterogeneity—including differences between those with and without management experience. Third, we examine potential consequences beyond the experiments. For instance, we show that tastes and preferences against taste discrimination are divided along political lines and map onto support for a range of policies—from anti-discrimination policies to immigration reductions, same-sex marriage, legal gender changes, and even affordable childcare. In a survey, we also show that reported wage valuations for working at firms with different hiring discrimination policies are broadly consistent with the experiments. That is, ceteris paribus, the average value to workers of a no-taste-discrimination policy is 5% of the wage, with 42% reporting a value of $\geq$2%. The value of a no-statistical-discrimination policy is lower at 3% of the wage, with 35% reporting a value of $\geq$2%, but also one in six reporting a value of $\geq$2% for a policy in favor of statistical discrimination. Fourth, we conduct extensions, i.e., showing that discrimination preferences are related to and distinct from pure (group-neutral) redistributive preferences, that many are even willing to pay to implement statistical discrimination, that the main results are robust to experimenter demand/social desirability effects, and that introducing transparency in the wage-setting process, by having workers observe discrimination and provide feedback, has no impact on discrimination.

We provide three primary contributions through this article. First, we introduce moral pref-

erences into the rich literature in economics on the motivations behind discrimination (e.g., Myrdal, 1944; Becker, 1957; Phelps, 1972; Arrow, 1973; Spence, 1973; Akerlof, 1976; Aigner and Cain, 1977; Lang, 1986; Akerlof and Kranton, 2000; Bertrand et al., 2005; Bartoš et al., 2016; Bordalo et al., 2016; Bohren et al., 2019).[3] By doing so, we also enter a debate about the fairness of discrimination that has little empirical underpinning (e.g., Becker, 1993; Arrow, 1998; List, 2004; Bertrand and Duflo, 2017; Kuhn et al., 2025).[4] We find that, on average, 93% (47%) of individuals are against taste (statistical) discrimination on moral grounds, which can be a strong basis for policies against taste discrimination, but highlights the difficulty of gathering support for policies against statistical discrimination. Moreover, that most statistical discrimination here stems from merit concerns suggests that tackling it is more challenging than previously thought, e.g., providing information or rendering it unprofitable through fines may not eliminate it because of its moral appeal.

Second, our article extends the moral judgments literature in economics (e.g., Konow, 2000; Fong, 2001; Cappelen et al., 2007, 2013; Bartling et al., 2015; Almås et al., 2020; Cappelen et al., 2020; Enke, 2020; Stantcheva, 2021; Andre, 2023; Cappelen et al., 2023; Almås et al., 2025). We show that preferences about taste and statistical discrimination emerge from moral concerns about equality and merit, building on the literature's investigation of these concerns for group-neutral individuals. Previous studies provide surprisingly little empirical examination of the consequences of these concerns for discrimination. An exception is Cappelen et al. (2025), which contemporaneously shows that the acceptance of men falling behind women in education is consistent with merit-based statistical discrimination. Earlier on, Fong and Luttmer (2011) also shows structurally that worthiness perceptions can underpin ethnic discrimination in giving to charity recipients.[5] Ours is the only study systematically incorporating both equality and merit motives, and we also highlight that moral concerns are not colorblind; rather, they interact with domains. Overall, our investigation highlights a paradox of meritocratic morality

[3]Prominent experiments we do not mention elsewhere include Ayres and Siegelman (1995); Neumark et al. (1996); Weichselbaumer (2003); Ahmed and Hammarstedt (2008); Fong and Luttmer (2009); Castillo and Petrie (2010); Hanson and Hawley (2011); Oreopoulos (2011); Pope and Sydnor (2011); Castillo et al. (2013); Doleac and Stein (2013); Ewens et al. (2014); Reuben et al. (2014); Feld et al. (2016); Agan and Starr (2018); Hedegaard and Tyran (2018); Kessler et al. (2019); Neumark et al. (2019); Rao (2019); Acquisti and Fong (2020); Berge et al. (2020); Cui et al. (2020); Coffman et al. (2021); Lowe (2021); Sarsons et al. (2021); Corno et al. (2022); Settele (2022); Aksoy et al. (2023); Bellemare et al. (2023); Christensen and Timmins (2023); Haaland and Roth (2023); Haushofer et al. (2023); Campos-Mercade and Mengel (2024); Exley et al. (2024); Karpowitz et al. (2024); Lepage (2024); Aksoy et al. (2025); Evsyukova® et al. (2025); Ghosh et al. (2026).

[4]The exception to the lack of empirical work is Kuhn et al. (2025), which reports similar fairness ratings of ethnic discrimination for taste and statistical reasons. Two differences are that it uses a survey with hypothetical scenarios and studies taste as the avoidance of social interactions with a group without animosity toward the group. It also goes beyond this question by (1) showing that varying reasons behind tastes and belief accuracy affect fairness ratings, and (2) categorizing individuals according to these variations, neither of which we explore. In law and philosophy, see Alexander (1992); Arneson (2006); Hellman (2008); Lippert-Rasmussen (2013).

[5]In an incentivized experiment, Cappelen et al. (2025) shows that under uncertainty about the effort put into a task, individuals on average (1) compensate a woman who performs worse than a man more than a man who performs worse than a woman, and (2) believe men performing worse exerted lower effort than women performing worse. Removing uncertainty reduces favoritism, consistent with individuals acting on their beliefs that women have a higher average merit than men, rather than on their taste only. Also using an experiment, Fong and Luttmer (2011) shows that manipulating the perceived ethnicity of donation recipients alters their perceived worthiness, and structurally estimates that discrimination decreases donation through perceived lower worthiness.

for discrimination—while merit may justify rejecting taste discrimination of groups with equal merit, it also justifies statistical discrimination under incomplete information.

Third, the presence of moral preferences raises new considerations for evaluating discrimination and its sources. Among others, preferences against discrimination mean that measuring beliefs about groups (e.g., Bordalo et al., 2016; Esponda et al., 2023; Barron et al., 2025), such as their profitability or merit, is not enough to conclude that individuals will use those beliefs to discriminate. Preferences for merit-based statistical discrimination also make it challenging to infer beliefs from observing statistical discrimination or its absence, e.g., one may observe no discrimination if individuals' beliefs about merit and profitability move in opposite directions and offset each other. Moreover, preferences against discrimination also raise new challenges for comprehensively evaluating prejudice, e.g., finding that individuals are, on average, less generous toward a group (e.g., Fershtman and Gneezy, 2001; Cettolin and Suetens, 2019; Mujcic and Frijters, 2021; Kudashvili and Lergetporer, 2022) may mask the fact that none or most individuals are willing to prevent discrimination—two very different situations.

The rest of this article is organized as follows. We briefly propose our conceptualization of discrimination preferences in Section II, present the main experiments in Section III, provide the data analyses in Section IV, discuss ramifications in Section V, and conclude in Section VI.

II. Conceptualizing Discrimination Preferences

We conceptualize discrimination decisions in a manner that resembles the framework introduced by Cappelen et al. (2007, 2013), in which an individual trades off (1) their own earnings, and (2) moral redistribution preferences about how income should be distributed among group-neutral individuals. Instead, we consider decisions about protected groups, i.e., based on a domain such as ethnicity, gender, and LGBTQ+ status. In addition, instead of redistribution preferences, we consider three types of discrimination preferences: tastes for groups, and two moral ones—preferences against discrimination, and merit-based preferences for statistical discrimination. They are moral in that they are grounded in moral principles unrelated to individuals' own interests. Moreover, although our moral discrimination preferences are rooted in pure redistribution preferences, we allow them to differ across discrimination domains. That is, preferences about gender discrimination do not necessarily translate into the same preferences about ethnic or LGBTQ+ discrimination.

We provide an example that closely follows our experiments, set in the context of an individual in management or human resources making a decision under incomplete information. However, it is applicable to other settings with incomplete information. This includes, for instance, teachers grading students, judges and jurors evaluating a case, clients choosing sellers, and workers choosing how to coordinate or collaborate with co-workers. In different cases, what serves as a merit basis may vary, e.g., effort, productivity, honesty, criminality, and, in the case of teachers, judges, and jurors, the profitability of decisions may simply be set to zero.

An individual must select which workers from one of two protected groups from a domain, e.g., men and women, receive a bonus for their completed work (equivalently, the decision can be to select workers to hire or promote). The individual knows the average productivity

(the work completed, which we take as merit) of the two groups, and the average profitability of selecting from each group (which may reflect that bonuses affect retention, and ultimately earnings). Neither productivity nor profitability is available at the worker level. Furthermore, not all workers in one group have greater merit and are more profitable to select than those in the other group.[6] For simplicity, the two groups have the same number of workers.

We define *discrimination* as failing to select an equal number of workers from each group or a random draw. In other words, it is the unequal selection of workers who are either (1) identical in productivity or (2) whose productivity can only be estimated by considering average group productivity. The individual values their own earnings but may also incur a psychological cost for deviating from their discrimination preference. The preferences and the size of the psychological cost are heterogeneous. If the psychological cost is zero, the individual maximizes their earnings when implementing their preference is costly, and implements that preference in decisions without monetary stakes for the individual. Otherwise, an individual's decision is a tradeoff between (1) their expected earnings and (2) their discrimination preference.[7]

If taste is the only discrimination preference, individuals with a taste for a group favor that group when groups are equally profitable, but trade off doing so and their earnings when the group is less profitable. In contrast, individuals without a taste are indifferent between equally profitable groups, and they maximize their earnings by only selecting workers from the most profitable group when groups differ in profitability. This is how we often think of statistical discrimination, and the merit of groups plays no role.

Now we consider the following two moral discrimination preferences.

Preferences against discrimination. We propose that individuals may have preferences against discrimination in that they have a moral desire to treat protected groups equally. Such preferences build on widespread evidence that many prefer equality between (group-neutral) individuals, especially between individuals with equal merit (e.g., Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Konow, 2000; Cappelen et al., 2007; Almås et al., 2020, 2025). We consider two options to implement such equality. Individuals may want to select an equal number of workers from each group, which corresponds to ex-post group equality (it ensures equal outcomes). They may instead want to select a random draw of workers, which corresponds to ex-ante group equality (it ensures equal chances).[8]

Those who value protected-group equality seek to achieve equality for specific groups. For example, they are concerned with ethnic equality when they must choose half of a fixed number of workers to receive a bonus, even though their choice does not affect overall inequality (regardless of ethnic inequality, half of the workers receive the bonus and half do not). Although individuals may have underlying pure redistributive preferences for avoiding inequality

[6] We assume earnings from selecting either group are equally risky, which we ensure in the experiments.

[7] The decision is conscious, as in most of the literature. We leave it to future research to consider potentially unconscious decisions (e.g., Bertrand et al., 2005; Carlana, 2019; Barron et al., 2025) in our framework.

[8] The two equality options match classical conceptions of equality—ex post (Harsanyi, 1955) and ex ante (Diamond, 1967)—both finding support in settings with neutral groups (e.g., Krawczyk and Le Lec, 2010; Brock et al., 2013; Cappelen et al., 2013; Cettolin and Riedl, 2016). Ex-ante equality aligns with UK and US anti-discrimination law, and ex-post equality aligns with what Scandinavian countries sometimes seek to implement (e.g., equalizing the proportions of men and women among similarly-qualified workers).

between neutral groups, preferences against discrimination also differ in that they are specific to each domain.[9] Moreover, preferences against taste discrimination—which we take as a desire for the equality of protected groups that have equal merit—may be stronger than preferences against statistical discrimination—which we take as a desire for the equality of protected groups when information is incomplete and one group has a higher merit only on average.[10] In our framework, provided that the psychological cost of deviating from their preferences is non-zero, individuals against discrimination trade off group equality and their earnings.

Merit-based preference for statistical discrimination. We propose that, under incomplete information where productivity is better known at the group than the worker level, individuals may prefer to reward a more productive-on-average protected group on meritocratic grounds. We base this preference on previous work showing that, at least under complete information, many individuals prefer to favor a more productive (group-neutral) individual over a less productive one as productivity is taken as a measure of merit (e.g., Konow, 2000; Cappelen et al., 2007; Almås et al., 2020, 2025). Here, individuals apply their meritocratic concerns at the group level, so they are likely to reward more productive individuals, as well as some less productive ones (analogously, they maximize the probability that more productive workers are rewarded). Merit-based preferences for statistical discrimination stem from equivalent merit preferences about neutral groups, but they are also distinct since they depend on the discrimination domains. For example, a merit-based preference for statistical discrimination based on gender does not necessarily imply the same preference for statistical discrimination based on LGBTQ+ status, since the moral acceptability of rewarding average merit under incomplete information may vary across domains and even across groups within a domain. Merit-based preferences for statistical discrimination extend to different domains, groups, and decisions the concept of *statistical fairness* contemporaneously proposed by Cappelen et al. (2025) for explaining the acceptance of men falling behind women in education.[11]

In our framework, when one group is more productive on average, but groups are equally profitable, individuals with merit-based preferences for statistical discrimination engage in it by selecting workers from the more productive group. In the more usual case where a group is more profitable and productive on average, those individuals engage in statistical discrimination by selecting workers from that group on both profit and merit grounds. In the more unusual case where a group is more productive on average but less profitable, provided that the psychological cost is non-zero, those individuals trade off their preferences and profits, and may still discriminate by selecting more workers from the more productive group on merit grounds.

Overall, these two moral preferences provide grounds for two important behaviors that tastes and earnings maximization do not predict: (1) opposition to discrimination beyond self-

[9] Gagnon et al. (2025) comes closest to a preference against discrimination by showing that workers decrease their labor supply more when they themselves face gender-discriminatory inequality than neutral inequality.

[10] A possibility is that individuals conceptualize taste discrimination as less of a violation of equality principles than statistical discrimination, for instance, since the first occurs between individuals of equal merit, and the second does not on average. In this sense, meritocrats may value the equality of groups with equal merit more. For simplicity, we abstain from discussing possible conceptual differences in detail.

[11] Moreover, they are closely related to Cappelen et al. (2023), which shows the existence of preferences for trading off probabilities of false positives and false negatives when rewarding an individual, and to Fong and Luttmer (2011)'s earlier investigation of how merit and ethnicity may interact.

interest, and (2) statistical discrimination without monetary stakes for those discriminating.

III. Main Experiments

To empirically investigate discrimination preferences, we designed two main experiments, Studies 1 and 2, both incentivized and structured similarly. We conducted them on an online platform with a total sample of 2,893 individuals representative of UK adults based on age, ethnicity, and sex quotas (more individuals took part in extensions, which we present later, bringing the total to 3,537 individuals).[12] The design builds on the staple methodology of Cappelen et al. (2007, 2013) and Almås et al. (2020, 2025) to measure pure redistribution preferences—in which an individual assigns bonuses between two group-neutral workers—that we extend to a discrimination setting with protected groups, multiple workers, and incomplete information.[13] For simplicity, we often refer to two types of groups: A for groups of generally-advantaged members (men, White workers, non-LGBTQ+ workers) and D for groups of generally-disadvantaged members (women, Black workers, LGBTQ+ workers).

Before the experiments, we recruited approximately 3,000 platform workers to work on the same individual assignment of copying lines of characters. The assignment stopped whenever a worker made a mistake. We recruited A and D workers based on demographic characteristics across three discrimination domains (men and women for gender, Black and White workers for ethnicity, and LGBTQ+ and non-LGBTQ+ workers for LGBTQ+ status), and thus generated large productivity distributions by group (we take productivity to be the assignment share completed). Workers were paid a fixed fee of 0.50 GBP and informed that their performance would later be reviewed to determine whether they would receive a 2 GBP bonus.

Decisions. In the experiments, each individual made a series of fully anonymous decisions about which six workers would receive the 2 GBP bonus from a pool of 12 or 16 workers.[14] Each pool contained equal shares from two groups from a single discrimination domain at a time. The individual could not select specific workers from the pool, but instead chose the number of workers from the two groups. For example, in the gender domain, they chose the number of men and women. They could choose one of eight options: (1) zero A workers and six D workers, (2) one A worker and five D workers, (3) two A workers and four D workers, (4) three A workers and three D workers, (5) four A workers and two D workers, (6) five A workers and one D worker, (7) six A workers and zero D workers, or (8) a random draw of six workers. Individuals have two options for implementing group equality (three workers from

[12] We employed the Prolific platform, which implements quotas by constructing 50 cells based on age, ethnicity, and sex, and allocating registered UK adults to match the per-cell proportions to UK statistics (see Haaland et al., 2023 for representative sample providers). Appendix A shows socio-demographic characteristics. We note that participants are more educated: nearly 60% hold at least a bachelor's degree, compared with 44.9% of UK adults aged 25 to 64 in 2024 (OECD, 2024).

[13] An advantage of this design is its external validity, as group-neutral moral redistribution preferences elicited with it are important in explaining government redistribution and attitudes toward redistributive policies (e.g., Almås et al., 2020, 2025). Our four main changes are to (1) employ protected groups to study discrimination, (2) use several workers instead of two to study all preferences we introduce, (3) provide information at the group rather than the worker level to study statistical discrimination, and (4) vary the profitability of discrimination.

[14] We rely on a double-anonymity procedure: we recruited and paid using platform-provided anonymized IDs so we cannot trace identities, and the platform cannot access our data since we used external software.

each group and the random draw), reflecting ex-post and ex-ante equality. We randomized the presentation order of the eight options in each decision.[15]

Workers selected from a group for a decision were randomly selected from that group in the pool for that decision. For example, in the LGBTQ+ domain, selecting four LGBTQ+ workers resulted in four LGBTQ+ workers being randomly drawn from the six or eight in the pool. Individuals made decisions about one or two of the three domains. If they encountered two domains, they made all decisions for the first domain before those for the second, and the domain order was randomized. An individual faced a different pool of workers in each decision, so that if they discriminated against workers in one decision, they could not compensate those workers in another. There was a 5% chance that one of an individual's decisions would be implemented, and we then paid selected workers the bonus. Workers not selected were neither given the bonus nor compensated by anyone else.

In each decision, the individual knew the average productivity of groups A and D and the profitability of selecting workers from each group. In this manner, we set exogenous beliefs about productivity and profitability to identify preferences.

Productivity (merit). We provided the average productivity by showing the entire productivity distribution of the two groups in the pool. The distributions overlapped, so there were always some workers in one group who were less productive than those in the other group. Therefore, favoring the more productive group entailed rewarding more productive workers only on average. We exogenously varied productivity across decisions by changing the composition of A and D workers in the pool.

Profitability. We provided the profitability of groups by paying individuals for selecting A and D workers. The payment was clearly shown. We make a valuable simplification compared to other statistical discrimination settings by paying individuals fixed amounts per A and D workers selected. This is equivalent to paying individuals the expected profitability of A and D workers in a pool. That is, when individuals select from the more profitable group, they are guaranteed to earn more rather than to earn more on average. This simplification leaves the profit motive for discrimination intact, makes the instructions easier to comprehend, and ensures that selecting from each group is financially equally risky, i.e., that financial risk does not become another reason to discriminate, which would threaten the identification of preferences. We exogenously varied profitability across decisions by changing how much individuals are paid for selecting A and D workers in the pool.

Discrimination. As in Section II, discrimination is the failure to select three A workers and three D workers or a random draw. To ease the reading, we typically take a shortcut in formulation by writing that individuals have a certain *discrimination preference* when their behavior is consistent with it. For instance, we write that individuals have a taste for non-LGBTQ+ workers or a merit-based preference for statistical discrimination based on gender.

Differences across decisions. Table 1 summarizes the 14 main decisions per discrimina-

[15] We need at least three options to identify engaging in and opposing discrimination. We employ more options to create a richer picture. For instance, if individuals discriminate on merit grounds, additional options make it easier to observe whether they discriminate more when financial incentives are added. Randomizing the option order gives us more confidence that consistent choices stem from preferences rather than randomness. Extending our setting to unequal groups is possible; discrimination would be deviating from group proportions.

Table 1: 14 Main Decisions

	Decision	Number of workers in pool (50% A, 50% D)	Average productivity (merit) of groups A and D	Profitability of selecting groups A and D
	TASTE SITUATION			
Decisions without monetary stakes	EQUAL	12	Equal	Equal
	EQUAL*	16	Equal	Equal
Decisions with monetary stakes	PROFIT5%A	12	Equal	5% higher for A
	PROFIT33%A	12	Equal	33% higher for A
	PROFIT5%D	12	Equal	5% higher for D
	PROFIT33%D	12	Equal	33% higher for D
	STATISTICAL SITUATION			
Decisions without monetary stakes	PROD25%A	12	25% higher for A	Equal
	PROD50%A	12	50% higher for A	Equal
	PROD25%D	12	25% higher for D	Equal
	PROD50%D	12	50% higher for D	Equal
Decisions with monetary stakes	PROD25%A-PROFIT5%A	12	25% higher for A	5% higher for A
	PROD50%A-PROFIT33%A	12	50% higher for A	33% higher for A
	PROD25%D-PROFIT5%D	12	25% higher for D	5% higher for D
	PROD50%D-PROFIT33%D	12	50% higher for D	33% higher for D

Notes: Decisions without (with) monetary stakes do not (do) involve profits for the individual making the decisions, but the decision is always the same: select six workers to receive a monetary bonus. Generally-advantaged (A) groups are men for gender, White workers for ethnicity, and non-LGBTQ+ workers for LGBTQ+ status. Generally-disadvantaged (D) groups are women for gender, Black workers for ethnicity, and LGBTQ+ workers for LGBTQ+ status. Individuals always choose six workers from a pool balanced between A and D workers from a single domain in a decision, e.g., men vs. women for gender. Study 1 contains all 14 decisions for gender (N=1,212), and Study 2 contains eight decisions for ethnicity (N=1,111), LGBTQ+ status (N=1,114), and gender (N=567) since it does not include PROFIT5%A(D), PROD25%A(D), and PROD25%A(D)-PROFIT5%A(D). As an example, PROD50%A-PROFIT33%A (as in panel (d) of Figure 1) indicates that A workers are 50% more productive on average than D workers and that the individual is paid 33% more per A worker selected. We randomized whether TASTE SITUATION or STATISTICAL SITUATION decisions came first. In the TASTE SITUATION, decisions without monetary stakes came first, followed, in random order, by decisions with monetary stakes where one group is more profitable and decisions with monetary stakes where the other group is more profitable. In the STATISTICAL SITUATION, we randomized decisions where one group is more productive on average and decisions where the other group is.

tion domain. Study 1 individuals each made all 14 decisions for gender discrimination. Study 2 individuals made eight of these decisions, usually for two discrimination domains, but sometimes in a single domain, randomly drawn from gender, ethnicity, and LGBTQ+ status. Study 2 individuals also made two additional decisions, with productivity and profitability negatively correlated, as presented in Subsection IV.E. In addition, the minority of Study 2 individuals who made decisions about a single discrimination domain also made decisions about two neutral groups, as discussed in Subsection IV.E. Therefore, in total, individuals in Study 1 made 14 decisions and those in Study 2 made 20. Figure 1 provides screenshot examples of decisions.

Identification. Our experiments have three key features for identifying preferences. First, we can identify preferences by clearly revealing workers' gender, ethnicity, or LGBTQ+ status, as well as productivity and profitability. Therefore, an individual may favor specific groups (or implement equality for those groups), and we do not conflate preferences with uncontrolled beliefs about productivity and profitability or about whether workers belong to a group. Second, we can decompose merit vs. profit motivations behind discrimination by varying groups' average productivity while holding their profitability constant. Third, repeated decisions enable us to estimate distributions of preferences, and do so jointly for gender, ethnicity, and LGBTQ+ status—which allows us to examine commonalities and differences across domains.

We evaluate tastes for groups and preferences against taste discrimination in TASTE SITUATION decisions, where groups A and D have equal average productivity. In EQUAL decisions

2. Your decision concerns 12 individuals with the same assignment:

- 6 women: 3 completed the ***entire*** assignment correctly, 3 completed ***half*** of it correctly.
- 6 men: 3 completed the ***entire*** assignment correctly, 3 completed ***half*** of it correctly.

Please select one of these options:

- ◯ 1 man and 5 women receive £2 each; you receive £30.00
- ◯ 6 men and 0 women receive £2 each; you receive £30.00
- ◯ 4 men and 2 women receive £2 each; you receive £30.00
- ◯ randomly draw 6 workers to receive £2 each; you receive £30.00
- ◯ 5 men and 1 woman receive £2 each; you receive £30.00
- ◯ 3 men and 3 women receive £2 each; you receive £30.00
- ◯ 2 men and 4 women receive £2 each; you receive £30.00
- ◯ 0 men and 6 women receive £2 each; you receive £30.00

(a) TASTE SITUATION without monetary stakes (EQUAL)

1. Your decision concerns 12 individuals with the same assignment:

- 6 women: 3 completed the ***entire*** assignment correctly, 3 completed ***one quarter*** of it correctly.
- 6 men: 3 completed the ***entire*** assignment correctly, 3 completed ***half*** of it correctly.

Please select one of these options:

- ◯ 3 men and 3 women receive £2 each; you receive £30.00
- ◯ randomly draw 6 workers to receive £2 each; you receive £30.00
- ◯ 0 men and 6 women receive £2 each; you receive £30.00
- ◯ 5 men and 1 woman receive £2 each; you receive £30.00
- ◯ 2 men and 4 women receive £2 each; you receive £30.00
- ◯ 1 man and 5 women receive £2 each; you receive £30.00
- ◯ 4 men and 2 women receive £2 each; you receive £30.00
- ◯ 6 men and 0 women receive £2 each; you receive £30.00

(b) STATISTICAL SITUATION without monetary stakes (PROD25%A)

2. Your decision concerns 12 individuals with the same assignment:

- 6 women: 3 completed the ***entire*** assignment correctly, 3 completed ***half*** of it correctly.
- 6 men: 3 completed the ***entire*** assignment correctly, 3 completed ***half*** of it correctly.

Please select one of these options:

- ◯ 4 men and 2 women receive £2 each; you receive £25
- ◯ 3 men and 3 women receive £2 each; you receive £26.25
- ◯ 1 man and 5 women receive £2 each; you receive £28.75
- ◯ randomly draw 6 workers to receive £2 each; you receive £26.25
- ◯ 2 men and 4 women receive £2 each; you receive £27.50
- ◯ 5 men and 1 woman receive £2 each; you receive £23.75
- ◯ 0 men and 6 women receive £2 each; you receive £30.00
- ◯ 6 men and 0 women receive £2 each; you receive £22.50

(c) TASTE SITUATION with monetary stakes (PROFIT33%D)

2. Your decision concerns 12 individuals with the same assignment:

- 6 women: 3 completed the ***entire*** assignment correctly, 3 completed ***no part*** of it correctly.
- 6 men: 3 completed the ***entire*** assignment correctly, 3 completed ***half*** of it correctly.

Please select one of these options:

- ◯ 2 men and 4 women receive £2 each; you receive £25
- ◯ randomly draw 6 workers to receive £2 each; you receive £26.25
- ◯ 6 men and 0 women receive £2 each; you receive £30.00
- ◯ 4 men and 2 women receive £2 each; you receive £27.50
- ◯ 0 men and 6 women receive £2 each; you receive £22.50
- ◯ 5 men and 1 woman receive £2 each; you receive £28.75
- ◯ 3 men and 3 women receive £2 each; you receive £26.25
- ◯ 1 man and 5 women receive £2 each; you receive £23.75

(d) STATISTICAL SITUATION with monetary stakes (PROD50%A-PROFIT33%A)

Figure 1: Decision examples about the gender domain: men (group A) vs. women (group D).

without monetary stakes for the individual selecting workers (as in panel (a) of Figure 1), the profitability of discrimination is zero, so we identify tastes of individuals who favor a group and preferences against taste discrimination for those choosing group equality. We create two nearly identical decisions without monetary stakes (EQUAL and EQUAL*)—one with 12 workers and one with 16 workers—and randomly re-order the presentation of the eight options for each decision to examine consistency and whether tastes simply come from random choices. In decisions with monetary stakes (e.g., PROFIT33%D, as in panel (c) of Figure 1), we vary the profitability of taste discrimination by paying the individual 5% or 33% more per worker from a group, so we measure how taste discrimination and opposition to it change with profits.

Similarly, we study merit-based preferences for statistical discrimination and preferences against statistical discrimination in STATISTICAL SITUATION decisions, where, on average, one group is 25% or 50% more productive. In decisions without monetary stakes for the individual selecting workers (e.g., PROD25%A, as in panel (b) of Figure 1), there is no profit in discrimination, but we identify whether the individual engages in statistical discrimination to reward the more productive-on-average group. In decisions with monetary stakes (e.g., PROD50%A-PROFIT33%A, as in panel (d) of Figure 1), the individual is paid 5% or 33% more per worker from the more productive-on-average group, so we measure statistical discrimination caused by both profit and merit motives, and how statistical discrimination and the opposition to it vary with profits. When studying statistical discrimination, we account for the tastes identified in EQUAL so that we do not confound the two types of discrimination, e.g., an individual with a taste for group A would favor group A in PROD50%A and in EQUAL.

We conducted Study 1 (1,212 individuals) in October 2023 and Study 2 (1,681 individuals) in November 2024. Individuals participated in a single study. They signed an informed consent form disclosing that they were participating in a study and that the workers were real and previously recruited from the same platform. All individuals had to answer comprehension questions correctly to participate. Their participation lasted an average of 22 minutes, and their mean payment was 4 GBP (11 GBP/hour). Appendix N provides Study 1's instructions.

IV. Empirical Assessment

We begin by investigating discrimination preferences, focusing on how common moral ones are. Then, we study commonalities and differences across domains, analyze who has which preferences, explore their potential consequences, provide extensions to better understand them, and discuss practical significance and pre-registration deviations. Throughout, we implement the following two conventions:

Pre-registered test notation. We indicate pre-registered tests with their analysis plan numbers in footnotes. The plans are available at osf.io/z8hwj, osf.io/fuwqc, and osf.io/gnhys.

Statistical significance. For simplicity, we write that we find a *difference* when a test on this difference is statistically significant at the 5% level (our findings also often meet $p<.001$ or $p<.0001$). For instance, we write that two shares differ only if the difference satisfies $p<.05$.

IV.A. Discrimination Preferences

We start by assessing preferences when the two groups are equally profitable but vary in average productivity. Then, we measure how discrimination changes when its profitability varies.

IV.A.1 Distributions of Preferences

Figure 2 provides the distribution of choices for the decisions without monetary stakes with 12 workers. Each decision varies in the average group productivity, and there is no profit in discrimination. The three panels show the distributions for the three domains—gender (panel a), ethnicity (panel b), and LGBTQ+ status (panel c). We employ the gender dataset with five decisions from Study 1 and the ethnicity and LGBTQ+ status datasets with three decisions from Study 2.[16] The number of D workers out of six workers selected to receive the bonus is on the vertical axis (the rest of the six workers are A workers from the same domain). The middle column shows the distribution for the TASTE SITUATION decision EQUAL, where the average productivity of the two groups is equal. The other columns are STATISTICAL SITUATION decisions: A workers (men or White workers or non-LGBTQ+ workers) are more productive on average in the left columns (PROD25%A, PROD50%A), and so are D workers (women or Black workers or LGBTQ+ workers) in the right columns (PROD25%D, PROD50%D). The two types of equality (three workers from each group or a random draw of six workers) are shown as selecting three workers from each group.

Table 2 provides the accompanying tests of how, relative to EQUAL, varying average group productivity alters the percentages of (1) anti-discrimination choices (three workers from each group or a random draw, columns 1a–c), (2) pro-A choices (four or more workers from group A, columns 2a–c), and (3) pro-D choices (four or more workers from group D, columns 3a–c), using linear probability model regressions with socio-demographic controls.[17] Using the regression estimates, Table 3 then displays the percentage of individuals with each preference.

Expected choices. Pure profit-maximizing individuals are indifferent without financial incentives; we may expect their choices to be uniformly distributed since we randomly re-order options for every decision. Individuals with a taste should instead select more workers from one of the two groups in EQUAL, and we identify the share of those who do so (e.g., they select four or more men or women in the middle column of panel (a) in Figure 2). Individuals with a preference against taste discrimination should choose group equality (three workers from each group or the random draw) in EQUAL, and we identify the share doing so (e.g., those individuals select three men and three women in the middle column of panel (a) in Figure 2).

Then, individuals who prefer statistical discrimination on merit grounds should select more workers from the more productive group in the left and right decisions where the two groups differ in average productivity (e.g., they select four or more men in the leftmost column and four or more women in the rightmost column of panel (a) in Figure 2). To identify their share,

[16] We employ the smaller Study 2 gender dataset when we formally test for aggregate differences across domains in Subsection IV.B. Differences are not large enough to alter the picture we present here.

[17] We use this model for its simplicity. Socio-demographic controls are: age, ethnicity, number of studies completed, gender, income, student status, employment status, UK region, living in one of the largest 10 UK cities, marital status, being a UK national, education, LGBTQ+ status (Study 2), and being religious (Study 2).

(a) Gender—Men vs. Women



(b) Ethnicity—White vs. Black Workers



(c) LGBTQ+ Status—Non-LGBTQ+ vs. LGBTQ+ Workers

Figure 2: Distribution of Choices When Varying Group Average Productivity in Decisions Without Monetary Stakes for Individuals Selecting Workers

Notes. Individuals choose six workers from a balanced pool of 12 generally-advantaged (A) and generally-disadvantaged (D) workers from a single discrimination domain at a time: men (A) vs. women (D) for gender in panel (a), White (A) vs. Black (D) workers for ethnicity in panel (b), or non-LGBTQ+ (A) vs. LGBTQ+ (D) workers for LGBTQ+ status in panel (c). In each domain, we classify three types of choices: anti-discrimination (three A and three D workers or a random draw), pro-A (four or more A workers; the rest of the six are D workers), and pro-D (four or more D workers; the rest of the six are A workers). We show the distributions of individual choices for decisions without monetary stakes for individuals selecting workers. Each point is a choice, each column a decision, and the vertical axis shows the number of D workers out of six chosen in a decision (the rest of the six selected are A workers from the same domain). The two groups are equally productive in the middle column (EQUAL, TASTE SITUATION), group A is 25 or 50% more productive on average in the left column (PROD25(50)%A, STATISTICAL SITUATION), and group D is 25 or 50% more productive on average in the right columns (PROD25(50)%D, STATISTICAL SITUATION). Individuals who choose a random draw are shown as selecting three D workers. Obs. per decision: 1,212 for gender (Study 1), 1,111 for ethnicity (Study 2), and 1,114 for LGBTQ+ status (Study 2).

Table 2: Effects of Varying Average Group Productivity in Decisions Without Monetary Stakes for Individuals Selecting Workers on the Percentage Making Each Choice Type

	Anti-discrimination choice			Pro-advantaged (A) choice			Pro-disadvantaged (D) choice		
	Gender	Ethnicity	LGBTQ+ status	Pro-men	Pro-White	Pro-non-LGBTQ+	Pro-women	Pro-Black	Pro-LGBTQ+
	(1a)	(1b)	(1c)	(2a)	(2b)	(2c)	(3a)	(3b)	(3c)
STATISTICAL SITUATION									
PROD25%A	-.481****			.473****			.008		
	(.016)			(.015)			(.005)		
PROD50%A	-.576****	-.450****	-.388****	.574****	.448****	.391****	.002	.002	-.003
	(.015)	(.016)	(.017)	(.015)	(.016)	(.016)	(.006)	(.006)	(.007)
PROD25%D	-.485****			.011**			.474****		
	(.015)			(.006)			(.015)		
PROD50%D	-.587****	-.452****	-.400****	.009*	.011*	.021**	.577****	.441****	.379****
	(.015)	(.016)	(.017)	(.005)	(.006)	(.008)	(.015)	(.016)	(.016)
EQUAL	.949****	.939****	.891****	.017****	.025****	.064****	.034****	.036****	.045****
(constant)	(.006)	(.007)	(.009)	(.004)	(.005)	(.007)	(.005)	(.006)	(.006)
Wald (p)									
All PROD decisions	<.0001	<.0001	<.0001	<.0001	<.0001	<.0001	<.0001	<.0001	<.0001
Asymmetry A vs. D	.629	.859	.320						
All variables	<.0001	<.0001	<.0001	<.0001	<.0001	<.0001	<.0001	<.0001	<.0001
R^2	.201	.217	.175	.371	.310	.220	.369	.303	.245
Obs	5,940	3,240	3,240	5,940	3,240	3,240	5,940	3,240	3,240

Notes: Individuals choose six workers from a balanced pool of 12 generally-advantaged (A) and generally-disadvantaged (D) workers from a single discrimination domain at a time: men (A) vs. women (D) for gender, White (A) vs. Black (D) workers for ethnicity, or non-LGBTQ+ (A) vs. LGBTQ+ (D) workers for LGBTQ+ status. We employ linear probability models for one discrimination domain (gender in cols. 1a-2a-3a, ethnicity in cols. 1b-2b-3b, and LGBTQ+ status in cols. 1c-2c-3c), with individual-level random effects and robust standard errors. The **dependent variable** is an indicator for an anti-discrimination choice (three workers from each group or a random draw) in cols. 1a–c, an indicator for a pro-A choice (four or more workers out of six from group A: men/White/non-LGBTQ+ workers) in cols. 2a–c, and an indicator for a pro-D choice (four or more workers out of six from group D: women/Black/LGBTQ+ workers) in cols. 3a–c. We use the data from three/five decisions without monetary stakes: EQUAL (groups A and D are equally productive on average and equally profitable), PROD25%A (group A is 25% more productive on average than group D and the two groups are equally profitable), PROD50%A, PROD25%D, and PROD50%D. As **independent variables** of interest, we employ indicators for the decisions without monetary stakes, except for the TASTE SITUATION decision EQUAL, which serves as the baseline decision. The coefficient of EQUAL is the constant from the same regression without control variables. We include socio-demographic controls (see footnote 17) and an indicator for decisions about a second domain in Study 2. The Wald test *All* PROD *decisions* is on all two/four of the decision coefficients being equal to zero. The Wald test *Asymmetry A vs. D* is on the equality of the coefficients for the generally-advantaged group and the disadvantaged group being more productive (i.e., PROD25%A vs. PROD25%D and PROD50%A vs. PROD50%D). Obs. per decision: 1,212 for gender (Study 1), 1,111 for ethnicity (Study 2), and 1,114 for LGBTQ+ status (Study 2). $^{*}p < .10$, $^{**}p < .05$, $^{***}p < .01$, $^{****}p < .001$.

we average the changes in (1) the share favoring A workers in PROD50%A (where group A is at its most productive) compared to EQUAL, and (2) the share favoring D workers in PROD50%D compared to EQUAL. Individuals against statistical discrimination should instead choose group equality whenever one group is more productive on average (e.g., they select three men and three women in the leftmost and rightmost columns of panel (a) in Figure 2). To identify their share, we average the share doing so in PROD50%A(D).[18]

Choices. Figure 2 and Table 2 allow us to draw several conclusions about the distribution

[18]We identify preferences about statistical discrimination in a simplified aggregate manner to facilitate presentation without sacrificing the essence of what we do. Specifically, our identification ignores these preferences for a minority of individuals—those with tastes and contrarians. First, we do not clearly classify preferences about statistical discrimination for individuals with tastes, which, as we show next, are a minority (7% on average per domain). We do not classify those who always implement their taste as for or against statistical discrimination. Those with a taste for A (D) workers and preferring statistical discrimination are still detected as for statistical discrimination if they choose pro-D (A) in PROD50%D(A) when comparing PROD50%D(A) to EQUAL; they are not classified when comparing PROD50%A(D) to EQUAL. If instead they choose anti-discrimination in PROD50%D(A) to balance their taste and merit, we inaccurately classify them as against statistical discrimination when comparing PROD50%D(A) and EQUAL. Second, we do not capture preferences about statistical discrimination for contrarians who prefer rewarding a less productive group: they choose pro-A (D) in PROD50%D(A) and not in EQUAL, but, from individual data, on average per domain, they represent 2.5% of the sample.

Table 3: Discrimination Preferences from Decisions Without Monetary Stakes

Gender	Pref. against taste disc.	Taste for men	Taste for women	Pref. against stats disc.	Merit-based pref. for stats disc.
Percentage	94	1.7	3.4	37	58
Ethnicity	Pref. against taste disc.	Taste for White workers	Taste for Black workers	Pref. against stats disc.	Merit-based pref. for stats disc.
Percentage	95	2.5	3.6	49	45
LGBTQ+ Status	Pref. against taste disc.	Taste for non-LGBTQ+ workers	Taste for LGBTQ+ workers	Pref. against stats disc.	Merit-based pref. for stats disc.
Percentage	89	6.4	4.5	50	39

Notes: We show the percentage of individuals with each preference in decisions without monetary stakes for individuals selecting workers using Table 2. Preferences against taste discrimination are identified with the EQUAL coefficients in cols. 1a–c, and tastes with the same coefficient in cols. 2a–c and 3a–c. Preferences for merit-based statistical discrimination are identified with the average of the coefficients of PROD50%A in cols. 2a–c and PROD50%D in cols. 3a–c. Preferences against statistical discrimination are identified by subtracting the average of the PROD50%A and PROD50%D coefficients from the EQUAL coefficient in cols. 1a–c. Table C1 provides the same information using only Study 2. Percentages with preferences for or against statistical discrimination do not sum to one hundred because we do not classify them for a minority, largely for individuals with tastes (see footnote 18).

of preferences, which we summarize in Table 3. In the first place, unlike what we may expect under indifference, the shares of anti-discrimination, pro-A, and pro-D choices are clearly not evenly distributed, and, as can be seen in EQUAL, the noise level appears extremely low.[19] Second, using the coefficients of EQUAL (the constant) in Table 2 columns 2a–c and 3a–c, we identify minorities with tastes—1.7% prefer men and 3.4% prefer women, 2.5% prefer White workers and 3.6% prefer Black workers, and 6.4% prefer non-LGBTQ+ workers and 4.5% prefer LGBTQ+ workers.[20] Using the two nearly identical decisions EQUAL and EQUAL*, we also confirm that these tastes do not simply show up because of random choices.[21] Conversely, from the coefficients for EQUAL in columns 1a–c, we detect large majorities with preferences against taste discrimination—94% for gender, 95% for ethnicity, and 89% for LGBTQ+ status.

Third, using the coefficients for PROD50%A in columns 2a–c and PROD50%D in columns 3a–c, we identify substantial shares with merit-based preferences for statistical discrimination—reaching a majority at 58% for gender, a middle ground of 45% for ethnicity, and a minority of 39% for LGBTQ+ status.[22] Subtracting the average of the coefficients for PROD50%A and PROD50%D from the EQUAL coefficient in columns 1a–c, we identify similarly considerable shares with preferences against statistical discrimination—37% for gender, 49% for ethnicity, and 50% for LGBTQ+.[23] These preferences are symmetric in group A or D being more productive at the aggregate level.[24] We note that those engaging in statistical discrimination on merit

[19]Chi-Square Goodness of Fit Tests reject equal proportions of the three choice types in each decision without monetary stakes at $p<.0001$ (pre-reg. Suppl. Interest 2 and Ext. Suppl. Interest 2).

[20]Cols. 2a-3a for gender, cols. 2b-3b for ethnicity, and cols. 2c-3c for LGBTQ+ status, all $p<.0001$.

[21]From EQUAL to EQUAL*, 10% of pro-men (women) choices become pro women (men), 18% of pro-White (Black) choices become pro Black (White), and 14% of pro-non-LGBTQ+ (LGBTQ+) choices become pro LGBTQ+ (non-LGBTQ+). For each domain, we rule out that pro-A and pro-D choices are random using proportion tests ($p<.0004$; with random re-ordering of options, random choices generate 37.5% of such reversals in expectation; pre-reg. Suppl. Interest 2 and Ext. Suppl. Interest 2). Reversals still suggest that, even though tastes are in the minority, we may overestimate them, and that a very small share of individuals are choosing randomly.

[22]The Wald test *All* PROD *decisions* on the two or four PROD(25)50%A(D) coefficients being equal to zero is rejected in Table 2 cols. 2a–3c at $p<.0001$ (pre-reg. Main Interest 1 and Ext. Main Interest 1).

[23]The Wald test *All* PROD *decisions* on the two or four PROD(25)50%A(D) coefficients being equal to zero is rejected in Table 2 cols. 1a–c at $p<.0001$ (pre-reg. Main Interest 1 and Ext. Main Interest 1).

[24]The Wald test *Asymmetry A vs. D* in Table 2 cols. 1a–c shows no significant asymmetry in the aggregate response to group A or D being more productive (joint test on PROD25(50)%A vs. PROD25(50)%D; pre-reg.

grounds maintain a sense of proportionality, as they typically still hire one or two workers from the less productive-on-average group. We summarize our first result as follows.

RESULT 1, DISCRIMINATION PREFERENCES: *Per domain, a minority has a taste, and a large majority is against taste discrimination; around half prefer statistical discrimination on merit grounds, and half are against it. Moral discrimination preferences are therefore widespread.*

Ex-ante vs. ex-post equality. When individuals choose protected-group equality in EQUAL, we report that, on average across domains, 58% choose ex-post equality (three workers from each group) and 42% choose ex-ante equality (random draw of six workers).[25]

Individual profiles in a domain. We construct individual profiles according to taste and statistical discrimination preferences in a domain. On average, 48% are *for statistical but against taste discrimination*, 45% are *fully against discrimination* (against both types), and 7% are *for taste discrimination* (and for or against statistical discrimination). A majority prefers at least one type of discrimination in all domains—rising to two-thirds for gender.

IV.A.2 How Discrimination Changes with its Profitability

Figure 3 provides the distribution of choices for the decisions with monetary stakes with 12 workers—where the profitability of the two protected groups varies—separately for the three discrimination domains. As a reference, the sub-figures also show in the middle the TASTE SITUATION decision without monetary stakes EQUAL, where there is no profitability in favoring a group, and groups are equally productive. We show the TASTE SITUATION decisions with monetary stakes in the left panels (a-c-e), where average productivity is the same for both groups. We provide the STATISTICAL SITUATION decisions with monetary stakes in the right panels (b-d-f), where the two groups are unequally productive on average, and selecting the more productive group is more profitable. Table 4 shows the accompanying statistical tests of how decisions with monetary stakes change the percentages of the three types of choices relative to EQUAL, using linear probability model regressions.

Expected choices. This time, pure profit-maximizing individuals should only select workers from the most profitable group (e.g., they select six men in the leftmost columns and six women in the rightmost columns of panels (a)-(b) in Figure 3). In both TASTE SITUATION and STATISTICAL SITUATION decisions, those with a taste should balance favoring a group with their earnings (e.g., those with a taste for men balance it against the higher earnings from selecting women in the rightmost columns of panels (a)-(b) in Figure 3). Similarly, individuals against discrimination should balance group equality and their earnings. Finally, in STATISTICAL SITUATION decisions (e.g., panel (b) in Figure 3), those with a merit-based preference for statistical discrimination should balance (1) choosing more workers from the more productive-on-average group in the way they prefer on a merit basis alone, and (2) their earnings.[26]

Suppl. Interest 3 and Ext. Suppl. Interest 3). At the individual level, these preferences are symmetric for the majority, but asymmetric for a large minority (see descriptive statistics in Table B1).

[25]Using tests of proportion, there is a difference at $p<.0001$ for gender and ethnicity, but no difference for LGBTQ+ status (pre-reg. Suppl. Interest 1 and Ext. Suppl. Interest 1).

[26]This tradeoff exists for individuals who prefer selecting four or five workers from the more productive group on merit grounds rather than the maximum of six, as this group is also more profitable to select now.

(a) Taste Discrimination—Men vs. Women



(b) Statistical Discrimination—Men vs. Women



(c) Taste Discrimination—White vs. Black Workers



(d) Statistical Discrimination—White vs. Black Workers

(e) Taste Discrimination—Non-LGBTQ+ vs. LGBTQ+ Workers



(f) Statistical Discrimination—Non-LGBTQ+ vs. LGBTQ+ Workers

Figure 3: Distribution of Choices when Varying the Profitability of Taste and Statistical Discrimination

Notes. Individuals choose six workers from a balanced pool of 12 generally-advantaged (A) or generally-disadvantaged (D) workers from a single discrimination domain at a time: men (A) vs. women (D) for gender in panels (a)-(b), White (A) vs. Black (D) workers for ethnicity in panels (c)-(d), or non-LGBTQ+ (A) vs. LGBTQ+ (D) workers for LGBTQ+ status in panels (e)-(f). In each domain, we classify three types of choices: anti-discrimination (three A and three D workers or a random draw), pro-A (four or more A workers; the rest of the six are D workers), and pro-D (four or more D workers; the rest of the six are A workers). We show the distributions of individual choices for decisions with monetary stakes and the EQUAL decision without monetary stakes. Each point is a choice, each column a decision, and the vertical axis shows the number of D workers out of six chosen in a decision (the rest of the six selected are A workers from the same domain). For the TASTE SITUATION, the two groups are equally productive and profitable in the middle column (EQUAL), group A is 5 or 33% more profitable (but not more productive) in the left columns (PROFIT5(33)%A), and so is group D in the right columns (PROFIT5(33)%D). For the STATISTICAL SITUATIONS, the two groups are equally productive and profitable in the middle column (EQUAL), group A is 5 or 33% more profitable and 25 or 50% more productive on average in the left columns (PROD25(50)%A-PROFIT5(33)%A), and so is group D in the right columns (PROD25(50)%D-PROFIT5(33)%D). Individuals who choose a random draw are shown as selecting three D workers. Obs. per decision: 1,212 for gender (Study 1), 1,111 for ethnicity (Study 2), and 1,114 for LGBTQ+ status (Study 2).

We measure how making taste discrimination profitable alters the share discriminating by averaging (1) the share of pro-A choices in PROFIT33%A minus that in EQUAL, and (2) the share of pro-D choices in PROFIT33%D minus that in EQUAL. We also use anti-discrimination choices to measure how profit affects the share refusing to discriminate. Then, we follow the same approach for statistical discrimination using PROD50%A(D)-PROFIT33%A(D).

Choices. We report that all three choice types are sensitive to profit in the expected direction. However, even in decisions where one group is 33% more profitable, on average only 21% are pure profit maximizers.[27] Using Table 4, we observe that, in the TASTE SITUATION, a group becoming more profitable (but not more productive) in PROFIT33%A(D) increases the choices favoring that group relative to EQUAL by between 18 and 22%pt.—by 20%pt. for men, 22%pt. for women, 18%pt. for White workers, 18%pt. for Black workers, 18%pt. for non-LGBTQ+ workers, and 19%pt. for LGBTQ+ workers (PROFIT33%A(D) coefficients in cols. 2a–c (3a–c)). We observe large decreases in anti-discrimination choices (PROFIT33%A(D) coefficients in cols. 1a–c), and smaller reductions in taste-discrimination choices (PROFIT33%A(D) coefficients in cols. 3a–c (2a–c)).[28]

The price sensitivity in STATISTICAL SITUATION decisions is much larger. Choices favoring the more profitable (and more productive on average) group increase in PROD50%A(D)-PROFIT33%A(D) relative to EQUAL by between 56 and 71%pt.—by 70%pt. for men, 71%pt. for women, 60%pt. for White workers, 60%pt. for Black workers, 56%pt. for non-LGBTQ+ workers, and 56%pt. for LGBTQ+ workers. Again, there are decreases in anti-discrimination and taste choices.[29] The aggregate sensitivity to the profitability of taste and statistical discrimination is close to symmetrical in whether the A or D group is more profitable, although there is more resistance (up to 2%pt.) to favoring men at the expense of women, and White workers at the expense of Black workers.[30]

Overall, 75% (gender), 77% (ethnicity), and 74% (LGBTQ+ status) forgo earnings by choosing protected group equality over profitable taste discrimination, and 26% (gender), 35% (ethnicity), and 35% (LGBTQ+ status) do so by choosing it over profitable statistical discrimination. We study forgoing earnings to engage in statistical discrimination in Subsection IV.E.

Merit vs. profit motives for statistical discrimination. Recalling the previous subsection, on average, 47% prefer statistical discrimination on merit grounds in PROD50%A(D), so adding financial incentives in PROD50%A(D)-PROFIT33%A(D) only raises the share en-

[27]On average in PROFIT33%A(D) and PROD25%A(D)-PROFIT5%A(D), a share of 23% selects six workers from the most profitable group, but 2% select six from a given group in EQUAL for taste reasons.

[28]In Table 4, the Wald test *Taste decisions* indicates that PROFIT5(33)%A and PROFIT5(33)%D are jointly significant in all columns, at $p<.0001$ (pre-reg. Main Interest 2 and Ext. Main Interest 2). Looking at individual coefficients, the six increases meet $p<.0001$, and the 12 decreases mostly meet $p<.0001$.

[29]Wald tests *Taste vs. stats decisions* in all Table 4 columns show higher price sensitivity for statistical than taste discrimination, $p<.0001$ (pre-reg. Main Interest 2 and Ext. Main Interest 2). Increases, PROD25(50)%A-PROFIT5(33)%A in cols. 2a–c and PROD25(50)%D-PROFIT5(33)%D in cols. 3a–c, meet $p<.0001$; decreases, PROD25(50)%A-PROFIT5(33)%A in cols. 1a–c and 3a–c and PROD25(50)%D-PROFIT5(33)%D in cols. 1a–c and 2a–c, mostly meet $p<.01$.

[30]Wald tests *Asymmetry A vs. D* in Table 4 cols. 1a–c show this asymmetry meets $p<.0001$ for gender and $p<.05$ for ethnicity (pre-reg. Suppl. Interest 4 and Ext. Suppl. Interest 4). We use the regression with anti-discrimination choices for simplicity, because decreases in anti-discrimination choices caused by increasing a group's profitability translate into similar increases in choices favoring that group.

Table 4: Effects of Varying (1) Group Profitability (TASTE SITUATION), and (2) Group Profitability and Average Productivity (STATISTICAL SITUATION) on the Percentage Making Each Choice Type

	Anti-discrimination choice			Pro-advantaged (A) choice			Pro-disadvantaged (D) choice		
	Gender	Ethnicity	LGBTQ+ status	Pro-men	Pro-White	Pro-non-LGBTQ+	Pro-women	Pro-Black	Pro-LGBTQ+
	(1a)	(1b)	(1c)	(2a)	(2b)	(2c)	(3a)	(3b)	(3c)
TASTE SITUATION									
PROFIT5%A	-.104****			.113****			-.009*		
	(.010)			(.010)			(.005)		
PROFIT33%A	-.184****	-.157****	-.148****	.198****	.180****	.175****	-.013***	-.022****	-.027****
	(.012)	(.012)	(.013)	(.012)	(.012)	(.012)	(.005)	(.006)	(.006)
PROFIT5%D	-.117****			.001			.116****		
	(.010)			(.004)			(.010)		
PROFIT33%D	-.208****	-.172****	-.162****	-.008**	-.011**	-.026****	.216****	.183****	.188****
	(.013)	(.013)	(.013)	(.004)	(.005)	(.007)	(.012)	(.013)	(.013)
STATISTICAL SITUATION									
PROD25%A-PROFIT5%A	-.544****			.551****			-.007		
	(.015)			(.015)			(.005)		
PROD50%A-PROFIT33%A	-.677****	-.582****	-.531****	.695****	.600****	.557****	-.019***	-.018***	-.026****
	(.014)	(.016)	(.017)	(.014)	(.015)	(.016)	(.005)	(.006)	(.007)
PROD25%D-PROFIT5%D	-.577****			.008			.569****		
	(.015)			(.005)			(.015)		
PROD50%D-PROFIT33%D	-.704****	-.597****	-.549****	-.008*	-.006	-.009	.711****	.604****	.558****
	(.014)	(.016)	(.017)	(.004)	(.005)	(.009)	(.014)	(.015)	(.016)
EQUAL	.949****	.939****	.891****	.017****	.025****	.064****	.034****	.036****	.045****
(constant)	(.006)	(.007)	(.009)	(.004)	(.005)	(.007)	(.005)	(.006)	(.006)
Wald (p)									
Taste decisions	<.0001	<.0001	<.0001	<.0001	<.0001	<.0001	<.0001	<.0001	<.0001
Stats decisions	<.0001	<.0001	<.0001	<.0001	<.0001	<.0001	<.0001	<.0001	<.0001
Taste vs. stats decisions	<.0001	<.0001	<.0001	<.0001	<.0001	<.0001	<.0001	<.0001	<.0001
Asymmetry A vs. D	<.0001	.042	.099						
All variables	<.0001	<.0001	<.0001	<.0001	<.0001	<.0001	<.0001	<.0001	<.0001
R^2	.295	.289	.242	.419	.396	.321	.427	.397	.357
Obs	10,692	5,400	5,400	10,692	5,400	5,400	10,692	5,400	5,400

Notes: Individuals choose six workers from a balanced pool of 12 generally-advantaged (A) and generally-disadvantaged (D) workers from a single discrimination domain at a time: men (A) vs. women (D) for gender, White (A) vs. Black (D) workers for ethnicity, or non-LGBTQ+ (A) vs. LGBTQ+ (D) workers for LGBTQ+ status. We employ linear probability models for one discrimination domain (gender in cols. 1a-2a-3a, ethnicity in cols. 1b-2b-3b, and LGBTQ+ status in cols. 1c-2c-3c), with individual-level random effects and robust standard errors. The **dependent variable** is an indicator for an anti-discrimination choice (three workers from each group or a random draw) in cols. 1a–c, an indicator for a pro-A choice (four or more workers out of six from group A: men/White/non-LGBTQ+ workers) in cols. 2a–c, and an indicator for a pro-D choice (four or more workers out of six from group D: women/Black/LGBTQ+ workers) in cols. 3a–c. We use the data from the four or eight TASTE SITUATION and STATISTICAL SITUATION decisions with monetary stakes and the TASTE SITUATION decision without monetary stakes EQUAL. As **independent variables** of interest, we employ indicators for the decisions with monetary stakes, so that EQUAL serves as the baseline decision. We include socio-demographic controls (see footnote 17) and an indicator for decisions about a second domain in Study 2. The coefficient of EQUAL is the constant from the same regression without control variables. The Wald test *Taste decisions* is on all two/four TASTE SITUATION coefficients being equal to zero. The Wald test *Stats decisions* is on all two/four STATISTICAL SITUATION coefficients being equal to zero. The Wald test *Taste vs. stats decisions* is on the equality of the coefficients from TASTE SITUATION and STATISTICAL SITUATION decisions (i.e., PROFIT5%A vs. PROD25%A-PROFIT5%A,..., PROFIT33%D vs. PROD50%D-PROFIT33%D). The Wald test *Asymmetry A vs. D* is on the equality of the coefficients for group A and group D being more profitable (i.e., PROFIT5%A vs. PROFIT5%D,..., PROD50%A-PROFIT33%A vs. PROD50%D-PROFIT33%D). Obs. per decision: 1,212 for gender (Study 1), 1,111 for ethnicity (Study 2), and 1,114 for LGBTQ+ status (Study 2). $^{*}p < .10$, $^{**}p < .05$, $^{***}p < .01$, $^{****}p < .001$.

gaging in it to 62%.[31] At the individual level, 73% of those with a merit-based preference for statistical discrimination make the same choice with and without financial incentives—typically four or five workers from the more productive-on-average protected group, so that they forgo earnings by refusing to fully discriminate. Moral principles consequently explain the bulk of statistical discrimination here. We write our second result as follows.

RESULT 2, PROFITABILITY: *Discrimination is sensitive to profitability, but many forgo earnings by refusing to discriminate. Merit concerns, not profit, drive most statistical discrimination here. Therefore, moral discrimination preferences remain relevant with financial incentives.*

[31]The latter is the average of the six coefficients of PROD50%A(D)-PROFIT33%A(D) in cols. 2a–c (3a–c).

IV.B. Preferences Are Related But Distinct Across the Three Domains

We examine differences and similarities across domains by assessing aggregate differences and individual-level relationships. This allows us to validate our conceptualization of moral discrimination preferences as sharing a common root while also being domain specific.

Consistent with domain specificity, we confirm the presence of aggregate differences across the three domains using Study 2 data.[32] First, from decisions without monetary stakes, for A workers, tastes are most frequent for non-LGBTQ+ workers, next for White workers, and least for men (6%pt. and 2%pt. more relative to 1% for men; a Wald test that the shares differ meets $p<.0001$), there is no difference in tastes for D workers, and preferences against taste discrimination are less frequent for LGBTQ+ status. Second, merit-based preferences for statistical discrimination reach a majority for gender, are at medium levels for ethnicity, and are lower for LGBTQ+ status (12%pt. more for gender and 6%pt. more for ethnicity, relative to 39% for LGBTQ+ status; Wald tests that the three shares differ meet $p<.0002$), and preferences against it are more common for LGBTQ+ status and ethnicity than for gender.[33] Therefore, gender is the most morally acceptable domain for statistical discrimination among the three. Third, differences exist in how profit sways individuals to discriminate.

In line with preferences—especially moral ones—sharing a common root across domains, yet also being domain specific, we report that individuals often, but far from always, show similar preferences across domains. A consequence is that the proportion with a preference in at least one domain can be larger than in a single domain. For example, one in six individuals making decisions about gender and LGBTQ+ status have a taste for at least one group, compared to one in seventeen for gender and one in nine for LGBTQ+ status. Figure 4 provides an overview of the within-individual joint distribution of preferences for two domains at a time, based on decisions without monetary stakes. In each sub-figure, for individuals with a preference in at least one of two domains, we show the percentage of preferences for a single domain in blue and teal, and the percentage of similar preferences across two domains in pink. Without noise, preferences that are perfectly distinct should appear only in blue and teal, and those that are perfectly related only in pink. For example, the leftmost sub-figure of panel (a) shows the joint distribution of tastes for White and non-LGBTQ+ workers.

We highlight three features confirmed by data analyses.[34] First, as suggested in the two left-

[32]Study 2 contains data for all three domains (although it contains a smaller sample for gender than Study 1). In Appendix C, Table C1 reproduces Table 3 using Study 2 data, and Table C2 shows the analyses (pre-reg. Ext. Suppl. Interest 6). We follow the regression approaches of the previous two subsections, but add indicators for two domains and interactions with the decisions to the independent variables. In the Study 2 gender dataset, we find a similar low share of tastes (fewer tastes for men and more for women), but less frequent merit-based preferences for statistical discrimination than in Study 1 (by 8%pt.), which does not change that they are more frequent for gender than other domains. Appendix G provides the analyses (pre-reg. Ext. Suppl. Interest 13).

[33]When we compare preferences against statistical discrimination along two domains or two factors, we compare with regression estimates the differences in the average decrease in anti-discrimination choices in PROD50%A and PROD50%D relative to EQUAL. That is, we compare how much fewer preferences there are against statistical discrimination than against taste discrimination. For instance, we examine the average of the coefficients from the two interaction terms between a domain and PROD50%A and PROD50%D. This does not affect conclusions as long as the number of individuals with tastes is small.

[34]In Appendix C, Tables C3-C6 show the analyses of the relationships, first for decisions without monetary stakes and then for the reactions to profits (pre-reg. Ext. Suppl. Interest 7).

Figure 4: Within-Individual Preferences Across Discrimination Domains



Notes. We show the joint distribution of a preference for two discrimination domains. That is, among individuals with a preference in at least one of two domains, we show the percentages with it (1) in one domain only, (2) in the other domain only, and (3) in both domains. Panel (a) shows the ethnicity and LGBTQ+ status domains, panel (b) shows the gender and ethnicity domains, and panel (c) shows the gender and LGBTQ+ status domains. In each panel, the leftmost two sub-figures show tastes for groups A and D, the third shows preferences against taste discrimination, the fourth and fifth show merit-based preferences for statistical discrimination when groups A and D are on average more productive, and the rightmost two show the same for preferences against statistical discrimination. We use Study 2 data, in which individuals make decisions for two domains. Among those, 12% have a taste in at least one domain—up to 16% for those making gender and LGBTQ+ status decisions—and 59% have a merit-based preference for statistical discrimination in at least one domain.

most sub-figures of the three panels, tastes for White workers partially overlap with tastes for non-LGBTQ+ workers—but neither correlates with tastes for men—and tastes for D workers correlate across domains. For instance, around half of individuals with a taste for White workers also have a taste for non-LGBTQ+ workers. Second, as the third-from-the-left sub-figure of each panel suggests, preferences against taste discrimination are closely related across domains, but they are not identical. For example, around one in ten individuals with preferences against taste discrimination based on gender or LGBTQ+ status are against it for gender but not for LGBTQ+ status. Third, as the rightmost four sub-figures of each panel suggest, individuals who prefer or oppose statistical discrimination mostly do so across two domains, but with substantial heterogeneity. Among those who prefer or oppose statistical discrimination on merit grounds, around three to five in ten do so in only one of two domains. In addition, although not shown in the figure, profit sensitivity patterns also correlate across domains.

IV.C. Who Has Different Discrimination Preferences

Beyond studying adults in general, we narrow down who holds which preferences by comparing individuals from generally-advantaged (A) and disadvantaged (D) groups and examining variations across socio-demographic characteristics—including management experience.

A vs. D individuals in a domain. We report differences between (1) men and women regarding gender discrimination, (2) White and ethnic minority individuals regarding ethnic discrimination, and (3) non-LGBTQ+ and LGBTQ+ individuals for LGBTQ+ status discrimination, controlling for socio-demographic characteristics. We highlight two results here, and Figure D1 summarizes the main differences in its first three rows.[35] First, D individuals have more frequent tastes for D workers than A individuals do. That is, women have more tastes for women than men do (4%pt. more relative to 1% for men[36]), ethnic minority individuals have more tastes for Black workers than White individuals do (6%pt. more relative to 3% for White individuals), and LGBTQ+ individuals have more tastes for LGBTQ+ workers than non-LGBTQ+ individuals do (9%pt. more relative to 3% for non-LGBTQ+ individuals).[37] Second, A and D individuals are mostly similar in their statistical discrimination preferences—except for ethnic minority individuals, who are 11%pt. more against statistical discrimination than White individuals are, which may reflect different experiences with it.[38]

Socio-demographics. We provide an atlas of heterogeneity across eight (pre-registered) socio-demographic characteristics—age, education, gender, income, living in a large city, being a UK national, being religious, and having experience in managing, hiring, or promoting employees—controlling for socio-demographic characteristics other than the one of interest.

[35] In Appendix D, Table D1 shows the full analyses (pre-reg. Main Interest 3 and Ext. Main Interest 3). We have greater statistical power to compare men and women due to even shares; we separate ethnic minority (instead of Black) and White individuals to increase power.

[36] When we provide a reference group share as for men here, we provide it without socio-demographic controls.

[37] There is limited evidence that non-LGBTQ+ individuals have more tastes for non-LGBTQ+ workers, as a Wald test for tastes meets $p<.05$, but a Wald test jointly for taste and statistical discrimination does not ($p<.10$).

[38] There is also limited evidence that White individuals have more merit-based preferences for statistical discrimination (see panel (b) in Table D1).

We emphasize three results, and Figure D1 summarizes the main differences.[39] First, individuals with experience managing, hiring, or promoting employees exhibit broad patterns of preferences similar to those without this experience, although they tend to have less frequent merit-based preferences for statistical discrimination, and profits tend to sway them less to engage in such discrimination. Second, there are gender differences outside of the gender domain: relative to men, women have less frequent tastes for non-LGBTQ+ workers (6%pt. less relative to 9%), are more against ethnic and LGBTQ+ status taste discrimination, and are less swayed by profits to discriminate based on ethnicity and LGBTQ+ status. Third, the religious have more tastes for non-LGBTQ+ workers than the non-religious do (9%pt. more relative to 4%).

IV.D. Beyond the Experiments

Complementing the experiments, we show that discrimination preferences have potentially broad societal consequences, e.g., they map onto politics, policies, and the gender wage gap, and workers' wage valuations of hiring practices align with the experiments' main results.

Politics and policies. We study how preferences are linked to political ideologies and support for 12 (pre-registered) policies—policies against gender or ethnic or LGBTQ+ status discrimination, Affirmative Action for women or ethnic minorities or sexual and gender minorities, large reductions in immigration, same-sex marriage, easier legal gender changes, gender pay gap transparency, and affordable childcare to facilitate women's careers. This is of interest because policies require public support to be passed and implemented, and political parties need public support to thrive. We again control for socio-demographic characteristics. Two results stand out, both about preferences regarding taste discrimination, and Figure E1 summarizes the main differences.[40] First, there are clear taste differences along political lines—with more tastes for White workers and for non-LGBTQ+ workers among the right-leaning. Second, support for each policy is linked to tastes or preferences against taste discrimination.

Industry gender wage gap. We examine relationships between preferences and the gender pay gap at the UK industry level, which we see as a first step for future research using more extensive firm-level data with more variation in pay gaps and richer controls. First, compared to working in industries with low gender pay gaps (e.g., public administration sector, wholesale and retail trade sector, accommodation and food services sector), working in industries with high gender pay gaps (e.g., financial and insurance sector, professional, technical and scientific sector) is somewhat positively related to merit-based preferences for statistical discrimination.[41] Second, workers in high-gap industries are more frequently swayed to engage in statistical discrimination when it becomes profitable to favor men (a 1 SD or 5%pt. increase in the industry pay gap is associated with a 5%pt. increase in being swayed to discriminate).

Wage valuation. Building on wage valuation surveys (e.g., Wiswall and Zafar, 2018; Folke and Rickne, 2022), we asked individuals at the end of Study 2 about their preferences regarding firms' hiring practices regarding taste and statistical discrimination and how much they value

[39] In Appendix D, Tables D2–D8 show the full analyses (pre-reg. Suppl. Interest 5 and Ext. Suppl. Interest 5).

[40] In Appendix E, Tables E1–E12 show the full analyses (pre-reg. Suppl. Interest 5 and Ext. Suppl. Interest 5).

[41] When men become more productive, the decrease in pro-women choices is larger for individuals in high-gap than low-gap industries. We take the mean hourly gender wage gap by industry from the UK ONS in 2023.

such practices as a percentage of their wages (keeping other work characteristics fixed). This valuation can influence the selection of firms to work for and subsequent retention. The answers broadly align with the experiments' main results—i.e., many have preferences regarding discriminatory practices and would forgo wages to work at a firm that matches their preferences.[42] First, there is a non-negligible positive average value of a no-taste-discrimination policy in hiring across domains: 5% of the wage. Answers are heterogeneous, with, on average, 51% placing zero or near zero value (equivalent to a wage change of $<2\%$) on this policy, 42% a positive value (equivalent to a wage increase of $\geq 2\%$), and 7% a negative value (equivalent to a wage decrease of $\geq 2\%$; typically because they prefer positive discrimination). Second, the average value of a no-statistical-discrimination policy is lower at 3% of the wage; on average, 49% report a zero or near-zero value, 35% a positive value, and 16% a negative value (i.e., they would give up wages to work at a statistically-discriminating firm).

Workplace experiences. We also asked Study 2 individuals about their workplace behavior regarding discrimination in the past 10 years, using separate situations representing taste and statistical discrimination (based on ethnicity, gender, or LGBTQ+ status combined). Unless workers all end up in firms that do not allow them to personally act on their preferences—e.g., firms with strict anti-discrimination practices, making discriminatory actions difficult and personal interventions unnecessary, or firms with low diversity levels—then we may expect that some personally engage in or take actions to oppose discrimination. We find that 9% and 6% report having personally engaged in taste and statistical discrimination, respectively, for a total of 13% having discriminated in the workplace. Furthermore, 12% and 11% report having personally refused to engage in taste and statistical discrimination or taken action to prevent someone else from doing it, for a total of 18% having opposed workplace discrimination.[43]

IV.E. Extensions

We extend the experiments to better understand preferences and their robustness. We first compare discrimination and pure redistributive preferences. Then, we briefly summarize whether individuals are willing to pay to engage in statistical discrimination, possible effects of experimenter demand and social desirability, and whether transparency reduces discrimination.

Pure redistributive preferences. Complementing the analyses of differences and similarities across discrimination domains, we compare discrimination preferences with pure (group-neutral) redistributive preferences. We confirm that, although the two are closely related, they are distinct. To study this, we had a randomly-selected subset of Study 2 individuals complete a neutral version of the decisions they also made in one of the three discrimination domains.

[42] Appendix L shows descriptive statistics and analyses (pre-reg. Ext. Suppl. Interest 10); in it, we also explain how we made a pre-registration deviation in the valuation calculations, and show variations across domains.

[43] All four percentages differ from zero, and percentages also differ between engaging (refusing to engage) in taste vs. statistical discrimination (pre-reg. Ext. Suppl. Interest 11). Even though we ensure anonymity, we may suspect under-reporting of workplace discrimination since it is illegal. Furthermore, although our statistical power is limited, we also relate workplace behaviors to preferences in the experiments: having engaged in taste discrimination is associated with less frequent opposition to taste discrimination, more frequent tastes for D workers (which is consistent with engaging in positive discrimination), and less frequent merit-based preferences for statistical discrimination. Appendix M provides the analyses for this last point (pre-reg. Ext. Suppl. Interest 12).

The neutral decision groups are two randomly generated groups, which we denote as "Circle" and "Square." We compare aggregate decisions in the neutral vs. discrimination domains using Study 2 data. We summarize the average comparisons across the three domains combined and leave most domain-specific comparisons and additional explanations for Appendix J.[44]

In neutral decisions without monetary stakes, we find that 4.0% have a "taste" for Square workers, and 1.5% for Circle workers. Unlike for the discrimination domains, using the nearly identical EQUAL and EQUAL*, we cannot reject that these tastes show up due to random choices.[45] Conversely, 95% have preferences against "taste discrimination." In addition, 54% have merit-based preferences for "statistical discrimination," and 42% are against it. We point out two differences. First, although comparing tastes with their neutral equivalent is challenging,[46] we observe a clear statistical discrimination pattern: the frequency of neutral merit-based preferences for it serves as an upper bound on its discrimination-domain equivalent, and the frequency of neutral preferences against it as a lower bound. That is, there are 8%pt. more merit-based preferences for statistical discrimination in the neutral domain, and fewer preferences against it. The disparity is largest for LGBTQ+ status and smallest for gender, e.g., merit-based preferences for it are 14%pt. more frequent in the neutral than LGBTQ+ status domain, and not significantly different compared to the gender domain.[47] Second, profit sways individuals to discriminate neutral groups more than protected ones. For instance, moving from 0% to 33% profit for taste discrimination convinces 5%pt. more individuals than the 19% convinced in the case of protected groups; the difference is 8%pt. for statistical discrimination.

Costly statistical discrimination. Using a variation of the experiment where productivity and profitability are negatively correlated, we go one step further to show that individuals value engaging in statistical discrimination on merit grounds. We do so by examining whether they are even willing to forgo earnings to engage in merit-based statistical discrimination—to favor the more productive-on-average protected group. We report that at least 37% of individuals do so. We explain the methodology and analyses in Appendix I.[48]

Experimenter demand and social desirability. Even though we provide strict anonymity, we may worry that individuals may engage in discrimination more or less than they normally would to satisfy the experimenters' expectations or because it carries social stigma. We therefore estimate possible effects of experimenter demand and social desirability in a variation of

[44]Specifically, we informed individuals that we "randomly divided [workers] into two artificial groups with equal probability: random group "Circle" and random group "Square." Workers had the same chance of being in one or the other group." Individuals making decisions were not part of either group. Table M1 shows the analyses (pre-reg. Ext. Suppl. Interest 9). Figure J1 provides supplementary individual-level information on the percentages with a preference who have this preference in the neutral and discrimination domains.

[45]From EQUAL to EQUAL*, 26% of pro-Square (Circle) choices become pro Circle (Square), twice the average rate of reversals for the discrimination domains (see footnote 21). We (marginally) fail to rule out that these choices are random using a proportion test (one-sided p=.08; with random re-ordering of options, random choices generate 37.5% of such reversals in expectation). Therefore, the noise level appears higher in the neutral domain.

[46]Tastes in the discrimination domains taken together are 1.3%pt. more frequent (tastes for women, and Black, non-LGBTQ+, and LGBTQ+ workers are significantly more frequent). Moreover, within individuals making neutral and discrimination decisions, tastes in the two domains are largely distinct (see Figure J1).

[47]For the subset of individuals who do prefer statistical discrimination on merit grounds in a discrimination domain, this preference appears clearly related: 85% also reward the most productive neutral group (see Figure J1).

[48]Pre-reg. Ext. Suppl. Interest 8. Such a situation may arise, for example, when less productive workers hold less bargaining power, wage structures are based on seniority, or there are subsidies for employing certain workers.

the experiments for the gender domain, building on De Quidt et al. (2018). We find that doing so suggests tastes may be more frequent than we estimate—the point estimate is that they may be twice as frequent—but this would not change our two main results. For instance, moral discrimination preferences would still be widespread. We explain this estimation in Appendix K.[49]

Increasing transparency. Building on recent insights about social norms (Bursztyn et al., 2017; Barr et al., 2018; Bursztyn et al., 2020) and UK and EU wage transparency policies to combat gender pay gaps, we examine whether introducing some transparency reduces gender discrimination. We do so with an additional treatment, in which, before an individual made decisions, we informed them that workers would (1) learn about their decision if it was implemented, and (2) then comment on its appropriateness. We find that transparency reduces neither taste nor statistical discrimination. This also means that our measures of preferences are robust to heightening norms in this way. We explain the treatment in Appendix H.[50]

IV.F. Practical significance and pre-registration

Practical significance. To evaluate differences in preferences, we provide effects as percentages of individuals, which may be difficult to interpret. We offer three alternative ways to judge the effects here, using the example of a 5%pt. change in the share of individuals engaging or refusing to engage in discrimination. First, using standardized effects, a 5%pt. change when the initial shares are 2% and 50% correspond to about 0.25 and 0.10 standard deviations, respectively, both common effect sizes for experiments.[51] Second, using back-of-the-envelope pay gaps, compared to when groups are treated equally and when 50% already favor a group, a 5%pt. increase in discrimination creates pay gaps of 6% and 4%. Third, we can linearly approximate the cost of inducing effects by considering two decisions with different profits. Relative to when we pay an extra 5% per worker selected from a group, increasing the share of individuals favoring that group by 5%pt. requires an increase in this extra pay by around 12%pt. That is, inducing a 5%pt. increase requires more than tripling the financial incentives.[52]

Pre-registration. We deviate from the planned regression specifications in the same way for all analyses of decisions without monetary stakes in which we measure differences in preferences based on this factor, e.g., differences between men and women.[53] We also deviate in calculating hiring policy valuations, which we explain in Appendix L.

[49]Pre-reg. Bound Exp. Main Interest.

[50]Pre-reg. Main Interest 4. The UK Equality Act 2010 and EU Pay Transparency Directive are such policies; see Bennedsen et al. (2022); Baker et al. (2023); Cullen and Pakzad-Hurson (2023); Gulyas et al. (2023) for impacts.

[51]As examples in this range, in Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004), the gap in interview callback rates of Black and White job applicants (6.5% vs. 9.5%) corresponds to 0.11 standard deviations, and, in Gagnon et al. (2025), the effect of gender discrimination on workers' labor supply is 0.17 standard deviations.

[52]For the second alternative, we assume that discriminating in favor of a group means choosing five workers from it. For the third, we make a linear approximation based on how much a 28%pt. increase in profits for selecting a gender increases the frequency of selecting that gender in Table 4 (i.e., PROFIT33%A(D) vs. PROFIT5%A(D) and PROD50%A(D)-PROFIT33%A(D) vs. PROD25%A(D)-PROFIT5%A(D)).

[53]Most subsections after the two main results use this type of analysis. We use the factor as an independent variable rather than the factor interacted with the baseline EQUAL decision. This enables us to correctly interpret the factor as how it relates to tastes and preferences against taste discrimination, and interactions between the factor and the STATISTICAL SITUATION decisions as how it relates to preferences about statistical discrimination.

V. Research and Policy Discussion

Moral discrimination preferences account well for the behaviors observed in the vast majority of individuals. This includes giving up earnings to reject discrimination, and engaging in statistical discrimination to favor a group with higher average merit. What are the implications for research and policy, and what are future research avenues?

Rationale for anti-discrimination behavior and the difficulty of fighting statistical discrimination. Preferences against discrimination provide a basis to understand why individuals may engage in potentially costly restraints on discrimination (especially from individuals who are not targets of discrimination): workers standing up to the discrimination faced by a coworker, mass protests against discrimination, algorithm designs preventing the use of protected characteristics in recommendations, and support for potentially costly anti-discrimination policies. In contrast, the subdued opposition to statistical discrimination highlights a challenge for policymakers seeking public support for policies to address it, and future research may explore how policymakers could abate the link between merit and statistical discrimination in public opinion. For firms and institutions seeking to reduce discrimination, preferences against discrimination can be a positive externality created by workers and managers. Future research may address how to identify individuals strongly against discrimination and how to use them—e.g., increase their share on evaluation committees. It also appears important to examine how preferences translate into policy support when ingrained group imbalances exist—e.g., Affirmative Action underlies many policies but can be contentious (e.g., Gramlich, 2023).

Rationale for statistical discrimination in environments with no or limited financial incentives. Merit-based preferences for statistical discrimination provide a reason to expand the search for belief-based discrimination across environments with limited monetary incentives. A first environment is education, where teachers receive no monetary benefits from discriminating against students, but where studies document belief-based discrimination (e.g., Carlana, 2019; Alesina et al., 2024). A second consists of workplace situations in which managers and employees (including academics) have limited financial incentives at stake when evaluating individuals, e.g., experiments by Bohren et al. (2019), Cappelen et al. (2025), and Uchida (2025) show that belief-based discrimination occurs in evaluations with no or limited financial incentives. A third is the judicial system, e.g., jurors' and judges' decisions, where there is evidence of discrimination based on beliefs (e.g., Arnold et al., 2022).

Discriminatory beliefs do not imply discriminatory action, and beliefs may be challenging to infer from statistical discrimination. Moral preferences mean that the common assumption that discriminatory beliefs translate into discriminatory actions is not necessarily valid for many individuals. This has two main consequences. First, measuring beliefs about groups (e.g., Bordalo et al., 2016; Esponda et al., 2023; Barron et al., 2025), such as beliefs about productivity, does not necessarily inform us about whether those beliefs will lead to discriminatory behavior. Second, they make it more challenging to identify beliefs from discriminatory behavior. For instance, individuals may not discriminate but still hold discriminatory beliefs that we may overlook, and which may translate into discrimination in other settings, e.g., when it becomes profitable or moral to act on these beliefs. Individuals may also treat two

protected groups similarly because they hold opposing beliefs, e.g., they believe a group is less profitable to select, but that it also has higher merit. Therefore, we consider examining how beliefs translate into discrimination a promising research area.

Understanding which discrimination is preferred and the potential consequences. If, in line with longstanding theoretical propositions (Becker, 1957), it is the frequency of preferences that impacts aggregate outcomes, then statistical rather than taste discrimination appears more likely to have impacts (in line with evidence regarding labor discrimination by firms, e.g., Kline et al., 2022), so that institutions against discrimination may want to primarily target it. Nevertheless, even though tastes are less frequent, they are linked to support for a range of policies, so institutions concerned with discrimination in politics and policies may also want to target tastes, especially tastes for non-LGBTQ+ workers. This matters because different means may be used to alleviate different types of discrimination.

Understanding who holds which preferences. We document a range of variations across socio-demographic characteristics, but find preferences for discrimination across subgroups, especially merit-based preferences for statistical discrimination. In a nutshell, because policies are often costly, institutions may want to target specific groups more than others for tastes, and the broader population for statistical discrimination. Future research could examine why some groups are more likely to hold specific preferences, and the effectiveness of targeted policies.

Evaluating prejudice. Experiments on discrimination typically study average behavior. For example, Cettolin and Suetens (2019) studies average taste discrimination through generosity toward Dutch natives and Non-Western immigrants and shows that the latter face discrimination. If individuals have tastes or are indifferent, this may lead us to conclude that there is overall negative prejudice. However, if some have a preference against discrimination, accounting for the distribution of preferences as we do can lead to very different conclusions. For instance, one may find the same average discrimination in two very different societies: Society A, where 10% taste-discriminate against a group and 90% are indifferent, and Society B, where 10% taste-discriminate against a group and 90% are against taste discrimination and may be willing to pay to prevent it. Developing comprehensive ways to measure overall prejudice provides interesting and challenging questions for future research.

VI. Conclusion

We introduce moral discrimination preferences that arise from equality and merit concerns, and study them alongside tastes through incentivized experiments. We find that moral discrimination preferences are widespread and that they augment our understanding of why individuals may engage in or oppose discrimination. Overall, our article provides a stepping stone toward the comprehensive integration of moral principles into the economics of discrimination.

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*** Online Supplementary Materials ***

We present additional information, figures, and tables. Pre-analysis plans on the Open Science Framework website (osf.io/z8hwj, osf.io/fuwqc, and osf.io/gnhys) contain more details on regression specifications, and the article's Subsection IV.F indicates deviations. We typically use linear regressions with individual-level random effects, employ indicators for each decision of interest in the independent variables, and interact these indicators with a factor whenever we are interested in how these decisions relate to the factor. Unless otherwise indicated, we use socio-demographic controls, an indicator for decisions about a second domain in Study 2, and robust standard errors.

A. Descriptive Statistics—Socio-Demographic Characteristics

Table A1 presents descriptive statistics about the socio-demographic characteristics of individuals in Studies 1 and 2. In the table, Study 1 includes individuals randomized into the additional wage transparency treatment described in Appendix H.

Table A1: Descriptive statistics—socio-demographic characteristics

Characteristic	Study 1		Study 2	
	Mean	Standard Deviation	Mean	Standard Deviation
Age	46	15	46	15
Man	.48	.	.49	.
Woman	.52	.	.51	.
Non-binary	.01	.	.01	.
Ethnicity: Asian	.07	.	.08	.
Ethnicity: Black	.03	.	.03	.
Ethnicity: Other	.01	.	.02	.
Ethnicity: Mixed	.02	.	.02	.
Ethnicity: White	.87	.	.85	.
Single	.31	.	.28	.
UK national	.89	.	.88	.
Student	.09	.	.11	.
University degree	.57	.	.60	.
LGBTQ+	.	.	.11	.
Religious	.	.	.26	.
Full-time employed	.52	.	.50	.
After-tax income: <10k	.17	.	.17	.
After-tax income: 10–19.99k	.22	.	.21	.
After-tax income: 20–29.99k	.26	.	.24	.
After-tax income: 30–39.99k	.17	.	.18	.
After-tax income: 40k+	.19	.	.21	.
East Midlands England	.10	.	.08	.
East of England	.10	.	.09	.
London England	.12	.	.12	.
North East England	.04	.	.05	.
North West England	.11	.	.12	.
South East England	.13	.	.14	.
South West England	.09	.	.09	.
West Midlands England	.08	.	.08	.
Yorkshire Humber England	.10	.	.09	.
Northern Ireland	.02	.	.02	.
Scotland	.08	.	.07	.
Wales	.05	.	.04	.
Largest ten cities	.31	.	.33	.
Studies	796	590	594	731

Notes: We indicate the mean and standard deviation for socio-demographics in Study 1 (1,596 individuals) and Study 2 (1,681 individuals). The standard deviation is omitted for binary variables. We do not have information on LGBTQ+ and being religious for Study 1. The after-tax income categories are for personal after-tax income per year in GBP.

B. Symmetry and Asymmetry in Merit-Based Preferences for Statistical Discrimination

Figure B1 provides, for all individuals who have a merit-based preference for statistical discrimination when A or D workers are more productive, (1) the percentage with this preference only when A workers are more productive, (2) the percentage with this preference only when D workers are more productive, and (3) the percentage with this preference for both domains. We use only Study 2 individuals.

Figure B1: Percentages of Symmetric and Asymmetric Merit-Based Preferences for Statistical Discrimination per Domain



Notes. We show, for all individuals who have merit-based preferences for statistical discrimination in a domain, the distribution of symmetric and asymmetric preferences. That is, we show the percentages who are (1) asymmetric in that they reward average merit only for group A, (2) asymmetric in that they reward average merit only for group D, and (3) symmetric in that they reward the average merit of both groups. Panel (a) is for ethnicity, panel (b) for LGBTQ+ status, and panel (c) for gender. We use Study 2 data, in which individuals make decisions across two discrimination domains.

C. Discrimination across Domains

Table C1 reproduces Table 3, but using only the dataset from Study 2 instead of using the larger dataset from Study 1 for gender and the dataset from Study 2 for ethnicity and LGBTQ+ status.

Table C1: Discrimination preferences from decisions without monetary stakes using only the Study 2 dataset

Gender	Pref. against taste disc.	Taste for men	Taste for women	Pref. against stats disc.	Merit-based pref. for stats disc.
Percentage	94	0.7	5.1	44	50
Ethnicity	Pref. against taste disc.	Taste for White workers	Taste for Black workers	Pref. against stats disc.	Merit-based pref. for stats disc.
Percentage	95	2.5	3.6	49	45
LGBTQ+ Status	Pref. against taste disc.	Taste for non-LGBTQ+ workers	Taste for LGBTQ+ workers	Pref. against stats disc.	Merit-based pref. for stats disc.
Percentage	89	6.4	4.5	50	39

Notes: We show the percentage of individuals with each preference in decisions without monetary stakes for individuals selecting workers using Table 2 for ethnicity and LGBTQ+ status using the Study 2 dataset, and the equivalent regression for gender using the Study 2 dataset (which is smaller than the gender dataset in Study 1, and smaller than the ethnicity and LGBTQ+ status datasets in Study 2). Percentages with preferences for or against statistical discrimination do not sum to one hundred because we do not classify them for a minority, largely for individuals with tastes (see footnote 18 in the main text).

Table C2 shows differences between the three discrimination domains at the aggregate level. The table presents regression estimates for differences in preferences and differences in being swayed to engage in discrimination across the three domains. Panel (a) is about preferences estimated from decisions without monetary stakes. It mirrors the regressions of Table 2, but where the dependent variables also contain an indicator for the ethnicity domain and an indicator for the LGBTQ+ domains (gender serves as the baseline domain), and interactions between these two indicators and the indicators for the different decisions. For example, to evaluate differences in tastes and preferences against taste discrimination, we use interactions between the domains and EQUAL. Similarly, to evaluate differences in merit-based preferences for statistical discrimination and preferences against it, we rely on interactions between the domains and PROD50%A and PROD50%D. Panel (b) is about how making discrimination profitable sways individuals to engage in it. It mirrors the regressions of Table 4, but where the dependent variables also contain the two additional domain indicators, and interactions between these two indicators and the indicators for the different decisions.

Then, the remaining four tables show individual-level correlations across domains. For these individual analyses, we use indicators for preferences, and their classification in decisions without monetary stakes is as follows. For tastes for a group (and preferences against taste discrimination), we require that an individual make a pro-group (anti-discrimination) choice in the EQUAL decision. For the merit-based preferences for statistical discrimination, when the A (D) group is more productive, we require that an individual make an anti-discrimination choice in EQUAL and a pro-group-A (D) choice in PROD50%A (PROD50%D). For the preferences against it, when the A (D) group is more productive, we require that an individual make an anti-discrimination choice in both EQUAL and in PROD50%A (PROD50%D). We also use indicators when we add monetary stakes, and the classification is similar.

Table C2: Aggregate differences between the three discrimination domains

(a) Without monetary stakes

	Anti	Pro-Advantaged	Pro-Disadvantaged
	(1)	(2)	(3)
PROD50%A	-.477****	.491****	-.014
	(.024)	(.022)	(.009)
PROD50%D	-.527****	.016***	.511****
	(.022)	(.006)	(.022)
Ethnicity	-.012	.021***	-.016
	(.014)	(.007)	(.010)
PROD50%A x Ethnicity	.027	-.043*	.016
	(.026)	(.025)	(.010)
PROD50%D x Ethnicity	.075***	-.005	-.070***
	(.025)	(.008)	(.025)
LGBTQ+	-.062****	.058****	-.003
	(.015)	(.009)	(.011)
PROD50%A x LGBTQ+	.089****	-.100****	.012
	(.027)	(.025)	(.011)
PROD50%D x LGBTQ+	.127****	.005	-.132****
	(.025)	(.010)	(.025)
Wald (p)			
Equality all domains	.0000	.0000	.0000
Taste, equality all domains	.0000	.0000	.1376
Stats, equality all domains	.0000	.0002	.0000
Ethn. vs. LGBTQ+	.0002	.0000	.0070
Taste, Ethn. vs. LGBTQ+	.0000	.0000	
Stats, Ethn. vs. LGBTQ+	.0036	.0013	.0025
Ethn. vs. gender	.0081	.0132	.0005
Taste, Ethn. vs. gender	.3733	.0014	
Stats, Ethn. vs. gender	.0031	.2030	.0017
Gender vs. LGBTQ+	.0000	.0000	.0000
Taste, Gender vs. LGBTQ+	.0001	.0000	
Stats, Gender vs. LGBTQ+	.0000	.0002	.0000
all variables	.0000	.0000	.0000
R^2	.200	.277	.293
Obs	8148	8148	8148

(b) With monetary stakes

	Anti	Pro-Advantaged	Pro-Disadvantaged
	(1)	(2)	(3)
PROFIT33%A	-.191****	.223****	-.032****
	(.019)	(.018)	(.009)
PROFIT33%D	-.203****	-.002	.205****
	(.018)	(.004)	(.018)
PROD50%A-PROFIT33%A	-.612****	.647****	-.036****
	(.023)	(.020)	(.009)
PROD50%D-PROFIT33%D	-.647****	.011	.637****
	(.021)	(.007)	(.022)
Ethnicity	.000	.017**	-.020*
	(.014)	(.007)	(.010)
LGBTQ+	-.046***	.053****	-.009
	(.015)	(.009)	(.011)
PROFIT33%A x Ethnicity	.033	-.043**	.010
	(.021)	(.019)	(.010)
PROFIT33%D x Ethnicity	.031	-.009	-.022
	(.020)	(.006)	(.020)
PROD50%A-PROFIT33%A x Ethnicity	.029	-.047**	.018*
	(.025)	(.023)	(.010)
PROD50%D-PROFIT33%D x Ethnicity	.050**	-.017**	-.033
	(.024)	(.009)	(.024)
PROFIT33%A x LGBTQ+	.042**	-.048**	.006
	(.021)	(.020)	(.011)
PROFIT33%D x LGBTQ+	.041**	-.024***	-.017
	(.020)	(.008)	(.020)
PROD50%A-PROFIT33%A x LGBTQ+	.080***	-.090****	.010
	(.026)	(.024)	(.011)
PROD50%D-PROFIT33%D x LGBTQ+	.098****	-.020*	-.078***
	(.025)	(.011)	(.025)
Wald (p)			
Equality all domains	.0103	.0013	.0111
Taste, equality all domains	.3228	.0078	.5632
Stats, equality all domains	.0008	.0012	.0014
Ethn. vs. LGBTQ+	.0526	.0337	.0648
Taste, Ethn. vs. LGBTQ+		.1425	
Stats, Ethn. vs. LGBTQ+	.0113	.0483	.0334
Ethn. vs. gender	.1989	.0472	.0969
Taste, Ethn. vs. gender		.0367	
Stats, Ethn. vs. gender	.0826	.0278	.0261
Gender vs. LGBTQ+	.0030	.0003	.0065
Taste, Gender vs. LGBTQ+		.0015	
Stats, Gender vs. LGBTQ+	.0004	.0004	.0009
all variables	.0000	.0000	.0000
R^2	.268	.368	.383
Obs	13580	13580	13580

Notes: Linear probability models with individual-level random effects, socio-demographic controls, an indicator for decisions about a second discrimination domain in Study 2, and robust standard errors. Gender decisions serve as baseline. Ethnicity and LGBTQ+ are indicators for ethnicity decisions and LGBTQ+ status decisions, respectively. $^{*}p < .10$, $^{**}p < .05$, $^{***}p < .01$, $^{****}p < .001$.

Table C3: Relationship between taste discrimination for ethnicity, LGBTQ+ status, and gender, in decision without monetary stake EQUAL

	LGBTQ+ EQUAL			Gender EQUAL			LGBTQ+ EQUAL		
	Anti	Pro-nLGBTQ+	Pro-LGBTQ+	Anti	Pro-men	Pro-wom.	Anti	Pro-nLGBTQ+	Pro-LGBTQ+
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Anti, ethn. EQUAL	.635****			.430***					
	(.076)			(.150)					
Pro-White, ethn. EQUAL		.512****			-.009				
		(.124)			(.006)				
Pro-Black, ethn. EQUAL			.355***			.688****			
			(.111)			(.199)			
Anti, gender EQUAL							.365***		
							(.139)		
Pro-men, gender EQUAL								-.062	
								(.059)	
Pro-wom., gender EQUAL									.389***
									(.143)
Constant	.308****	.044****	.026****	.538****	.009	.026**	.533****	.062****	.039***
	(.076)	(.008)	(.006)	(.150)	(.006)	(.011)	(.138)	(.016)	(.013)
Wald (p)									
R^2	.268	.131	.111	.185	.000	.307	.071	.000	.142
Obs	633	633	633	236	236	236	242	242	242

Notes: Pre-registered linear probability models with robust standard errors. $^{*}p < .10$, $^{**}p < .05$, $^{***}p < .01$, $^{****}p < .001$.

Table C4: Relationship between statistical discrimination for ethnicity, LGBTQ+ status, and gender, in decisions without monetary stakes EQUAL and PROD50%A(D)

	LGBTQ+ status				Gender				LGBTQ+ status			
	Anti in PROD50%A and EQUAL	Anti in PROD50%D and EQUAL	Pro-nLGBTQ+ in PROD50%A and EQUAL	Pro-LGBTQ+ in PROD50%D and EQUAL	Anti in PROD50%A and EQUAL	Anti in PROD50%D and EQUAL	Pro-men in PROD50%A and EQUAL	Pro-wom. in PROD50%D and EQUAL	Anti in PROD50%A and EQUAL	Anti in PROD50%D and EQUAL	Pro-nLGBTQ+ in PROD50%A and EQUAL	Pro-LGBTQ+ in PROD50%D and EQUAL
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Ethn.: anti in PROD50%A and EQUAL	.656****				.639****							
	(.030)				(.051)							
Ethn.: anti in PROD50%D and EQUAL		.675****				.608****						
		(.029)				(.051)						
Ethn.: pro-White in PROD50%A, anti in EQUAL			.664****				.636****					
			(.030)				(.051)					
Ethn.: pro-Black in PROD50%D, anti in EQUAL				.681****				.584****				
				(.030)				(.052)				
Gender: anti in PROD50%A and EQUAL									.570****			
									(.054)			
Gender: anti in PROD50%D and EQUAL										.481****		
										(.058)		
Gender: pro-men in PROD50%A, anti in EQUAL											.544****	
											(.054)	
Gender: pro-wom. in PROD50%D, anti in EQUAL												.551****
												(.053)
Constant	.171****	.152****	.103****	.102****	.148****	.104****	.185****	.272****	.182****	.209****	.179****	.146****
	(.021)	(.020)	(.016)	(.016)	(.032)	(.028)	(.035)	(.040)	(.033)	(.035)	(.035)	(.032)
Wald (p)												
R^2	.430	.455	.455	.475	.411	.387	.404	.343	.326	.233	.299	.312
Obs	633	633	633	633	236	236	236	236	242	242	242	242

Notes: Pre-registered linear probability models with robust standard errors. $^{*}p < .10$, $^{**}p < .05$, $^{***}p < .01$, $^{****}p < .001$.

Table C5: Relationship between taste discrimination for ethnicity, LGBTQ+ status, and gender, in EQUAL and decisions with monetary stakes PROFIT33%A(D)

	LGBTQ+ status				Gender				LGBTQ+ status			
	Anti in PROFIT33%A and EQUAL	Anti in PROFIT33%D and EQUAL	Pro-nLGBTQ+ in PROFIT33%A and EQUAL	Pro-LGBTQ+ in PROFIT33%D, anti in EQUAL	Anti in PROFIT33%A and EQUAL	Anti in PROFIT33%D and EQUAL	Pro-men in PROFIT33%A and EQUAL	Pro-wom. in PROFIT33%D, anti in EQUAL	Anti in PROFIT33%A and EQUAL	Anti in PROFIT33%D and EQUAL	Pro-nLGBTQ+ in PROFIT33%A, anti in EQUAL	Pro-LGBTQ+ in PROFIT33%D, anti in EQUAL
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Ethn.: anti in PROFIT33%A and EQUAL	.748****				.874****							
	(.032)				(.040)							
Ethn.: anti in PROFIT33%D and EQUAL		.737****				.773****						
		(.032)				(.054)						
Ethn.: pro-White in PROFIT33%A, anti in EQUAL			.743****				.859****					
			(.038)				(.046)					
Ethn.: pro-Black in PROFIT33%D, anti in EQUAL				.750****				.748****				
				(.035)				(.064)				
Gender: anti in PROFIT33%A and EQUAL									.667****			
									(.059)			
Gender: anti in PROFIT33%D and EQUAL										.633****		
										(.061)		
Gender: pro-men in PROFIT33%A, anti in EQUAL											.624****	
											(.070)	
Gender: pro-wom. in PROFIT33%D, anti in EQUAL												.693****
												(.068)
Constant	.153****	.166****	.049****	.066****	.062*	.151***	.066****	.062****	.238****	.246****	.036***	.046***
	(.029)	(.029)	(.010)	(.011)	(.036)	(.050)	(.018)	(.017)	(.055)	(.056)	(.014)	(.015)
Wald (p)												
R^2	.513	.513	.555	.540	.675	.554	.622	.521	.436	.373	.462	.506
Obs	633	633	633	633	236	236	236	236	242	242	242	242

Notes: Pre-registered linear probability models with robust standard errors. $^{*}p < .10$, $^{**}p < .05$, $^{***}p < .01$, $^{****}p < .001$.

Table C6: Relationship between statistical discrimination for ethnicity, LGBTQ+ status, and gender, in EQUAL and decisions with monetary stakes PROD50%A(D)-PROFIT33%A(D)

	LGBTQ+ status				Gender				LGBTQ+ status			
	Anti in PROD50%A-PROFIT33%A and EQUAL	Anti in PROD50%D-PROFIT33%D and EQUAL	Pro-nLGBTQ+ in PROD50%A-PROFIT33%A and EQUAL	Pro-LGBTQ+ in PROD50%D-PROFIT33%D, anti in EQUAL	Anti in PROD50%A-PROFIT33%A and EQUAL	Anti in PROD50%D-PROFIT33%D and EQUAL	Pro-men in PROD50%A-PROFIT33%A and EQUAL	Pro-wom. in PROD50%D-PROFIT33%D, anti in EQUAL	Anti in PROD50%A-PROFIT33%A and EQUAL	Anti in PROD50%D-PROFIT33%D and EQUAL	Pro-nLGBTQ+ in PROD50%A-PROFIT33%A, anti in EQUAL	Pro-LGBTQ+ in PROD50%D-PROFIT33%D, anti in EQUAL
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Ethn.: anti in PROD50%A-PROFIT33%A and EQUAL	.726****				.726****							
	(.030)				(.049)							
Ethn.: anti in PROD50%D-PROFIT33%D and EQUAL		.713****				.681****						
		(.031)				(.052)						
Ethn.: pro-White in PROD50%A-PROFIT33%A, anti in EQUAL			.712****				.697****					
			(.029)				(.049)					
Ethn.: pro-Black in PROD50%D-PROFIT33%D, anti in EQUAL				.713****				.666****				
				(.029)				(.050)				
Gender: anti in PROD50%A-PROFIT33%A and EQUAL									.518****			
									(.063)			
Gender: anti in PROD50%D-PROFIT33%D and EQUAL										.558****		
										(.061)		
Gender: pro-men in PROD50%A-PROFIT33%A, anti in EQUAL											.514****	
											(.059)	
Gender: pro-wom. in PROD50%D-PROFIT33%D, anti in EQUAL												.566****
												(.055)
Constant	.085****	.091****	.145****	.150****	.086****	.040**	.185****	.247****	.158****	.146****	.241****	.195****
	(.014)	(.014)	(.022)	(.023)	(.023)	(.016)	(.041)	(.044)	(.028)	(.027)	(.048)	(.043)
Wald (p)												
R^2	.535	.513	.498	.500	.535	.524	.486	.466	.260	.302	.244	.299
Obs	633	633	633	633	236	236	236	236	242	242	242	242

Notes: Pre-registered linear probability models with robust standard errors. $^{*}p < .10$, $^{**}p < .05$, $^{***}p < .01$, $^{****}p < .001$.

D. Advantaged and Disadvantaged Groups, and Socio-Demographics

Figure D1: Summary of Socio-Demographic Differences

(a) Differences (%pt.) in discrimination preferences, from decisions without monetary stakes

(b) Differences (%pt.) in being swayed to discriminate when it becomes profitable



Notes. We show percentage-point differences across the eight socio-demographic characteristics, controlling for socio-demographic characteristics other than the one of interest. We indicate differences that meet the restrictions below, and denote non-significant differences with zeroes. *Large city* indicates living in one of the 10 largest UK cities, *University* indicates having a university degree, *UK nat.* indicates being a UK citizen, and *Manager* denotes having work experience in managing, hiring, or promoting employees. Characteristics are binary, except for age and income, for which we provide the percentage-point difference associated with a one-standard-deviation increase. For simplicity, the figure summarizes the main differences from regression estimates, and Appendix D presents the complete analyses, which capture more subtle differences. ***Restrictions to indicate non-zero values.*** In panel (a), for tastes, preferences against taste discrimination, and preferences for statistical discrimination, we take the difference in the share of a preference if three restrictions are jointly met: (1) the difference is significant, (2) a Wald test for differences in statistical discrimination is significant, and (3) an overarching Wald test for joint differences in taste and statistical discrimination is significant. For the merit-based preference for statistical discrimination, we take the average of difference in the share estimated when group A is more productive and when group D is more productive, if three restrictions are jointly met: (1) at least one of the two differences is significant, (2) a Wald test for differences in statistical discrimination is significant, and (3) an overarching Wald test for joint differences in taste and statistical discrimination is significant. In panel (b), we show differences in how the making discrimination of a group profitable changes the share of individuals selecting more workers from the more profitable group, again taking the average of the difference when groups A and D are more profitable if three restrictions are jointly met: (1) at least one of the two differences is significant, (2) a Wald test for differences in statistical discrimination is significant, and (3) an overarching Wald test for joint differences in taste and statistical discrimination is significant. Moreover, when taste differences are large, differences about statistical discrimination become less precise, as we do not identify all preferences about statistical discrimination for individuals with tastes (see footnote 18).

In this appendix, we use the data from Study 1 for gender, and from Study 2 for ethnicity and LGBTQ+ status. First, we report differences between (1) men and women regarding gender discrimination, (2) White and ethnic minority individuals regarding ethnic discrimination, and (3) non-LGBTQ+ and LGBTQ+ individuals for LGBTQ+ status discrimination, controlling for socio-demographic characteristics. The first three lines of Figure D1 summarize the main differences between individuals from groups A and D. Panel (a) shows differences in preferences evaluated with decisions without monetary stakes, and panel (b) shows differences in being swayed to discriminate when it becomes profitable.

Table D1 presents the full analyses: regression estimates for differences in preferences and differences in being swayed to engage in discrimination. Panels (a)–(c) are about preferences estimated from decisions without monetary stakes. They mirror the regressions of Table 2, but where the dependent variables also contain an indicator for being a woman, an ethnic minority

participant or an LGBTQ+ participant, and interactions between this indicator and the indicators for the different decisions.[1] Panels (d)–(e) are about how making discrimination profitable sways individuals to engage in it. They mirror the regressions of Table 4, but where the dependent variables also contain an indicator for being a woman, an ethnic minority participant or an LGBTQ+ participant, and interactions between this indicator and the indicators for the different decisions. Figure D1 summarizes the main results in the first row (columns 1–5 for panel (a) and 1-2 for panel (b)) and in rows 2-3.

Second, we provide an atlas of heterogeneity in preferences across eight socio-demographic characteristics. We control for socio-demographic characteristics other than the one of interest, so we present partial relationships.[2] Of the 120 (pre-registered) overarching Wald tests for joint taste and statistical discrimination differences we conduct across socio-demographic characteristics, 28% are significant at the 5% level (mostly at the 1% level or below), which is over five times the false positive rate of 5% we expect from random noise when there are no true differences. Similarly, of the 240 possible (pre-registered) Wald tests for either taste or statistical discrimination, 24% are significant (mostly at the 1% level or below).[3] We summarize the bulk of these differences in Figure D1, where we show differences in preferences from decisions without monetary stakes in panel (a) and differences in being swayed to discriminate when it becomes profitable in panel (b).

Tables D2–D9 show regression estimates for differences in preferences and differences in being swayed to engage in discrimination across eight socio-demographic characteristics. In each table, the first panels are about preferences estimated from decisions without monetary stakes. They mirror the regressions of Table 2, but where the dependent variables also contain an indicator for the socio-characteristics of interest, and interactions between this indicator and the indicators for the different decisions. The subsequent panels are about how making discrimination profitable sways individuals to engage in it. They mirror the regressions of Table 4, but where the dependent variables also contain an indicator for the socio-characteristics of interest, and interactions between this indicator and the indicators for the different decisions. Figure D1 summarizes the main results in the first row (columns 6–15 for panel (a) and 3–6 for panel (b)) and in rows 4–10.

[1] Panels (a) and (d) also contain an indicator for non-binary participants and interactions between this indicator and the decisions, although we do not show their coefficients we have less than 1% of non-binary participants.

[2] We conduct 12 Wald tests from linear regressions for each characteristic of interest per domain. First, we mirror the analyses of IV.A.1 using decisions without monetary stakes, but we add, in the independent variables, a variable for the characteristic and interactions between the decisions and the characteristic. Second, we reproduce the analyses of IV.A.2 using decisions with monetary stakes, but we add a variable for the characteristic and interactions between the decisions and the characteristic. The rest of this appendix shows the analyses. We use Study 1 for gender and Study 2 for ethnicity and LGBTQ+ status.

[3] The percentage of false positives is lower than 5% if true differences exist. While most differences we find are therefore not false positives, our approach is to preserve statistical power by ignoring multiple hypothesis testing, and leave future research to identify the false positives (significant p-values range between $<.0001$ and $<.05$).

Table D1: Differences between men and women in gender decisions, ethnic minority and White individuals in ethnicity decisions, and non-LGBTQ+ and LGBTQ+ individuals in LGBTQ+ status decisions

(a) Gender—without monetary stakes

	Anti	Pro-Men	Pro-Wom.
	(1)	(2)	(3)
PROD25%A	-.503****	.502****	.002
	(.022)	(.021)	(.007)
PROD50%A	-.601****	.594****	.007
	(.021)	(.021)	(.007)
PROD25%D	-.500****	.012	.488****
	(.022)	(.008)	(.022)
PROD50%D	-.592****	.009	.583****
	(.022)	(.008)	(.021)
PROD25%A x Woman	.043	-.056*	.013
	(.031)	(.030)	(.012)
PROD50%A x Woman	.048	-.038	-.010
	(.031)	(.030)	(.011)
PROD25%D x Woman	.029	-.002	-.027
	(.031)	(.011)	(.030)
PROD50%D x Woman	.010	.001	-.011
	(.030)	(.011)	(.030)
Woman	-.041***	.001	.039****
	(.014)	(.009)	(.011)
Wald (p)			
All Woman terms	.0440	.6117	.0004
taste Woman terms	.0040	.8639	.0003
stats Woman terms	.3396	.4704	.3310
all variables	.0000	.0000	.0000
R^2	.202	.372	.369
Obs	5940	5940	5940

(b) Ethnicity—without monetary stakes

	Anti	Pro-White	Pro-Black
	(1)	(2)	(3)
PROD50%A	-.470****	.461****	.009
	(.017)	(.017)	(.006)
PROD50%D	-.463****	.010*	.454****
	(.017)	(.006)	(.017)
PROD50%A x EthMin	.141***	-.093*	-.048**
	(.051)	(.048)	(.019)
PROD50%D x EthMin	.082*	.010	-.092*
	(.047)	(.023)	(.048)
EthMin	-.070**	.012	.058**
	(.031)	(.019)	(.024)
Wald (p)			
All EthMin terms	.0262	.1877	.0392
taste EthMin terms	.0255	.5485	.0160
stats EthMin terms	.0182	.0941	.0217
all variables	.0000	.0000	.0000
R^2	.218	.311	.304
Obs	3240	3240	3240

(c) LGBTQ+ status—without monetary stakes

	Anti	Pro-nLGBTQ+	Pro-LGBTQ+
	(1)	(2)	(3)
PROD50%A	-.386****	.387****	-.001
	(.018)	(.017)	(.007)
PROD50%D	-.390****	.014	.376****
	(.018)	(.009)	(.017)
PROD50%A x LGBTQ+	-.019	.032	-.014
	(.055)	(.047)	(.029)
PROD50%D x LGBTQ+	-.081*	.060**	.021
	(.049)	(.028)	(.049)
LGBTQ+	-.050	-.041**	.091***
	(.034)	(.017)	(.030)
Wald (p)			
All LGBTQ+ terms	.0266	.0575	.0033
taste LGBTQ+ term	.1409	.0194	.0023
stats LGBTQ+ terms	.1056	.0962	.7612
all variables	.0000	.0000	.0000
R^2	.175	.220	.245
Obs	3240	3240	3240

(d) Gender—with monetary stakes

	Anti	Pro-Men	Pro-Wom.
	(1)	(2)	(3)
PROFIT5%A	-.111****	.122****	-.010*
	(.014)	(.014)	(.005)
PROFIT33%A	-.224****	.231****	-.007
	(.018)	(.018)	(.005)
PROFIT5%D	-.116****	-.002	.118****
	(.014)	(.004)	(.014)
PROFIT33%D	-.222****	-.003	.226****
	(.018)	(.005)	(.018)
PROD25%A-PROFIT5%A	-.599****	.601****	-.002
	(.021)	(.021)	(.007)
PROD50%A-PROFIT33%A	-.715****	.720****	-.005
	(.019)	(.019)	(.007)
PROD25%D-PROFIT5%D	-.616****	.012*	.604****
	(.021)	(.007)	(.021)
PROD50%D-PROFIT33%D	-.724****	-.002	.726****
	(.019)	(.006)	(.019)
PROFIT5%A x Woman	.015	-.017	.002
	(.020)	(.019)	(.010)
PROFIT33%A x Woman	.077***	-.064***	-.013
	(.025)	(.024)	(.010)
PROFIT5%D x Woman	-.001	.005	-.004
	(.021)	(.008)	(.020)
PROFIT33%D x Woman	.028	-.010	-.018
	(.025)	(.008)	(.025)
PROD25%A-PROFIT5%A x Woman	.107****	-.097***	-.010
	(.030)	(.030)	(.011)
PROD50%A-PROFIT33%A x Woman	.075***	-.049*	-.026**
	(.029)	(.027)	(.011)
PROD25%D-PROFIT5%D x Woman	.077**	-.009	-.068**
	(.030)	(.010)	(.030)
PROD50%D-PROFIT33%D x Woman	.039	-.011	-.028
	(.028)	(.008)	(.027)
Woman	-.053****	.011	.042****
	(.014)	(.008)	(.010)
Wald (p)			
Woman int. terms	.0002	.0040	.0326
taste Woman int. terms	.0015	.0116	.4763
stats Woman int. terms	.0039	.0179	.0349
all variables	.0000	.0000	.0000
R^2	.297	.421	.428
Obs	10692	10692	10692

(e) Ethnicity—with monetary stakes

	Anti	Pro-White	Pro-Black
	(1)	(2)	(3)
PROFIT33%A	-.145****	.165****	-.019****
	(.013)	(.013)	(.005)
PROFIT33%D	-.163****	-.006	.169****
	(.013)	(.005)	(.013)
PROD50%A-PROFIT33%A	-.589****	.602****	-.013**
	(.017)	(.017)	(.006)
PROD50%D-PROFIT33%D	-.607****	-.003	.610****
	(.017)	(.006)	(.017)
PROFIT33%A x EthMin	-.085**	.105**	-.020
	(.040)	(.042)	(.025)
PROFIT33%D x EthMin	-.068	-.033*	.101**
	(.042)	(.019)	(.043)
PROD50%A-PROFIT33%A x EthMin	.050	-.017	-.033
	(.047)	(.046)	(.024)
PROD50%D-PROFIT33%D x EthMin	.067	-.023	-.044
	(.046)	(.019)	(.045)
EthMin	-.059*	.008	.051**
	(.030)	(.019)	(.024)
Wald (p)			
All EthMin int. terms	.0366	.0054	.0059
taste EthMin int. terms	.0983	.0011	.0131
stats EthMin int. terms	.3287	.4920	.3257
all variables	.0000	.0000	.0000
R^2	.291	.398	.399
Obs	5400	5400	5400

(f) LGBTQ+ status—with monetary stakes

	Anti	Pro-nLGBTQ+	Pro-LGBTQ+
	(1)	(2)	(3)
PROFIT33%A	-.150****	.167****	-.017***
	(.014)	(.013)	(.006)
PROFIT33%D	-.155****	-.030****	.184****
	(.014)	(.008)	(.014)
PROD50%A-PROFIT33%A	-.530****	.549****	-.019***
	(.018)	(.017)	(.007)
PROD50%D-PROFIT33%D	-.538****	-.014	.552****
	(.018)	(.009)	(.017)
PROFIT33%A x LGBTQ+	.018	.061	-.079***
	(.042)	(.041)	(.028)
PROFIT33%D x LGBTQ+	-.059	.030**	.029
	(.039)	(.013)	(.041)
PROD50%A-PROFIT33%A x LGBTQ+	-.014	.069	-.054**
	(.052)	(.046)	(.026)
PROD50%D-PROFIT33%D x LGBTQ+	-.087*	.036*	.051
	(.049)	(.022)	(.049)
LGBTQ+	-.012	-.060****	.072**
	(.034)	(.017)	(.029)
Wald (p)			
All LGBTQ+ int. terms	.0119	.0636	.0033
taste LGBTQ+ int. terms	.0216	.0381	.0054
stats LGBTQ+ int. terms	.0424	.1053	.0241
all variables	.0000	.0000	.0000
R^2	.243	.321	.358
Obs	5400	5400	5400

Notes: Linear probability models with individual-level random effects, socio-demographic controls, an indicator for decisions about a second discrimination domain in Study 2, and robust standard errors. Woman, EthMin, and LGBTQ+ are indicators for women, ethnic minority individuals, and LGBTQ+ individuals, respectively. $^{*}p < .10$, $^{**}p < .05$, $^{***}p < .01$, $^{****}p < .001$.

Table D2: Differences between individuals residing or not residing in the largest 10 UK cities

(a) Gender—without monetary stakes

	Anti	Pro-Men	Pro-Wom.
	(1)	(2)	(3)
PROD25%A	-.480****	.467****	.013**
	(.018)	(.018)	(.007)
PROD50%A	-.579****	.574****	.005
	(.018)	(.018)	(.006)
PROD25%D	-.473****	.007	.465****
	(.018)	(.006)	(.018)
PROD50%D	-.582****	.006	.576****
	(.018)	(.007)	(.018)
PROD25%A x L10Cities	-.005	.021	-.016
	(.034)	(.033)	(.014)
PROD50%A x L10Cities	.009	.001	-.010
	(.034)	(.032)	(.013)
PROD25%D x L10Cities	-.040	.012	.028
	(.033)	(.012)	(.033)
PROD50%D x L10Cities	-.015	.010	.004
	(.033)	(.011)	(.033)
L10Cities	-.026	.001	.025
	(.022)	(.013)	(.016)
Wald (p)			
All L10Cities terms	.4593	.8365	.4416
taste L10Cities term	.2421	.9218	.1154
stats L10Cities terms	.5553	.7665	.5823
all variables	.0000	.0000	.0000
R^2	.201	.371	.369
Obs	5940	5940	5940

(b) Ethnicity—without monetary stakes

	Anti	Pro-White	Pro-Black
	(1)	(2)	(3)
PROD50%A	-.469****	.464****	.006
	(.020)	(.019)	(.007)
PROD50%D	-.462****	.014**	.448****
	(.020)	(.007)	(.020)
PROD50%A x L10Cities	.056	-.045	-.011
	(.035)	(.034)	(.013)
PROD50%D x L10Cities	.030	-.009	-.021
	(.034)	(.013)	(.034)
L10Cities	-.065***	.031**	.034**
	(.024)	(.014)	(.017)
Wald (p)			
All L10Cities terms	.0316	.1498	.2285
taste L10Cities term	.0054	.0293	.0385
stats L10Cities terms	.2408	.3913	.6138
all variables	.0000	.0000	.0000
R^2	.217	.311	.303
Obs	3240	3240	3240

(c) LGBTQ+ status—without monetary stakes

	Anti	Pro-nLGBTQ+	Pro-LGBTQ+
	(1)	(2)	(3)
PROD50%A	-.406****	.404****	.001
	(.020)	(.020)	(.008)
PROD50%D	-.421****	.024**	.397****
	(.020)	(.010)	(.019)
PROD50%A x L10Cities	.053	-.041	-.012
	(.037)	(.035)	(.017)
PROD50%D x L10Cities	.063*	-.007	-.056
	(.036)	(.019)	(.034)
L10Cities	-.064**	.028	.036**
	(.027)	(.020)	(.019)
Wald (p)			
All L10Cities terms	.0979	.4609	.1595
taste L10Cities term	.0194	.1645	.0496
stats L10Cities terms	.2174	.5019	.2486
all variables	.0000	.0000	.0000
R^2	.176	.220	.246
Obs	3240	3240	3240

(d) Gender—with monetary stakes

	Anti	Pro-Men	Pro-Wom.
	(1)	(2)	(3)
PROFIT5%A	-.106****	.112****	-.006
	(.012)	(.012)	(.006)
PROFIT33%A	-.185****	.195****	-.010*
	(.015)	(.014)	(.005)
PROFIT5%D	-.123****	-.004	.127****
	(.013)	(.005)	(.012)
PROFIT33%D	-.216****	-.009*	.224****
	(.015)	(.005)	(.015)
PROD25%A-PROFIT5%A	-.535****	.536****	-.001
	(.018)	(.018)	(.006)
PROD50%A-PROFIT33%A	-.676****	.685****	-.009
	(.017)	(.017)	(.005)
PROD25%D-PROFIT5%D	-.574****	.007	.566****
	(.018)	(.006)	(.018)
PROD50%D-PROFIT33%D	-.708****	-.009*	.716****
	(.016)	(.005)	(.016)
PROFIT5%A x L10Cities	.008	.002	-.010
	(.023)	(.021)	(.012)
PROFIT33%A x L10Cities	.003	.009	-.012
	(.028)	(.027)	(.013)
PROFIT5%D x L10Cities	.019	.015*	-.034
	(.022)	(.008)	(.022)
PROFIT33%D x L10Cities	.025	.000	-.025
	(.027)	(.008)	(.027)
PROD25%A-PROFIT5%A x L10Cities	-.029	.047	-.018
	(.034)	(.032)	(.013)
PROD50%A-PROFIT33%A x L10Cities	-.002	.035	-.032**
	(.032)	(.029)	(.014)
PROD25%D-PROFIT5%D x L10Cities	-.009	.001	.009
	(.033)	(.010)	(.033)
PROD50%D-PROFIT33%D x L10Cities	.013	.003	-.016
	(.031)	(.009)	(.030)
L10Cities	-.017	-.005	.021
	(.020)	(.011)	(.014)
Wald (p)			
All L10Cities int. terms	.8275	.5891	.3299
taste L10Cities int. terms	.7406	.4063	.5762
stats L10Cities int. terms	.6562	.6900	.1618
all variables	.0000	.0000	.0000
R^2	.295	.419	.427
Obs	10692	10692	10692

(e) Ethnicity—with monetary stakes

	Anti	Pro-White	Pro-Black
	(1)	(2)	(3)
PROFIT33%A	-.151****	.168****	-.017***
	(.015)	(.014)	(.006)
PROFIT33%D	-.159****	-.004	.164****
	(.015)	(.004)	(.015)
PROD50%A-PROFIT33%A	-.595****	.603****	-.009
	(.019)	(.019)	(.007)
PROD50%D-PROFIT33%D	-.607****	-.001	.609****
	(.019)	(.006)	(.019)
PROFIT33%A x L10Cities	-.019	.034	-.015
	(.027)	(.027)	(.014)
PROFIT33%D x L10Cities	-.037	-.020*	.057**
	(.028)	(.012)	(.028)
PROD50%A-PROFIT33%A x L10Cities	.035	-.009	-.026*
	(.034)	(.033)	(.013)
PROD50%D-PROFIT33%D x L10Cities	.029	-.014	-.015
	(.033)	(.013)	(.033)
L10Cities	-.042*	.025*	.017
	(.023)	(.013)	(.015)
Wald (p)			
L10Cities int. terms	.2680	.2363	.0233
taste L10Cities int. terms	.3178	.0716	.0343
stats L10Cities int. terms	.5807	.5421	.1482
all variables	.0000	.0000	.0000
R^2	.290	.397	.398
Obs	5400	5400	5400

(f) LGBTQ+ status—with monetary stakes

	Anti	Pro-nLGBTQ+	Pro-LGBTQ+
	(1)	(2)	(3)
PROFIT33%A	-.134****	.159****	-.025****
	(.015)	(.015)	(.007)
PROFIT33%D	-.144****	-.018***	.162****
	(.015)	(.007)	(.015)
PROD50%A-PROFIT33%A	-.541****	.562****	-.021***
	(.020)	(.019)	(.007)
PROD50%D-PROFIT33%D	-.558****	-.008	.566****
	(.020)	(.009)	(.019)
PROFIT33%A x L10Cities	-.042	.048*	-.005
	(.029)	(.027)	(.015)
PROFIT33%D x L10Cities	-.055*	-.023	.078***
	(.028)	(.017)	(.029)
PROD50%A-PROFIT33%A x L10Cities	.029	-.014	-.015
	(.036)	(.034)	(.016)
PROD50%D-PROFIT33%D x L10Cities	.026	-.003	-.024
	(.036)	(.020)	(.035)
L10Cities	-.048*	.023	.025
	(.026)	(.019)	(.017)
Wald (p)			
All L10Cities int. terms	.1321	.1114	.0150
taste L10Cities int. terms	.1497	.0515	.0157
stats L10Cities int. terms	.7146	.9185	.5931
all variables	.0000	.0000	.0000
R^2	.243	.322	.359
Obs	5400	5400	5400

Notes: Linear probability models with individual-level random effects, socio-demographic controls, an indicator for decisions about a second discrimination domain in Study 2, and robust standard errors. L10Cities is an indicator for living in one of the 10 largest UK cities (London, Birmingham, Manchester, Glasgow, Newcastle, Sheffield, Leeds, Bristol, Nottingham, and Liverpool). * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$, **** $p < .001$.

Table D3: Differences according to age

(a) Gender—without monetary stakes

	Anti	Pro-Men	Pro-Wom.
	(1)	(2)	(3)
PROD25%A	-.499****	.504****	-.005
	(.049)	(.047)	(.021)
PROD50%A	-.586****	.599****	-.013
	(.048)	(.046)	(.019)
PROD25%D	-.570****	.001	.569****
	(.049)	(.019)	(.048)
PROD50%D	-.611****	.006	.605****
	(.047)	(.019)	(.046)
PROD25%A x Age	.000	-.001	.000
	(.001)	(.001)	(.000)
PROD50%A x Age	.000	-.001	.000
	(.001)	(.001)	(.000)
PROD25%D x Age	.002*	.000	-.002**
	(.001)	(.000)	(.001)
PROD50%D x Age	.001	.000	-.001
	(.001)	(.000)	(.001)
Age	.000	.000	-.001
	(.001)	(.000)	(.000)
Wald (p)			
All Age terms	.3291	.8863	.1001
taste Age term	.6311	.4643	.1815
stats Age terms	.2667	.9219	.1323
all variables	.0000	.0000	.0000
R^2	.202	.371	.370
Obs	5940	5940	5940

(b) Ethnicity—without monetary stakes

	Anti	Pro-White	Pro-Black
	(1)	(2)	(3)
PROD50%A	-.483****	.485****	-.003
	(.053)	(.052)	(.021)
PROD50%D	-.510****	-.025	.535****
	(.050)	(.018)	(.049)
PROD50%A x Age	.001	-.001	.000
	(.001)	(.001)	(.000)
PROD50%D x Age	.001	.001**	-.002**
	(.001)	(.000)	(.001)
Age	-.000	-.000	.000
	(.001)	(.000)	(.000)
Wald (p)			
All Age terms	.6301	.0872	.2344
taste Age term	.8568	.7541	.5701
stats Age terms	.4214	.0383	.1234
all variables	.0000	.0000	.0000
R^2	.217	.311	.305
Obs	3240	3240	3240

(c) LGBTQ+ status—without monetary stakes

	Anti	Pro-nLGBTQ+	Pro-LGBTQ+
	(1)	(2)	(3)
PROD50%A	-.358****	.378****	-.020
	(.056)	(.053)	(.026)
PROD50%D	-.350****	.010	.340****
	(.055)	(.031)	(.051)
PROD50%A x Age	-.001	.000	.000
	(.001)	(.001)	(.000)
PROD50%D x Age	-.001	.000	.001
	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)
Age	.000	.001	-.001*
	(.001)	(.001)	(.000)
Wald (p)			
All Age terms	.7825	.5003	.4040
taste Age term	.9147	.2653	.0950
stats Age terms	.6059	.9158	.5872
all variables	.0000	.0000	.0000
R^2	.175	.220	.245
Obs	3240	3240	3240

(d) Gender—with monetary stakes

	Anti	Pro-Men	Pro-Wom.
	(1)	(2)	(3)
PROFIT5%A	-.132****	.164****	-.032*
	(.031)	(.029)	(.018)
PROFIT33%A	-.236****	.289****	-.054***
	(.039)	(.037)	(.018)
PROFIT5%D	-.141****	.017	.123****
	(.031)	(.013)	(.031)
PROFIT33%D	-.277****	-.008	.286****
	(.039)	(.013)	(.039)
PROD25%A-PROFIT5%A	-.615****	.644****	-.029
	(.048)	(.046)	(.020)
PROD50%A-PROFIT33%A	-.753****	.814****	-.061***
	(.045)	(.042)	(.019)
PROD25%D-PROFIT5%D	-.640****	-.028*	.668****
	(.047)	(.016)	(.046)
PROD50%D-PROFIT33%D	-.740****	-.022	.763****
	(.043)	(.014)	(.042)
PROFIT5%A x Age	.001	-.001*	.001
	(.001)	(.001)	(.000)
PROFIT33%A x Age	.001	-.002***	.001**
	(.001)	(.001)	(.000)
PROFIT5%D x Age	.001	-.000	-.000
	(.001)	(.000)	(.001)
PROFIT33%D x Age	.002*	-.000	-.002*
	(.001)	(.000)	(.001)
PROD25%A-PROFIT5%A x Age	.002	-.002**	.000
	(.001)	(.001)	(.000)
PROD50%A-PROFIT33%A x Age	.002*	-.003***	.001***
	(.001)	(.001)	(.000)
PROD25%D-PROFIT5%D x Age	.001	.001**	-.002**
	(.001)	(.000)	(.001)
PROD50%D-PROFIT33%D x Age	.001	.000	-.001
	(.001)	(.000)	(.001)
Age	.001	.000	-.001**
	(.001)	(.000)	(.000)
Wald (p)			
All Age int. terms	.4595	.0047	.0034
taste Age int. terms	.3993	.0482	.0075
stats Age int. terms	.3396	.0054	.0035
all variables	.0000	.0000	.0000
R^2	.295	.421	.429
Obs	10692	10692	10692

(e) Ethnicity—with monetary stakes

	Anti	Pro-White	Pro-Black
	(1)	(2)	(3)
PROFIT33%A	-.326****	.336****	-.010
	(.041)	(.041)	(.019)
PROFIT33%D	-.380****	-.022	.403****
	(.042)	(.014)	(.042)
PROD50%A-PROFIT33%A	-.724****	.736****	-.011
	(.048)	(.047)	(.020)
PROD50%D-PROFIT33%D	-.736****	-.021	.757****
	(.048)	(.017)	(.046)
PROFIT33%A x Age	.004****	-.003****	-.000
	(.001)	(.001)	(.000)
PROFIT33%D x Age	.005****	.000	-.005****
	(.001)	(.000)	(.001)
PROD50%A-PROFIT33%A x Age	.003***	-.003***	-.000
	(.001)	(.001)	(.000)
PROD50%D-PROFIT33%D x Age	.003***	.000	-.003****
	(.001)	(.000)	(.001)
Age	.001	-.000	-.000
	(.001)	(.000)	(.000)
Wald (p)			
All Age int. terms	.0000	.0000	.0000
taste Age int. terms	.0000	.0000	.0000
stats Age int. terms	.0052	.0034	.0030
all variables	.0000	.0000	.0000
R^2	.292	.401	.403
Obs	5400	5400	5400

(f) LGBTQ+ status—with monetary stakes

	Anti	Pro-nLGBTQ+	Pro-LGBTQ+
	(1)	(2)	(3)
PROFIT33%A	-.300****	.379****	-.079****
	(.044)	(.042)	(.022)
PROFIT33%D	-.335****	-.040	.374****
	(.044)	(.025)	(.044)
PROD50%A-PROFIT33%A	-.601****	.693****	-.092****
	(.053)	(.049)	(.024)
PROD50%D-PROFIT33%D	-.650****	-.044	.695****
	(.052)	(.028)	(.049)
PROFIT33%A x Age	.003****	-.004****	.001***
	(.001)	(.001)	(.000)
PROFIT33%D x Age	.004****	.000	-.004****
	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)
PROD50%A-PROFIT33%A x Age	.002	-.003***	.001***
	(.001)	(.001)	(.000)
PROD50%D-PROFIT33%D x Age	.002**	.001	-.003***
	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)
Age	.001	.001	-.002***
	(.001)	(.001)	(.000)
Wald (p)			
All Age int. terms	.0001	.0000	.0000
taste Age int. terms	.0000	.0000	.0000
stats Age int. terms	.1088	.0013	.0000
all variables	.0000	.0000	.0000
R^2	.244	.327	.364
Obs	5400	5400	5400

Notes: Linear probability models with individual-level random effects, socio-demographic controls, an indicator for decisions about a second discrimination domain in Study 2, and robust standard errors. Age takes values 18 to 81 years. $^{*}p < .10$, $^{**}p < .05$, $^{***}p < .01$, $^{****}p < .001$.

Table D4: Differences between individuals with and without a university degree

(a) Gender—without monetary stakes

	Anti	Pro-Men	Pro-Wom.
	(1)	(2)	(3)
PROD25%A	-.487****	.478****	.010
	(.023)	(.023)	(.009)
PROD50%A	-.563****	.551****	.012
	(.023)	(.022)	(.009)
PROD25%D	-.480****	.029***	.451****
	(.023)	(.009)	(.022)
PROD50%D	-.551****	.017**	.534****
	(.023)	(.009)	(.023)
PROD25%A x University	.011	-.008	-.002
	(.031)	(.030)	(.012)
PROD50%A x University	-.023	.040	-.018
	(.031)	(.030)	(.011)
PROD25%D x University	-.009	-.032***	.041
	(.031)	(.011)	(.030)
PROD50%D x University	-.063**	-.014	.077***
	(.031)	(.011)	(.030)
University	-.003	.006	-.003
	(.014)	(.009)	(.010)
Wald (p)			
All University terms	.0676	.0191	.0560
taste University terms	.8272	.4874	.7601
stats University terms	.0429	.0093	.0321
all variables	.0000	.0000	.0000
R^2	.202	.372	.370
Obs	5940	5940	5940

(b) Ethnicity—without monetary stakes

	Anti	Pro-White	Pro-Black
	(1)	(2)	(3)
PROD50%A	-.470****	.454****	.016*
	(.024)	(.024)	(.009)
PROD50%D	-.445****	.011	.434****
	(.024)	(.007)	(.024)
PROD50%A x University	.034	-.010	-.024**
	(.033)	(.032)	(.012)
PROD50%D x University	-.011	-.000	.011
	(.032)	(.011)	(.032)
University	-.067****	.022**	.045****
	(.015)	(.010)	(.011)
Wald (p)			
All University terms	.0000	.0889	.0003
taste University term	.0000	.0210	.0000
stats University terms	.0943	.9500	.1110
all variables	.0000	.0000	.0000
R^2	.217	.310	.303
Obs	3240	3240	3240

(c) LGBTQ+ status—without monetary stakes

	Anti	Pro-nLGBTQ+	Pro-LGBTQ+
	(1)	(2)	(3)
PROD50%A	-.390****	.387****	.002
	(.027)	(.026)	(.011)
PROD50%D	-.418****	.030**	.387****
	(.027)	(.015)	(.025)
PROD50%A x University	.003	.005	-.008
	(.035)	(.033)	(.015)
PROD50%D x University	.029	-.015	-.015
	(.034)	(.018)	(.033)
University	-.031	.005	.025*
	(.020)	(.015)	(.013)
Wald (p)			
All University terms	.3152	.8439	.2641
taste University term	.1297	.7150	.0554
stats University terms	.5074	.6667	.7987
all variables	.0000	.0000	.0000
R^2	.175	.220	.245
Obs	3240	3240	3240

(d) Gender—with monetary stakes

	Anti	Pro-Men	Pro-Wom.
	(1)	(2)	(3)
PROFIT5%A	-.097****	.106****	-.010
	(.015)	(.015)	(.007)
PROFIT33%A	-.170****	.182****	-.012
	(.018)	(.018)	(.007)
PROFIT5%D	-.128****	.002	.126****
	(.016)	(.006)	(.015)
PROFIT33%D	-.178****	-.006	.184****
	(.018)	(.006)	(.017)
PROD25%A-PROFIT5%A	-.538****	.540****	-.002
	(.023)	(.022)	(.008)
PROD50%A-PROFIT33%A	-.646****	.658****	-.012
	(.022)	(.022)	(.008)
PROD25%D-PROFIT5%D	-.576****	.021**	.555****
	(.023)	(.009)	(.022)
PROD50%D-PROFIT33%D	-.677****	-.008	.685****
	(.021)	(.005)	(.020)
PROFIT5%A x University	-.012	.011	.001
	(.020)	(.019)	(.010)
PROFIT33%A x University	-.025	.028	-.003
	(.025)	(.024)	(.010)
PROFIT5%D x University	.019	-.002	-.017
	(.021)	(.008)	(.020)
PROFIT33%D x University	-.053**	-.005	.058**
	(.025)	(.008)	(.025)
PROD25%A-PROFIT5%A x University	-.011	.019	-.008
	(.031)	(.030)	(.011)
PROD50%A-PROFIT33%A x University	-.054*	.067**	-.012
	(.029)	(.028)	(.011)
PROD25%D-PROFIT5%D x University	-.000	-.024**	.025
	(.030)	(.010)	(.030)
PROD50%D-PROFIT33%D x University	-.047*	.000	.047*
	(.028)	(.008)	(.027)
University	-.003	.002	.000
	(.014)	(.008)	(.010)
Wald (p)			
All University int. terms	.0072	.0454	.0061
taste University int. terms	.0035	.7230	.0020
stats University int. terms	.1054	.0062	.2181
all variables	.0000	.0000	.0000
R^2	.296	.420	.428
Obs	10692	10692	10692

(e) Ethnicity—with monetary stakes

	Anti	Pro-White	Pro-Black
	(1)	(2)	(3)
PROFIT33%A	-.154****	.157****	-.002
	(.018)	(.018)	(.007)
PROFIT33%D	-.170****	-.004	.174****
	(.019)	(.004)	(.019)
PROD50%A-PROFIT33%A	-.577****	.570****	.007
	(.024)	(.024)	(.008)
PROD50%D-PROFIT33%D	-.586****	-.000	.586****
	(.024)	(.006)	(.024)
PROFIT33%A x University	-.005	.039	-.034***
	(.025)	(.024)	(.011)
PROFIT33%D x University	-.004	-.011	.015
	(.026)	(.009)	(.026)
PROD50%A-PROFIT33%A x University	-.009	.050	-.041****
	(.032)	(.031)	(.012)
PROD50%D-PROFIT33%D x University	-.019	-.011	.030
	(.032)	(.010)	(.031)
University	-.040***	.010	.030***
	(.015)	(.009)	(.011)
Wald (p)			
All University int. terms	.9722	.1425	.0017
taste University int. terms	.9769	.0855	.0027
stats University int. terms	.7826	.1131	.0004
all variables	.0000	.0000	.0000
R^2	.289	.397	.398
Obs	5400	5400	5400

(f) LGBTQ+ status—with monetary stakes

	Anti	Pro-nLGBTQ+	Pro-LGBTQ+
	(1)	(2)	(3)
PROFIT33%A	-.144****	.167****	-.023**
	(.020)	(.020)	(.009)
PROFIT33%D	-.158****	-.023**	.181****
	(.020)	(.011)	(.020)
PROD50%A-PROFIT33%A	-.529****	.550****	-.021**
	(.027)	(.025)	(.010)
PROD50%D-PROFIT33%D	-.566****	-.002	.568****
	(.025)	(.014)	(.025)
PROFIT33%A x University	-.007	.013	-.006
	(.026)	(.026)	(.013)
PROFIT33%D x University	-.007	-.005	.012
	(.026)	(.014)	(.026)
PROD50%A-PROFIT33%A x University	-.004	.013	-.008
	(.034)	(.033)	(.013)
PROD50%D-PROFIT33%D x University	.028	-.012	-.017
	(.033)	(.018)	(.033)
University	-.006	-.004	.010
	(.020)	(.015)	(.013)
Wald (p)			
All University int. terms	.6489	.9200	.8906
taste University int. terms	.9591	.8058	.7557
stats University int. terms	.3293	.7016	.7660
all variables	.0000	.0000	.0000
R^2	.242	.321	.357
Obs	5400	5400	5400

Notes: Linear probability models with individual-level random effects, socio-demographic controls, an indicator for decisions about a second discrimination domain in Study 2, and robust standard errors. University is an indicator for holding a university degree. $^{*}p < .10$, $^{**}p < .05$, $^{***}p < .01$, $^{****}p < .001$.

Table D5: Differences according to the income level

(a) Gender—without monetary stakes

	Anti	Pro-Men	Pro-Wom.
	(1)	(2)	(3)
PROD25%A	-.502****	.477****	.024***
	(.027)	(.027)	(.009)
PROD50%A	-.565****	.557****	.008
	(.027)	(.027)	(.008)
PROD25%D	-.477****	.013	.464****
	(.027)	(.010)	(.027)
PROD50%D	-.567****	.006	.560****
	(.027)	(.009)	(.026)
PROD25%A x Income	.010	-.002	-.008**
	(.011)	(.011)	(.003)
PROD50%A x Income	-.005	.009	-.003
	(.011)	(.011)	(.004)
PROD25%D x Income	-.004	-.001	.005
	(.011)	(.004)	(.011)
PROD50%D x Income	-.010	.001	.009
	(.011)	(.004)	(.011)
Income	-.006	-.002	.008
	(.008)	(.005)	(.005)
Wald (p)			
All Income terms	.3400	.8267	.1289
taste Income term	.4335	.7318	.1377
stats Income terms	.3058	.7209	.1224
all variables	.0000	.0000	.0000
R^2	.201	.371	.369
Obs	5940	5940	5940

(b) Ethnicity—without monetary stakes

	Anti	Pro-White	Pro-Black
	(1)	(2)	(3)
PROD50%A	-.469****	.461****	.008
	(.029)	(.028)	(.010)
PROD50%D	-.473****	-.001	.474****
	(.028)	(.010)	(.028)
PROD50%A x Income	.009	-.006	-.003
	(.012)	(.012)	(.004)
PROD50%D x Income	.011	.006	-.017
	(.012)	(.005)	(.012)
Income	-.013	.009*	.003
	(.009)	(.006)	(.006)
Wald (p)			
All Income terms	.4811	.0817	.5237
taste Income term	.1491	.0964	.5579
stats Income terms	.6521	.3313	.3282
all variables	.0000	.0000	.0000
R^2	.217	.311	.304
Obs	3240	3240	3240

(c) LGBTQ+ status—without monetary stakes

	Anti	Pro-nLGBTQ+	Pro-LGBTQ+
	(1)	(2)	(3)
PROD50%A	-.416****	.414****	.002
	(.031)	(.029)	(.013)
PROD50%D	-.431****	.011	.421****
	(.031)	(.014)	(.029)
PROD50%A x Income	.014	-.011	-.002
	(.013)	(.012)	(.006)
PROD50%D x Income	.015	.005	-.020*
	(.012)	(.006)	(.012)
Income	-.013	.009	.004
	(.010)	(.007)	(.006)
Wald (p)			
All Income terms	.4719	.2224	.3961
taste Income term	.1773	.1898	.5444
stats Income terms	.4605	.3146	.2278
all variables	.0000	.0000	.0000
R^2	.175	.221	.246
Obs	3240	3240	3240

(d) Gender—with monetary stakes

	Anti	Pro-Men	Pro-Wom.
	(1)	(2)	(3)
PROFIT5%A	-.098****	.096****	.002
	(.018)	(.017)	(.008)
PROFIT33%A	-.161****	.163****	-.002
	(.022)	(.022)	(.008)
PROFIT5%D	-.113****	.003	.111****
	(.019)	(.007)	(.018)
PROFIT33%D	-.199****	-.012	.211****
	(.023)	(.008)	(.022)
PROD25%A-PROFIT5%A	-.507****	.491****	.016*
	(.027)	(.027)	(.009)
PROD50%A-PROFIT33%A	-.635****	.636****	-.001
	(.026)	(.025)	(.008)
PROD25%D-PROFIT5%D	-.545****	.008	.537****
	(.027)	(.009)	(.026)
PROD50%D-PROFIT33%D	-.674****	-.013	.687****
	(.025)	(.008)	(.024)
PROFIT5%A x Income	-.003	.008	-.006
	(.008)	(.007)	(.004)
PROFIT33%A x Income	-.012	.018*	-.006
	(.010)	(.009)	(.004)
PROFIT5%D x Income	-.002	-.001	.003
	(.008)	(.003)	(.008)
PROFIT33%D x Income	-.004	.002	.003
	(.010)	(.003)	(.010)
PROD25%A-PROFIT5%A x Income	-.018	.030***	-.011***
	(.011)	(.011)	(.004)
PROD50%A-PROFIT33%A x Income	-.021**	.030***	-.009**
	(.010)	(.010)	(.004)
PROD25%D-PROFIT5%D x Income	-.016	-.000	.016
	(.011)	(.004)	(.011)
PROD50%D-PROFIT33%D x Income	-.015	.003	.012
	(.010)	(.003)	(.010)
Income	-.003	-.006	.008*
	(.007)	(.004)	(.005)
Wald (p)			
All Income int. terms	.6658	.1968	.0558
taste Income int. terms	.6289	.3655	.5116
stats Income int. terms	.3715	.0455	.0054
all variables	.0000	.0000	.0000
R^2	.296	.420	.428
Obs	10692	10692	10692

(e) Ethnicity—with monetary stakes

	Anti	Pro-White	Pro-Black
	(1)	(2)	(3)
PROFIT33%A	-.135****	.148****	-.013
	(.021)	(.021)	(.010)
PROFIT33%D	-.166****	-.016**	.182****
	(.022)	(.008)	(.023)
PROD50%A-PROFIT33%A	-.569****	.573****	-.004
	(.028)	(.027)	(.010)
PROD50%D-PROFIT33%D	-.576****	-.018*	.594****
	(.028)	(.009)	(.027)
PROFIT33%A x Income	-.011	.016*	-.005
	(.009)	(.009)	(.005)
PROFIT33%D x Income	-.003	.003	.000
	(.010)	(.004)	(.010)
PROD50%A-PROFIT33%A x Income	-.006	.013	-.007
	(.011)	(.011)	(.004)
PROD50%D-PROFIT33%D x Income	-.010	.005	.005
	(.011)	(.005)	(.011)
Income	-.009	.003	.006
	(.008)	(.005)	(.005)
Wald (p)			
All Income int. terms	.5258	.3725	.5482
taste Income int. terms	.2694	.2140	.5393
stats Income int. terms	.6323	.3004	.2184
all variables	.0000	.0000	.0000
R^2	.289	.397	.397
Obs	5400	5400	5400

(f) LGBTQ+ status—with monetary stakes

	Anti	Pro-nLGBTQ+	Pro-LGBTQ+
	(1)	(2)	(3)
PROFIT33%A	-.123****	.151****	-.028**
	(.025)	(.022)	(.012)
PROFIT33%D	-.162****	-.029**	.191****
	(.024)	(.012)	(.024)
PROD50%A-PROFIT33%A	-.545****	.570****	-.025*
	(.031)	(.028)	(.013)
PROD50%D-PROFIT33%D	-.569****	-.021	.591****
	(.030)	(.014)	(.029)
PROFIT33%A x Income	-.012	.012	.000
	(.010)	(.009)	(.005)
PROFIT33%D x Income	.000	.001	-.001
	(.010)	(.005)	(.010)
PROD50%A-PROFIT33%A x Income	.007	-.006	-.001
	(.012)	(.011)	(.005)
PROD50%D-PROFIT33%D x Income	.010	.006	-.016
	(.012)	(.006)	(.012)
Income	-.007	.006	.002
	(.009)	(.007)	(.006)
Wald (p)			
All Income int. terms	.1851	.3973	.6960
taste Income int. terms	.1029	.4404	.9809
stats Income int. terms	.7096	.4739	.3995
all variables	.0000	.0000	.0000
R^2	.243	.321	.357
Obs	5400	5400	5400

Notes: Linear probability models with individual-level random effects, socio-demographic controls, an indicator for decisions about a second discrimination domain in Study 2, and robust standard errors. Income is a variable taking values 0 to 4 for five (after-tax) income categories: less than 10,000 GBP, 10,000–19,999 GBP, 20,000–29,999 GBP, 30,000—39,999 GBP, 40,000+ GBP. $^{*}p < .10$, $^{**}p < .05$, $^{***}p < .01$, $^{****}p < .001$.

Table D6: Differences between UK nationals and non-UK nationals

(a) Gender—without monetary stakes

	Anti	Pro-Men	Pro-Wom.
	(1)	(2)	(3)
PROD25%A	-.489****	.519****	-.031
	(.053)	(.049)	(.024)
PROD50%A	-.550****	.588****	-.038*
	(.052)	(.049)	(.023)
PROD25%D	-.504****	-.000	.504****
	(.049)	(.022)	(.048)
PROD50%D	-.595****	-.008	.603****
	(.048)	(.017)	(.047)
PROD25%A x UKNat	.008	-.052	.044*
	(.056)	(.051)	(.025)
PROD50%A x UKNat	-.029	-.015	.045*
	(.055)	(.052)	(.023)
PROD25%D x UKNat	.021	.012	-.034
	(.052)	(.022)	(.050)
PROD50%D x UKNat	.010	.019	-.029
	(.051)	(.018)	(.049)
UKNat	.056*	-.021	-.035
	(.030)	(.018)	(.024)
Wald (p)			
All UKNat terms	.2169	.4577	.2139
taste UKNat term	.0588	.2422	.1412
stats UKNat terms	.7376	.4353	.1377
all variables	.0000	.0000	.0000
R^2	.201	.372	.369
Obs	5940	5940	5940

(b) Ethnicity—without monetary stakes

	Anti	Pro-White	Pro-Black
	(1)	(2)	(3)
PROD50%A	-.437****	.429****	.008
	(.050)	(.048)	(.018)
PROD50%D	-.460****	.000	.460****
	(.049)	(.020)	(.049)
PROD50%A x UKNat	-.015	.022	-.007
	(.053)	(.051)	(.019)
PROD50%D x UKNat	.010	.013	-.022
	(.052)	(.020)	(.052)
UKNat	-.021	.004	.017
	(.027)	(.018)	(.019)
Wald (p)			
All UKNat terms	.7461	.7754	.8376
taste UKNat term	.4426	.8359	.3616
stats UKNat terms	.8212	.7881	.8799
all variables	.0000	.0000	.0000
R^2	.217	.310	.303
Obs	3240	3240	3240

(c) LGBTQ+ status—without monetary stakes

	Anti	Pro-nLGBTQ+	Pro-LGBTQ+
	(1)	(2)	(3)
PROD50%A	-.412****	.412****	-.000
	(.056)	(.050)	(.025)
PROD50%D	-.395****	.018	.377****
	(.055)	(.028)	(.051)
PROD50%A x UKNat	.027	-.024	-.003
	(.058)	(.053)	(.026)
PROD50%D x UKNat	-.006	.004	.002
	(.058)	(.029)	(.053)
UKNat	.038	-.029	-.009
	(.037)	(.028)	(.026)
Wald (p)			
All UKNat terms	.4687	.6008	.9703
taste UKNat term	.3090	.2953	.7310
stats UKNat terms	.6923	.8706	.9910
all variables	.0000	.0000	.0000
R^2	.175	.220	.245
Obs	3240	3240	3240

(d) Gender—with monetary stakes

	Anti	Pro-Men	Pro-Wom.
	(1)	(2)	(3)
PROFIT5%A	-.076**	.107****	-.031
	(.035)	(.029)	(.021)
PROFIT33%A	-.176****	.183****	-.008
	(.040)	(.037)	(.025)
PROFIT5%D	-.076**	-.015	.092***
	(.035)	(.015)	(.033)
PROFIT33%D	-.214****	-.031*	.244****
	(.042)	(.019)	(.042)
PROD25%A-PROFIT5%A	-.534****	.557****	-.023
	(.049)	(.047)	(.025)
PROD50%A-PROFIT33%A	-.626****	.679****	-.053**
	(.050)	(.044)	(.025)
PROD25%D-PROFIT5%D	-.573****	.031	.542****
	(.048)	(.021)	(.047)
PROD50%D-PROFIT33%D	-.695****	-.015	.710****
	(.046)	(.019)	(.043)
PROFIT5%A x UKNat	-.031	.007	.024
	(.037)	(.031)	(.022)
PROFIT33%A x UKNat	-.010	.016	-.007
	(.042)	(.039)	(.026)
PROFIT5%D x UKNat	-.046	.018	.028
	(.037)	(.016)	(.035)
PROFIT33%D x UKNat	.007	.025	-.031
	(.044)	(.019)	(.044)
PROD25%A-PROFIT5%A x UKNat	-.011	-.008	.018
	(.051)	(.050)	(.026)
PROD50%A-PROFIT33%A x UKNat	-.057	.018	.039
	(.052)	(.046)	(.025)
PROD25%D-PROFIT5%D x UKNat	-.005	-.026	.030
	(.051)	(.022)	(.050)
PROD50%D-PROFIT33%D x UKNat	-.010	.009	.002
	(.048)	(.019)	(.045)
UKNat	.068**	-.023	-.045*
	(.029)	(.017)	(.024)
Wald (p)			
All UKNat int. terms	.5929	.6665	.5159
taste UKNat int. terms	.5463	.7774	.3565
stats UKNat int. terms	.4774	.5665	.4696
all variables	.0000	.0000	.0000
R^2	.295	.419	.427
Obs	10692	10692	10692

(e) Ethnicity—with monetary stakes

	Anti	Pro-White	Pro-Black
	(1)	(2)	(3)
PROFIT33%A	-.175****	.183****	-.008
	(.036)	(.038)	(.018)
PROFIT33%D	-.190****	-.024*	.214****
	(.039)	(.014)	(.040)
PROD50%A-PROFIT33%A	-.619****	.627****	-.008
	(.045)	(.046)	(.018)
PROD50%D-PROFIT33%D	-.627****	-.016	.643****
	(.045)	(.016)	(.043)
PROFIT33%A x UKNat	.019	-.003	-.016
	(.038)	(.040)	(.019)
PROFIT33%D x UKNat	.021	.014	-.035
	(.041)	(.015)	(.042)
PROD50%A-PROFIT33%A x UKNat	.041	-.031	-.011
	(.048)	(.049)	(.019)
PROD50%D-PROFIT33%D x UKNat	.034	.011	-.044
	(.048)	(.017)	(.046)
UKNat	-.048*	.014	.034*
	(.026)	(.018)	(.017)
Wald (p)			
All UKNat int. terms	.9338	.7260	.5761
taste UKNat int. terms	.8651	.5914	.5728
stats UKNat int. terms	.6873	.6145	.5696
all variables	.0000	.0000	.
R^2	.289	.396	.397
Obs	5400	5400	5400

(f) LGBTQ+ status—with monetary stakes

	Anti	Pro-nLGBTQ+	Pro-LGBTQ+
	(1)	(2)	(3)
PROFIT33%A	-.149****	.193****	-.044**
	(.044)	(.039)	(.019)
PROFIT33%D	-.132***	-.035**	.167****
	(.044)	(.017)	(.039)
PROD50%A-PROFIT33%A	-.491****	.553****	-.061**
	(.059)	(.051)	(.026)
PROD50%D-PROFIT33%D	-.553****	-.009	.561****
	(.057)	(.029)	(.051)
PROFIT33%A x UKNat	.001	-.020	.019
	(.046)	(.041)	(.020)
PROFIT33%D x UKNat	-.034	.010	.024
	(.046)	(.019)	(.042)
PROD50%A-PROFIT33%A x UKNat	-.045	.005	.040
	(.061)	(.054)	(.027)
PROD50%D-PROFIT33%D x UKNat	.004	-.001	-.003
	(.060)	(.031)	(.054)
UKNat	.010	-.012	.003
	(.037)	(.028)	(.025)
Wald (p)			
All UKNat int. terms	.3902	.9535	.5547
taste UKNat int. terms	.5468	.7452	.6160
stats UKNat int. terms	.4444	.9940	.2593
all variables	.0000	.0000	.0000
R^2	.242	.321	.357
Obs	5400	5400	5400

Notes: Linear probability models with individual-level random effects, socio-demographic controls, an indicator for decisions about a second discrimination domain in Study 2, and robust standard errors. UKNat is an indicator for having the UK nationality. $^{*}p < .10$, $^{**}p < .05$, $^{***}p < .01$, $^{****}p < .001$.

Table D7: Differences between men and women

(a) Ethnicity—without monetary stakes

	Anti	Pro-White	Pro-Black
	(1)	(2)	(3)
PROD50%A	-.469****	.469****	.000
	(.024)	(.024)	(.010)
PROD50%D	-.459****	.012	.447****
	(.024)	(.009)	(.024)
PROD50%A x Woman	.035	-.037	.002
	(.033)	(.032)	(.012)
PROD50%D x Woman	.011	.001	-.012
	(.032)	(.012)	(.032)
Woman	.039**	-.017*	-.021*
	(.016)	(.010)	(.012)
Wald (p)			
All Woman terms	.0128	.0952	.1829
taste Woman term	.0149	.0860	.0722
stats Woman terms	.4082	.5018	.9169
all variables	.0000	.0000	.0000
R^2	.217	.311	.303
Obs	3240	3240	3240

(b) LGBTQ+ status—without monetary stakes

	Anti	Pro-nLGBTQ+	Pro-LGBTQ+
	(1)	(2)	(3)
PROD50%A	-.408****	.400****	.008
	(.025)	(.024)	(.011)
PROD50%D	-.398****	.016	.383****
	(.025)	(.014)	(.023)
PROD50%A x Woman	.036	-.018	-.019
	(.034)	(.033)	(.015)
PROD50%D x Woman	-.002	.011	-.009
	(.034)	(.017)	(.032)
Woman	.068***	-.056****	-.012
	(.021)	(.016)	(.014)
Wald (p)			
All Woman terms	.0003	.0011	.1583
taste Woman term	.0003	.0006	.3806
stats Woman terms	.2527	.6274	.4474
all variables	.0000	.	.0000
R^2	.176	.220	.246
Obs	3240	3240	3240

(c) Ethnicity—with monetary stakes

	Anti	Pro-White	Pro-Black
	(1)	(2)	(3)
PROFIT33%A	-.186****	.217****	-.031****
	(.019)	(.019)	(.008)
PROFIT33%D	-.178****	-.016**	.193****
	(.019)	(.007)	(.019)
PROD50%A-PROFIT33%A	-.617****	.641****	-.023**
	(.023)	(.022)	(.010)
PROD50%D-PROFIT33%D	-.619****	-.010	.629****
	(.023)	(.009)	(.022)
PROFIT33%A x Woman	.052**	-.069***	.017
	(.025)	(.025)	(.011)
PROFIT33%D x Woman	.008	.010	-.018
	(.026)	(.009)	(.026)
PROD50%A-PROFIT33%A x Woman	.064**	-.075**	.011
	(.031)	(.031)	(.012)
PROD50%D-PROFIT33%D x Woman	.037	.008	-.045
	(.031)	(.011)	(.031)
Woman	.001	.000	-.002
	(.016)	(.010)	(.012)
Wald (p)			
All Woman int. terms	.0076	.0110	.1899
taste Woman int. terms	.0054	.0071	.1810
stats Woman int. terms	.0871	.0274	.1565
all variables	.	.	.
R^2	.290	.399	.398
Obs	5400	5400	5400

(d) LGBTQ+ status—with monetary stakes

	Anti	Pro-nLGBTQ+	Pro-LGBTQ+
	(1)	(2)	(3)
PROFIT33%A	-.162****	.191****	-.029***
	(.020)	(.020)	(.009)
PROFIT33%D	-.170****	-.051****	.221****
	(.019)	(.012)	(.020)
PROD50%A-PROFIT33%A	-.559****	.574****	-.016
	(.024)	(.023)	(.010)
PROD50%D-PROFIT33%D	-.553****	-.027*	.580****
	(.024)	(.015)	(.023)
PROFIT33%A x Woman	.030	-.034	.004
	(.026)	(.025)	(.013)
PROFIT33%D x Woman	.018	.047****	-.065**
	(.026)	(.014)	(.026)
PROD50%A-PROFIT33%A x Woman	.054	-.034	-.020
	(.034)	(.032)	(.014)
PROD50%D-PROFIT33%D x Woman	.009	.034*	-.043
	(.033)	(.018)	(.032)
Woman	.029	-.036**	.006
	(.021)	(.016)	(.013)
Wald (p)			
All Woman int. terms	.2341	.0028	.0177
taste Woman int. terms	.4973	.0007	.0279
stats Woman int. terms	.0783	.0424	.2094
all variables	.	.	.
R^2	.243	.323	.358
Obs	5400	5400	5400

Notes: Linear probability models with individual-level random effects, socio-demographic controls, an indicator for decisions about a second discrimination domain in Study 2, and robust standard errors. Interaction terms are also included in the regression for non-binary individuals, but these terms are not of interest considering that there are only 11 non-binary individuals. $^{*}p < .10$, $^{**}p < .05$, $^{***}p < .01$, $^{****}p < .001$.

Table D8: Differences between individuals with and without experience in management, hiring, or promotion decisions

(a) Ethnicity—without monetary stakes

	Anti	Pro-White	Pro-Black
	(1)	(2)	(3)
PROD50%A	-.482****	.486****	-.004
	(.024)	(.024)	(.009)
PROD50%D	-.496****	.006	.490****
	(.023)	(.009)	(.023)
PROD50%A x ExpManagement	.058*	-.069**	.011
	(.033)	(.032)	(.012)
PROD50%D x ExpManagement	.081**	.009	-.090***
	(.032)	(.012)	(.032)
ExpManagement	.015	-.009	-.007
	(.018)	(.011)	(.013)
Wald (p)			
All ExpManagement terms	.0304	.0664	.0138
taste ExpManagement term	.3935	.4294	.5950
stats ExpManagement terms	.0369	.0468	.0068
all variables	.0000	.0000	.0000
R^2	.221	.314	.308
Obs	3240	3240	3240

(b) LGBTQ+ status—without monetary stakes

	Anti	Pro-nLGBTQ+	Pro-LGBTQ+
	(1)	(2)	(3)
PROD50%A	-.415****	.424****	-.008
	(.026)	(.025)	(.010)
PROD50%D	-.407****	.002	.405****
	(.027)	(.013)	(.025)
PROD50%A x ExpManagement	.048	-.059*	.010
	(.035)	(.033)	(.014)
PROD50%D x ExpManagement	.012	.034**	-.046
	(.034)	(.017)	(.032)
ExpManagement	-.006	-.001	.007
	(.022)	(.016)	(.015)
Wald (p)			
All ExpManagement terms	.3687	.0212	.3175
taste ExpManagement term	.7768	.9596	.6474
stats ExpManagement terms	.2111	.0080	.2055
all variables	.0000	.0000	.0000
R^2	.176	.222	.246
Obs	3240	3240	3240

(c) Ethnicity—with monetary stakes

	Anti	Pro-White	Pro-Black
	(1)	(2)	(3)
PROFIT33%A	-.165****	.191****	-.026***
	(.019)	(.019)	(.009)
PROFIT33%D	-.193****	-.010	.203****
	(.020)	(.007)	(.020)
PROD50%A-PROFIT33%A	-.610****	.630****	-.020**
	(.023)	(.023)	(.009)
PROD50%D-PROFIT33%D	-.622****	-.016**	.638****
	(.023)	(.007)	(.022)
PROFIT33%A x ExpManagement	.013	-.021	.008
	(.025)	(.025)	(.012)
PROFIT33%D x ExpManagement	.038	-.002	-.037
	(.026)	(.009)	(.026)
PROD50%A-PROFIT33%A x ExpManagement	.050	-.055*	.005
	(.032)	(.031)	(.012)
PROD50%D-PROFIT33%D x ExpManagement	.045	.018*	-.063**
	(.032)	(.011)	(.031)
ExpManagement	.008	-.011	.002
	(.017)	(.010)	(.012)
Wald (p)			
All ExpManagement int. terms	.2355	.0434	.1599
taste ExpManagement int. terms	.1472	.6978	.2119
stats ExpManagement int. terms	.2747	.0246	.0806
all variables	.0000	.0000	.0000
R^2	.291	.398	.398
Obs	5400	5400	5400

(d) LGBTQ+ status—with monetary stakes

	Anti	Pro-nLGBTQ+	Pro-LGBTQ+
	(1)	(2)	(3)
PROFIT33%A	-.167****	.195****	-.028***
	(.020)	(.019)	(.010)
PROFIT33%D	-.174****	-.028***	.201****
	(.020)	(.010)	(.020)
PROD50%A-PROFIT33%A	-.568****	.595****	-.028***
	(.025)	(.024)	(.010)
PROD50%D-PROFIT33%D	-.574****	-.019	.593****
	(.025)	(.013)	(.024)
PROFIT33%A x ExpManagement	.034	-.035	.001
	(.026)	(.025)	(.013)
PROFIT33%D x ExpManagement	.021	.003	-.024
	(.026)	(.014)	(.026)
PROD50%A-PROFIT33%A x ExpManagement	.065*	-.067**	.003
	(.034)	(.032)	(.014)
PROD50%D-PROFIT33%D x ExpManagement	.045	.017	-.062*
	(.033)	(.017)	(.032)
ExpManagement	-.019	.005	.014
	(.021)	(.015)	(.014)
Wald (p)			
All ExpManagement int. terms	.3687	.1091	.3547
taste ExpManagement int. terms	.4041	.3450	.6341
stats ExpManagement int. terms	.1530	.0316	.1195
all variables	.0000	.0000	.0000
R^2	.243	.322	.358
Obs	5400	5400	5400

Notes: Linear probability models with individual-level random effects, socio-demographic controls, an indicator for decisions about a second discrimination domain in Study 2, and robust standard errors. ExpManagement is an indicator for having experience in management, hiring, or promotion decisions. $^{*}p < .10$, $^{**}p < .05$, $^{***}p < .01$, $^{****}p < .001$.

Table D9: Differences between religious and non-religious individuals

(a) LGBTQ+ status—without monetary stakes

	Anti	Pro-nLGBTQ+	Pro-LGBTQ+
	(1)	(2)	(3)
PROD50%A	-.416****	.412****	.004
	(.019)	(.018)	(.008)
PROD50%D	-.426****	.028***	.398****
	(.019)	(.009)	(.019)
PROD50%A x Religious	.106***	-.081**	-.025
	(.041)	(.039)	(.017)
PROD50%D x Religious	.099**	-.024	-.074**
	(.039)	(.022)	(.037)
Religious	-.104****	.089****	.014
	(.026)	(.021)	(.016)
Wald (p)			
All Religious terms	.0011	.0003	.1634
taste Religious term	.0001	.0000	.3722
stats Religious terms	.0238	.0958	.0831
all variables	.0000	.0000	.0000
R^2	.177	.221	.246
Obs	3240	3240	3240

(b) LGBTQ+ status—with monetary stakes

	Anti	Pro-nLGBTQ+	Pro-LGBTQ+
	(1)	(2)	(3)
PROFIT33%A	-.163****	.189****	-.026****
	(.015)	(.015)	(.007)
PROFIT33%D	-.177****	-.015**	.192****
	(.015)	(.006)	(.015)
PROD50%A-PROFIT33%A	-.562****	.586****	-.024***
	(.019)	(.018)	(.008)
PROD50%D-PROFIT33%D	-.574****	.001	.573****
	(.019)	(.009)	(.019)
PROFIT33%A x Religious	.055*	-.053**	-.001
	(.029)	(.027)	(.016)
PROFIT33%D x Religious	.055*	-.041**	-.014
	(.030)	(.021)	(.030)
PROD50%A-PROFIT33%A x Religious	.116***	-.109***	-.007
	(.038)	(.037)	(.016)
PROD50%D-PROFIT33%D x Religious	.093**	-.040*	-.053
	(.039)	(.023)	(.037)
Religious	-.097****	.088****	.010
	(.026)	(.021)	(.016)
Wald (p)			
All Religious int. terms	.0405	.0248	.6670
taste Religious int. terms	.1388	.0370	.8973
stats Religious int. terms	.0097	.0084	.3516
all variables	.0000	.0000	.0000
R^2	.243	.322	.357
Obs	5400	5400	5400

Notes: Linear probability models with individual-level random effects, socio-demographic controls, an indicator for decisions about a second discrimination domain in Study 2, and robust standard errors. Religious is an indicator for religious individuals. $^{*}p < .10$, $^{**}p < .05$, $^{***}p < .01$, $^{****}p < .001$.

E. Politics and Policies

Figure E1: Summary of Differences according to Politics and Support for Policies

(a) Differences (%pt.) in preferences, from decisions without monetary stakes



(b) Differences (%pt.) in being swayed to discriminate when it becomes profitable



Notes. We show percentage-point differences for a 3-point increase on the 5-point scale that we use to measure being politically conservative and support for 12 policies, controlling for socio-demographic characteristics. We indicate differences that meet the restrictions below, and denote non-significant differences with zeroes. We use linear regressions to estimate those differences, so that a 1-point increase corresponds to one-third of the difference, and a full 4-point increase is one-quarter larger. *Conservative* denotes being on the right vs. the left end of the political spectrum. *Support anti-(domain)-policies* denotes supporting the strict enforcement of policies against discrimination based on a domain. *Support affordable childcare* denotes support for affordable childcare to facilitate the careers of women. *Support gender pay gap transparency* denotes support for policies making gender wage gaps transparent. *Support easier legal gender change* denotes support for making the process of changing one's legal gender easier. For simplicity, the figure summarizes only the main differences from regression estimates, and Appendix E presents the complete analyses, which capture more subtle differences. ***Restrictions to indicate non-zero values.*** In panel (a), for tastes, preferences against taste discrimination, and preferences for statistical discrimination, we take the difference in the share of a preference if three restrictions are jointly met: (1) the difference is significant, (2) a Wald test for differences in statistical discrimination is significant, and (3) an overarching Wald test for joint differences in taste and statistical discrimination is significant. For the merit-based preference for statistical discrimination, we take the average of difference in the share estimated when group A is more productive and when group D is more productive, if three restrictions are jointly met: (1) at least one of the two differences is significant, (2) a Wald test for differences in statistical discrimination is significant, and (3) an overarching Wald test for joint differences in taste and statistical discrimination is significant. In panel (b), we show differences in how the making discrimination of a group profitable changes the share of individuals selecting more workers from the more profitable group, again taking the average of the difference when groups A and D are more profitable if three restrictions are jointly met: (1) at least one of the two differences is significant, (2) a Wald test for differences in statistical discrimination is significant, and (3) an overarching Wald test for joint differences in taste and statistical discrimination is significant. Moreover, when taste differences are large, differences about statistical discrimination become less precise, as we do not identify all preferences about statistical discrimination for individuals with tastes (see footnotes 18).

In this appendix, we use the data from Study 1 for gender, and from Study 2 for ethnicity and LGBTQ+ status. We examine how discrimination preferences are linked to political ideologies and support for 12 policies. We again control for socio-demographic characteristics, so we present partial relationships. Of the 192 (pre-registered) overarching Wald tests for joint taste and statistical discrimination differences we conduct, 23% are significant at the 5% level (mostly at the 1% level or below), over four times the false positive rate of 5% we expect from random noise when there are no true differences. Similarly, of the 384 possible (pre-registered) Wald tests for either taste or statistical discrimination, 21% are significant at the 5% level.[4] Figure E1 summarizes the bulk of the differences, for preferences from decisions without mon-

[4]Again, while most differences we find are not false positives, we leave it to future research to identify which ones are (significant p-values range between $<.0001$ and $<.05$).

etary stakes in panel (a) and for being swayed to discriminate when it becomes profitable in panel (b).

Tables E1–E12 present the analyses: regression estimates for differences in preferences and differences in being swayed to engage in discrimination across politics and support for 12 policies. In each table, the first panels are about preferences estimated from decisions without monetary stakes. They mirror the regressions in Table 2, but the dependent variables also include a 5-point Likert-scale variable for being politically conservative or supporting a policy, and interactions between this variable and the indicators for the different decisions. The subsequent panels are about how making discrimination profitable sways individuals to engage in it. They mirror the regressions in Table 4, but the dependent variables also include a 5-point Likert-scale variable for being politically conservative or supporting a policy, and interactions between this variable and the indicators for the different decisions.

Table E1: Differences according to politically conservative level

(a) Gender—without monetary stakes

	Anti	Pro-Men	Pro-Wom.
	(1)	(2)	(3)
PROD25%A	-.448****	.431****	.017*
	(.027)	(.026)	(.010)
PROD50%A	-.540****	.533****	.007
	(.028)	(.026)	(.011)
PROD25%D	-.485****	.005	.479****
	(.027)	(.009)	(.026)
PROD50%D	-.580****	.007	.573****
	(.026)	(.009)	(.026)
PROD25%A x Conservative	-.022	.027**	-.005
	(.014)	(.014)	(.005)
PROD50%A x Conservative	-.023	.027*	-.004
	(.015)	(.014)	(.006)
PROD25%D x Conservative	-.000	.004	-.004
	(.014)	(.005)	(.014)
PROD50%D x Conservative	-.005	.002	.003
	(.014)	(.005)	(.014)
Conservative	-.002	.001	.001
	(.007)	(.004)	(.005)
Wald (p)			
All Conser. terms	.3525	.2929	.8528
taste Conser. term	.7896	.7471	.9085
stats Conser. terms	.2977	.3109	.7938
all variables	.0000	.0000	.0000
R^2	.202	.373	.369
Obs	5940	5940	5940

(b) Ethnicity—without monetary stakes

	Anti	Pro-White	Pro-Black
	(1)	(2)	(3)
PROD50%A	-.461****	.458****	.003
	(.029)	(.028)	(.010)
PROD50%D	-.477****	.025***	.452****
	(.028)	(.009)	(.028)
PROD50%A x Conservative	.007	-.006	-.001
	(.015)	(.015)	(.005)
PROD50%D x Conservative	.016	-.009*	-.007
	(.015)	(.005)	(.015)
Conservative	-.009	.015***	-.006
	(.008)	(.005)	(.005)
Wald (p)			
All Conservative terms	.4984	.0184	.4483
taste Conservative term	.2506	.0020	.2485
stats Conservative terms	.4769	.2169	.8866
all variables	.0000	.0000	.0000
R^2	.217	.311	.304
Obs	3240	3240	3240

(c) LGBTQ+ status—without monetary stakes

	Anti	Pro-nLGBTQ+	Pro-LGBTQ+
	(1)	(2)	(3)
PROD50%A	-.445****	.433****	.012
	(.030)	(.028)	(.013)
PROD50%D	-.457****	.010	.447****
	(.029)	(.014)	(.028)
PROD50%A x Conservative	.036**	-.027*	-.009
	(.016)	(.014)	(.008)
PROD50%D x Conservative	.036**	.007	-.043***
	(.016)	(.009)	(.015)
Conservative	-.033***	.027****	.006
	(.010)	(.008)	(.007)
Wald (p)			
All Conservative terms	.0098	.0003	.0279
taste Conservative term	.0012	.0003	.4169
stats Conservative terms	.0473	.0866	.0152
all variables	.0000	.0000	.0000
R^2	.177	.224	.249
Obs	3240	3240	3240

(d) Gender—with monetary stakes

	Anti	Pro-Men	Pro-Wom.
	(1)	(2)	(3)
PROFIT5%A	-.087****	.090****	-.003
	(.017)	(.016)	(.009)
PROFIT33%A	-.140****	.158****	-.019*
	(.022)	(.020)	(.010)
PROFIT5%D	-.094****	.000	.094****
	(.017)	(.005)	(.017)
PROFIT33%D	-.197****	-.010*	.207****
	(.022)	(.005)	(.022)
PROD25%A-PROFIT5%A	-.480****	.493****	-.013
	(.027)	(.026)	(.010)
PROD50%A-PROFIT33%A	-.621****	.648****	-.026***
	(.027)	(.025)	(.010)
PROD25%D-PROFIT5%D	-.533****	-.003	.535****
	(.026)	(.008)	(.026)
PROD50%D-PROFIT33%D	-.669****	-.011	.680****
	(.024)	(.007)	(.024)
Conservative	-.004	.005	-.001
	(.007)	(.004)	(.005)
PROFIT5%A x Conservative	-.011	.015*	-.004
	(.009)	(.009)	(.005)
PROFIT33%A x Conservative	-.029**	.026**	.003
	(.012)	(.011)	(.005)
PROFIT5%D x Conservative	-.015	.000	.015
	(.010)	(.003)	(.009)
PROFIT33%D x Conservative	-.007	.001	.006
	(.012)	(.003)	(.012)
PROD25%A-PROFIT5%A x Conservative	-.041***	.037***	.004
	(.014)	(.014)	(.005)
PROD50%A-PROFIT33%A x Conservative	-.036***	.031**	.005
	(.013)	(.013)	(.005)
PROD25%D-PROFIT5%D x Conservative	-.029**	.007	.022
	(.014)	(.005)	(.014)
PROD50%D-PROFIT33%D x Conservative	-.023*	.002	.020
	(.013)	(.004)	(.013)
Wald (p)			
All Conser. int. terms	.0168	.1311	.2318
taste Conser. int. terms	.0157	.2577	.1919
stats Conser. int. terms	.0389	.0434	.4960
all variables	.0000	.0000	.0000
R^2	.299	.422	.428
Obs	10692	10692	10692

(e) Ethnicity—with monetary stakes

	Anti	Pro-White	Pro-Black
	(1)	(2)	(3)
PROFIT33%A	-.125****	.162****	-.037***
	(.022)	(.021)	(.012)
PROFIT33%D	-.164****	.002	.162****
	(.023)	(.006)	(.023)
PROD50%A-PROFIT33%A	-.564****	.607****	-.043****
	(.028)	(.027)	(.011)
PROD50%D-PROFIT33%D	-.610****	.015*	.596****
	(.027)	(.008)	(.027)
PROFIT33%A x Conservative	-.021*	.011	.009*
	(.012)	(.012)	(.005)
PROFIT33%D x Conservative	-.005	-.008*	.014
	(.012)	(.005)	(.012)
PROD50%A-PROFIT33%A x Conservative	-.012	-.004	.016***
	(.015)	(.014)	(.006)
PROD50%D-PROFIT33%D x Conservative	.008	-.014***	.005
	(.015)	(.005)	(.014)
Conservative	-.012	.018****	-.006
	(.008)	(.005)	(.005)
Wald (p)			
All Conser. int. terms	.0307	.0616	.0544
taste Conser. int. terms	.0400	.0938	.1737
stats Conser. int. terms	.0838	.0303	.0154
all variables	.0000	.0000	.0000
R^2	.291	.398	.397
Obs	5400	5400	5400

(f) LGBTQ+ status—with monetary stakes

	Anti	Pro-nLGBTQ+	Pro-LGBTQ+
	(1)	(2)	(3)
PROFIT33%A	-.152****	.180****	-.028**
	(.023)	(.022)	(.012)
PROFIT33%D	-.190****	-.012	.202****
	(.022)	(.010)	(.022)
PROD50%A-PROFIT33%A	-.551****	.587****	-.036***
	(.029)	(.027)	(.013)
PROD50%D-PROFIT33%D	-.607****	.004	.602****
	(.029)	(.012)	(.028)
PROFIT33%A x Conservative	.002	-.003	.001
	(.012)	(.011)	(.007)
PROFIT33%D x Conservative	.017	-.009	-.009
	(.012)	(.007)	(.012)
PROD50%A-PROFIT33%A x Conservative	.013	-.019	.006
	(.015)	(.014)	(.007)
PROD50%D-PROFIT33%D x Conservative	.036**	-.008	-.028*
	(.016)	(.008)	(.015)
Conservative	-.041****	.032****	.009
	(.010)	(.007)	(.007)
Wald (p)			
All Conser. int. terms	.0350	.5666	.2194
taste Conser. int. terms	.1056	.4131	.7282
stats Conser. int. terms	.0187	.2939	.0583
all variables	.0000	.0000	.0000
R^2	.246	.325	.358
Obs	5400	5400	5400

Notes: Linear probability models with individual-level random effects, socio-demographic controls, an indicator for decisions about a second discrimination domain in Study 2, and robust standard errors. Conservative is a variable taking values 0 for Left Leaning, 1 for Moderately Left Leaning, 2 for Neither Left Nor Right Leaning, 3 for Moderately Right Leaning, 4 for Right Leaning, according to the answer to the question: How would you describe your political views? $^{*}p < .10$, $^{**}p < .05$, $^{***}p < .01$, $^{****}p < .001$.

Table E2: Differences according to how strict individuals want the enforcement of policies prohibiting gender discrimination to be

(a) Gender—without monetary stakes

	Anti	Pro-Men	Pro-Wom.
	(1)	(2)	(3)
PROD25%A	-.515****	.516****	-.001
	(.053)	(.052)	(.022)
PROD50%A	-.581****	.587****	-.006
	(.052)	(.052)	(.019)
PROD25%D	-.529****	.014	.515****
	(.053)	(.023)	(.054)
PROD50%D	-.604****	.009	.596****
	(.052)	(.019)	(.052)
PROD25%A x PreferStrictAntiGenDiscPol	.011	-.014	.003
	(.016)	(.016)	(.007)
PROD50%A x PreferStrictAntiGenDiscPol	.002	-.004	.002
	(.016)	(.016)	(.006)
PROD25%D x PreferStrictAntiGenDiscPol	.014	-.001	-.013
	(.016)	(.007)	(.016)
PROD50%D x PreferStrictAntiGenDiscPol	.006	.000	-.006
	(.016)	(.006)	(.016)
PreferStrictAntiGenDiscPol	-.002	-.001	.004
	(.007)	(.004)	(.005)
Wald (p)			
All PreferStrictAntiGenDiscPol terms	.9393	.9437	.7984
taste PreferStrictAntiGenDiscPol term	.7243	.7509	.4565
stats PreferStrictAntiGenDiscPol terms	.8743	.9097	.8751
all variables	.0000	.0000	.0000
R^2	.201	.372	.369
Obs	5940	5940	5940

(b) Gender—with monetary stakes

	Anti	Pro-Men	Pro-Wom.
	(1)	(2)	(3)
PROFIT5%A	-.192****	.207****	-.015
	(.040)	(.039)	(.017)
PROFIT33%A	-.337****	.326****	.011
	(.046)	(.046)	(.018)
PROFIT5%D	-.210****	.019	.192****
	(.041)	(.014)	(.040)
PROFIT33%D	-.272****	-.002	.273****
	(.047)	(.016)	(.046)
PROD25%A-PROFIT5%A	-.622****	.618****	.004
	(.051)	(.051)	(.020)
PROD50%A-PROFIT33%A	-.740****	.760****	-.020
	(.048)	(.046)	(.016)
PROD25%D-PROFIT5%D	-.632****	.021	.612****
	(.051)	(.018)	(.051)
PROD50%D-PROFIT33%D	-.777****	-.024*	.800****
	(.048)	(.013)	(.046)
PreferStrictAntiGenDiscPol	-.003	-.002	.004
	(.007)	(.004)	(.005)
PROFIT5%A x PreferStrictAntiGenDiscPol	.028**	-.030***	.002
	(.012)	(.011)	(.005)
PROFIT33%A x PreferStrictAntiGenDiscPol	.048****	-.040***	-.008
	(.014)	(.014)	(.005)
PROFIT5%D x PreferStrictAntiGenDiscPol	.030**	-.006	-.024**
	(.012)	(.004)	(.012)
PROFIT33%D x PreferStrictAntiGenDiscPol	.020	-.002	-.018
	(.014)	(.005)	(.014)
PROD25%A-PROFIT5%A x PreferStrictAntiGenDiscPol	.025	-.021	-.003
	(.016)	(.015)	(.006)
PROD50%A-PROFIT33%A x PreferStrictAntiGenDiscPol	.020	-.021	.001
	(.015)	(.014)	(.005)
PROD25%D-PROFIT5%D x PreferStrictAntiGenDiscPol	.018	-.004	-.013
	(.016)	(.006)	(.016)
PROD50%D-PROFIT33%D x PreferStrictAntiGenDiscPol	.023	.005	-.028**
	(.014)	(.004)	(.014)
Wald (p)			
All PreferStrictAntiGenDiscPol int. terms	.0018	.0287	.1818
taste PreferStrictAntiGenDiscPol int. terms	.0001	.0382	.1286
stats PreferStrictAntiGenDiscPol int. terms	.5416	.1153	.2389
all variables	.0000	.0000	.0000
R^2	.297	.421	.428
Obs	10692	10692	10692

Notes: Linear probability models with individual-level random effects, socio-demographic controls, an indicator for decisions about a second discrimination domain in Study 2, and robust standard errors. PreferStrictAntiGenDiscPol is a variable taking values 0 (Not Strict At All) to 4 (Very Strict) according to the answer to the question: In your opinion, how strict should firms, courts, and the government be in their enforcement of the prohibition of discrimination based on gender? $^{*}p < .10$, $^{**}p < .05$, $^{***}p < .01$, $^{****}p < .001$.

Table E3: Differences according to how much individuals oppose or support Affirmative Action programs for women

(a) Gender—without monetary stakes

	Anti	Pro-Men	Pro-Wom.
	(1)	(2)	(3)
PROD25%A	-.590****	.573****	.017
	(.034)	(.033)	(.012)
PROD50%A	-.649****	.630****	.019*
	(.033)	(.033)	(.011)
PROD25%D	-.561****	.026**	.535****
	(.033)	(.013)	(.033)
PROD50%D	-.648****	.019*	.630****
	(.033)	(.011)	(.033)
PROD25%A x SupAffActWomen	.042****	-.039****	-.003
	(.012)	(.012)	(.005)
PROD50%A x SupAffActWomen	.028**	-.022*	-.007*
	(.012)	(.012)	(.004)
PROD25%D x SupAffActWomen	.030**	-.006	-.024**
	(.012)	(.004)	(.012)
PROD50%D x SupAffActWomen	.024**	-.004	-.020*
	(.012)	(.004)	(.012)
SupAffActWomen	-.010**	.002	.008**
	(.005)	(.003)	(.004)
Wald (p)			
All SupAffActWomen terms	.0146	.0220	.1810
taste SupAffActWomen term	.0459	.4827	.0298
stats SupAffActWomen terms	.0109	.0119	.2056
all variables	.0000	.0000	.0000
R^2	.204	.374	.369
Obs	5940	5940	5940

(b) Gender—with monetary stakes

	Anti	Pro-Men	Pro-Wom.
	(1)	(2)	(3)
PROFIT5%A	-.152****	.152****	-.000
	(.025)	(.024)	(.008)
PROFIT33%A	-.302****	.293****	.009
	(.030)	(.029)	(.008)
PROFIT5%D	-.167****	-.002	.169****
	(.025)	(.005)	(.025)
PROFIT33%D	-.269****	-.007	.275****
	(.029)	(.005)	(.029)
PROD25%A-PROFIT5%A	-.658****	.651****	.007
	(.032)	(.031)	(.009)
PROD50%A-PROFIT33%A	-.787****	.776****	.011
	(.029)	(.028)	(.010)
PROD25%D-PROFIT5%D	-.675****	.013	.662****
	(.031)	(.011)	(.032)
PROD50%D-PROFIT33%D	-.796****	-.006	.802****
	(.028)	(.008)	(.028)
SupAffActWomen	-.012**	.002	.010***
	(.005)	(.003)	(.004)
PROFIT5%A x SupAffActWomen	.019**	-.015*	-.003
	(.009)	(.008)	(.004)
PROFIT33%A x SupAffActWomen	.046****	-.037****	-.009**
	(.010)	(.010)	(.004)
PROFIT5%D x SupAffActWomen	.019**	.001	-.021**
	(.009)	(.002)	(.009)
PROFIT33%D x SupAffActWomen	.024**	-.001	-.023**
	(.010)	(.002)	(.010)
PROD25%A-PROFIT5%A x SupAffActWomen	.045****	-.039****	-.005
	(.011)	(.011)	(.004)
PROD50%A-PROFIT33%A x SupAffActWomen	.043****	-.031***	-.012***
	(.011)	(.010)	(.004)
PROD25%D-PROFIT5%D x SupAffActWomen	.038****	-.002	-.036***
	(.011)	(.004)	(.011)
PROD50%D-PROFIT33%D x SupAffActWomen	.036****	-.000	-.035****
	(.010)	(.003)	(.010)
Wald (p)			
All SupAffActWomen int. terms	.0000	.0013	.0040
taste SupAffActWomen int. terms	.0000	.0022	.0323
stats SupAffActWomen int. terms	.0012	.0081	.0012
all variables	.0000	.0000	.0000
R^2	.299	.423	.429
Obs	10692	10692	10692

Notes: Linear probability models with individual-level random effects, socio-demographic controls, an indicator for decisions about a second discrimination domain in Study 2, and robust standard errors. SupAffActWomen is a variable taking values 0 (Oppose) to 4 (Support) according to the answer to the question: Do you generally oppose or support the following types of public or private policies? Positive action programs for women such as gender quotas. $^{*}p < .10$, $^{**}p < .05$, $^{***}p < .01$, $^{****}p < .001$.

Table E4: Differences according to how much they oppose or support affordable childcare

(a) Gender—without monetary stakes

	Anti	Pro-Men	Pro-Wom.
	(1)	(2)	(3)
PROD25%A	-.604****	.583****	.021
	(.068)	(.069)	(.027)
PROD50%A	-.617****	.601****	.016
	(.068)	(.068)	(.023)
PROD25%D	-.576****	.022	.554****
	(.067)	(.024)	(.068)
PROD50%D	-.625****	.019	.605****
	(.066)	(.019)	(.065)
PROD25%A x SupChildcare	.034*	-.031	-.003
	(.019)	(.019)	(.008)
PROD50%A x SupChildcare	.012	-.008	-.004
	(.019)	(.019)	(.006)
PROD25%D x SupChildcare	.025	-.003	-.022
	(.019)	(.006)	(.019)
PROD50%D x SupChildcare	.011	-.003	-.008
	(.018)	(.005)	(.018)
SupChildcare	-.007	.000	.007
	(.007)	(.005)	(.004)
Wald (p)			
All SupChildcare terms	.2247	.4680	.5496
taste SupChildcare term	.2969	.9724	.1050
stats SupChildcare terms	.1689	.3740	.6999
all variables	.0000	.0000	.0000
R^2	.202	.372	.369
Obs	5940	5940	5940

(b) Gender—with monetary stakes

	Anti	Pro-Men	Pro-Wom.
	(1)	(2)	(3)
PROFIT5%A	-.224****	.234****	-.010
	(.055)	(.054)	(.013)
PROFIT33%A	-.448****	.415****	.033***
	(.061)	(.062)	(.012)
PROFIT5%D	-.247****	.008	.239****
	(.054)	(.012)	(.054)
PROFIT33%D	-.326****	-.007	.332****
	(.062)	(.013)	(.061)
PROD25%A-PROFIT5%A	-.775****	.756****	.019
	(.061)	(.062)	(.020)
PROD50%A-PROFIT33%A	-.831****	.804****	.027
	(.055)	(.056)	(.022)
PROD25%D-PROFIT5%D	-.751****	.012	.739****
	(.061)	(.017)	(.061)
PROD50%D-PROFIT33%D	-.844****	-.008	.851****
	(.054)	(.015)	(.052)
SupChildcare	-.006	-.002	.008**
	(.007)	(.005)	(.004)
PROFIT5%A x SupChildcare	.034**	-.034**	.000
	(.015)	(.015)	(.004)
PROFIT33%A x SupChildcare	.074****	-.061****	-.013****
	(.017)	(.017)	(.004)
PROFIT5%D x SupChildcare	.036**	-.002	-.034**
	(.015)	(.003)	(.015)
PROFIT33%D x SupChildcare	.033*	-.001	-.033*
	(.017)	(.004)	(.017)
PROD25%A-PROFIT5%A x SupChildcare	.065****	-.058****	-.007
	(.017)	(.017)	(.006)
PROD50%A-PROFIT33%A x SupChildcare	.043***	-.031**	-.013**
	(.015)	(.016)	(.006)
PROD25%D-PROFIT5%D x SupChildcare	.049***	-.001	-.048***
	(.017)	(.005)	(.017)
PROD50%D-PROFIT33%D x SupChildcare	.039***	.000	-.039***
	(.015)	(.004)	(.014)
Wald (p)			
All SupChildcare int. terms	.0000	.0051	.0001
taste SupChildcare int. terms	.0000	.0078	.0002
stats SupChildcare int. terms	.0050	.0110	.0235
all variables	.0000	.0000	.0000
R^2	.299	.423	.429
Obs	10692	10692	10692

Notes: Linear probability models with individual-level random effects, socio-demographic controls, an indicator for decisions about a second discrimination domain in Study 2, and robust standard errors. SupChildcare is a variable taking values 0 (Oppose) to 4 (Support) according to the answer to the question: Do you generally oppose or support the following types of public or private policies? Affordable childcare for young children to facilitate the career of women. $^{*}p < .10$, $^{**}p < .05$, $^{***}p < .01$, $^{****}p < .001$.

Table E5: Differences according to how much individuals oppose or support gender pay gap transparency policies

(a) Gender—without monetary stakes

	Anti	Pro-Men	Pro-Wom.
	(1)	(2)	(3)
PROD25%A	-.583****	.589****	-.006
	(.057)	(.057)	(.015)
PROD50%A	-.590****	.566****	.024
	(.057)	(.057)	(.020)
PROD25%D	-.550****	.010	.540****
	(.056)	(.023)	(.056)
PROD50%D	-.600****	.009	.591****
	(.054)	(.021)	(.054)
PROD25%A x SupTranspGap	.029*	-.034**	.004
	(.016)	(.016)	(.005)
PROD50%A x SupTranspGap	.004	.002	-.006
	(.016)	(.016)	(.006)
PROD25%D x SupTranspGap	.019	.000	-.019
	(.016)	(.006)	(.016)
PROD50%D x SupTranspGap	.004	.000	-.004
	(.015)	(.006)	(.015)
SupTranspGap	-.004	-.003	.007*
	(.007)	(.005)	(.004)
Wald (p)			
All SupTranspGap terms	.2609	.0577	.0529
taste SupTranspGap term	.5316	.4976	.0589
stats SupTranspGap terms	.1716	.0402	.2593
all variables	.0000	.0000	.0000
R^2	.202	.373	.369
Obs	5940	5940	5940

(b) Gender—with monetary stakes

	Anti	Pro-Men	Pro-Wom.
	(1)	(2)	(3)
PROFIT5%A	-.163****	.175****	-.012
	(.043)	(.042)	(.012)
PROFIT33%A	-.351****	.336****	.015
	(.050)	(.051)	(.012)
PROFIT5%D	-.218****	.002	.216****
	(.045)	(.011)	(.045)
PROFIT33%D	-.277****	-.016	.293****
	(.049)	(.011)	(.049)
PROD25%A-PROFIT5%A	-.718****	.691****	.027
	(.053)	(.054)	(.019)
PROD50%A-PROFIT33%A	-.806****	.786****	.021
	(.046)	(.047)	(.018)
PROD25%D-PROFIT5%D	-.723****	-.005	.728****
	(.051)	(.018)	(.051)
PROD50%D-PROFIT33%D	-.802****	-.030*	.832****
	(.046)	(.016)	(.043)
SupTranspGap	-.008	-.002	.010***
	(.007)	(.005)	(.004)
PROFIT5%A x SupTranspGap	.017	-.018	.001
	(.012)	(.012)	(.004)
PROFIT33%A x SupTranspGap	.048****	-.040***	-.008**
	(.014)	(.014)	(.004)
PROFIT5%D x SupTranspGap	.029**	-.000	-.029**
	(.012)	(.003)	(.012)
PROFIT33%D x SupTranspGap	.020	.002	-.022
	(.014)	(.003)	(.014)
PROD25%A-PROFIT5%A x SupTranspGap	.051****	-.041***	-.010*
	(.015)	(.015)	(.005)
PROD50%A-PROFIT33%A x SupTranspGap	.038***	-.026**	-.011**
	(.013)	(.013)	(.005)
PROD25%D-PROFIT5%D x SupTranspGap	.043***	.004	-.046***
	(.014)	(.005)	(.014)
PROD50%D-PROFIT33%D x SupTranspGap	.029**	.006	-.035***
	(.013)	(.004)	(.012)
Wald (p)			
All SupTranspGap int. terms	.0003	.0109	.0008
taste SupTranspGap int. terms	.0003	.0435	.0086
stats SupTranspGap int. terms	.0116	.0096	.0067
all variables	.0000	.0000	.0000
R^2	.298	.422	.429
Obs	10692	10692	10692

Notes: Linear probability models with individual-level random effects, socio-demographic controls, an indicator for decisions about a second discrimination domain in Study 2, and robust standard errors. SupTranspGap is a variable taking values 0 (Oppose) to 4 (Support) according to the answer to the question: Do you generally oppose or support the following types of public or private policies? Legal requirements that firms publicly report the gender pay gap among their employees. $^{*}p < .10$, $^{**}p < .05$, $^{***}p < .01$, $^{****}p < .001$.

Table E6: Differences according to how strict individuals want the enforcement of policies prohibiting ethnic discrimination to be

(a) Ethnicity—without monetary stakes

	Anti	Pro-White	Pro-Black
	(1)	(2)	(3)
PROD50%A	-.373****	.367****	.007
	(.049)	(.048)	(.016)
PROD50%D	-.395****	-.005	.400****
	(.045)	(.022)	(.044)
PROD50%A x PreferStrictAntiEthDiscPol	-.025*	.026*	-.002
	(.015)	(.014)	(.005)
PROD50%D x PreferStrictAntiEthDiscPol	-.018	.005	.013
	(.013)	(.006)	(.013)
PreferStrictAntiEthDiscPol	.017**	-.022****	.005
	(.008)	(.007)	(.004)
Wald (p)			
All PreferStrictAntiEthDiscPol terms	.1325	.0055	.2740
taste PreferStrictAntiEthDiscPol term	.0251	.0009	.1865
stats PreferStrictAntiEthDiscPol terms	.2388	.1888	.5410
all variables	.0000	.0000	.0000
R^2	.217	.313	.304
Obs	3240	3240	3240

(b) Ethnicity—with monetary stakes

	Anti	Pro-White	Pro-Black
	(1)	(2)	(3)
PROFIT33%A	-.302****	.300****	.002
	(.043)	(.044)	(.014)
PROFIT33%D	-.257****	-.063***	.319****
	(.044)	(.021)	(.040)
PROD50%A-PROFIT33%A	-.618****	.596****	.023
	(.049)	(.049)	(.016)
PROD50%D-PROFIT33%D	-.631****	-.044*	.675****
	(.047)	(.023)	(.043)
PROFIT33%A x PreferStrictAntiEthDiscPol	.046****	-.039***	-.008*
	(.012)	(.013)	(.004)
PROFIT33%D x PreferStrictAntiEthDiscPol	.027**	.017***	-.044****
	(.013)	(.006)	(.012)
PROD50%A-PROFIT33%A x PreferStrictAntiEthDiscPol	.012	.001	-.013***
	(.015)	(.015)	(.005)
PROD50%D-PROFIT33%D x PreferStrictAntiEthDiscPol	.011	.012*	-.023*
	(.014)	(.006)	(.013)
PreferStrictAntiEthDiscPol	.011	-.020***	.009**
	(.007)	(.006)	(.004)
Wald (p)			
All PreferStrictAntiEthDiscPol int. terms	.0010	.0000	.0008
taste PreferStrictAntiEthDiscPol int. terms	.0002	.0000	.0005
stats PreferStrictAntiEthDiscPol int. terms	.7218	.1346	.0076
all variables	.0000	.0000	.0000
R^2	.296	.404	.400
Obs	5400	5400	5400

Notes: Linear probability models with individual-level random effects, socio-demographic controls, an indicator for decisions about a second discrimination domain in Study 2, and robust standard errors. PreferStrictAntiEthDiscPol is a variable taking values 0 (Not Strict At All) to 4 (Very Strict) according to the answer to the question: In your opinion, how strict should firms, courts, and the government be in their enforcement of the prohibition of discrimination based on ethnicity? $^{*}p < .10$, $^{**}p < .05$, $^{***}p < .01$, $^{****}p < .001$.

Table E7: Differences according to how much they oppose or support Affirmative Action programs for ethnic minorities

(a) Ethnicity—without monetary stakes

	Anti	Pro-White	Pro-Black
	(1)	(2)	(3)
PROD50%A	-.454****	.460****	-.005
	(.034)	(.033)	(.010)
PROD50%D	-.448****	.012	.436****
	(.033)	(.011)	(.033)
PROD50%A x SupAffActEthMin	.002	-.005	.003
	(.013)	(.012)	(.004)
PROD50%D x SupAffActEthMin	-.002	-.001	.002
	(.013)	(.004)	(.013)
SupAffActEthMin	-.001	-.006	.007
	(.006)	(.004)	(.005)
Wald (p)			
All SupAffActEthMin terms	.9758	.3128	.1040
taste SupAffActEthMin term	.8935	.1325	.1428
stats SupAffActEthMin terms	.9061	.9225	.7859
all variables	.0000	.0000	.0000
R^2	.217	.311	.304
Obs	3240	3240	3240

(b) Ethnicity—with monetary stakes

	Anti	Pro-White	Pro-Black
	(1)	(2)	(3)
PROFIT33%A	-.239****	.251****	-.012
	(.026)	(.027)	(.010)
PROFIT33%D	-.221****	-.028**	.249****
	(.028)	(.012)	(.028)
PROD50%A-PROFIT33%A	-.661****	.657****	.004
	(.031)	(.031)	(.012)
PROD50%D-PROFIT33%D	-.616****	-.032**	.648****
	(.033)	(.013)	(.032)
PROFIT33%A x SupAffActEthMin	.035****	-.031***	-.004
	(.009)	(.009)	(.005)
PROFIT33%D x SupAffActEthMin	.021**	.007*	-.028***
	(.010)	(.004)	(.010)
PROD50%A-PROFIT33%A x SupAffActEthMin	.034***	-.024**	-.009*
	(.012)	(.012)	(.005)
PROD50%D-PROFIT33%D x SupAffActEthMin	.008	.011**	-.019
	(.012)	(.005)	(.012)
SupAffActEthMin	.000	-.007*	.007
	(.006)	(.004)	(.005)
Wald (p)			
All SupAffActEthMin int. terms	.0000	.0005	.0343
taste SupAffActEthMin int. terms	.0002	.0003	.0240
stats SupAffActEthMin int. terms	.0005	.0041	.0839
all variables	.0000	.0000	.0000
R^2	.293	.402	.398
Obs	5400	5400	5400

Notes: Linear probability models with individual-level random effects, socio-demographic controls, an indicator for decisions about a second discrimination domain in Study 2, and robust standard errors. SupAffActEthMin is a variable taking values 0 (Oppose) to 4 (Support) according to the answer to the question: Do you generally oppose or support the following types of public or private policies? Affirmative action programs for ethnic minorities such as ethnic quotas. $^{*}p < .10$, $^{**}p < .05$, $^{***}p < .01$, $^{****}p < .001$.

Table E8: Differences according to how much they oppose or support a large reduction in immigration

(a) Ethnicity—without monetary stakes

	Anti	Pro-White	Pro-Black
	(1)	(2)	(3)
PROD50%A	-.479****	.469****	.010
	(.029)	(.029)	(.010)
PROD50%D	-.486****	.015	.471****
	(.029)	(.009)	(.029)
PROD50%A x SupLargeReducImmig	.015	-.010	-.004
	(.013)	(.012)	(.005)
PROD50%D x SupLargeReducImmig	.017	-.002	-.015
	(.012)	(.005)	(.012)
SupLargeReducImmig	-.013*	.014***	-.001
	(.007)	(.004)	(.005)
Wald (p)			
All SupLargeReducImmig terms	.2308	.0117	.3698
taste SupLargeReducImmig term	.0547	.0016	.8745
stats SupLargeReducImmig terms	.3797	.6710	.3469
all variables	.0000	.0000	.0000
R^2	.217	.312	.304
Obs	3240	3240	3240

(b) Ethnicity—with monetary stakes

	Anti	Pro-White	Pro-Black
	(1)	(2)	(3)
PROFIT33%A	-.117****	.143****	-.026**
	(.022)	(.021)	(.012)
PROFIT33%D	-.165****	.002	.163****
	(.022)	(.008)	(.023)
PROD50%A-PROFIT33%A	-.580****	.616****	-.037***
	(.029)	(.028)	(.012)
PROD50%D-PROFIT33%D	-.608****	.013	.595****
	(.028)	(.009)	(.028)
PROFIT33%A x SupLargeReducImmig	-.020**	.018*	.002
	(.010)	(.009)	(.005)
PROFIT33%D x SupLargeReducImmig	-.003	-.007	.010
	(.010)	(.004)	(.010)
PROD50%A-PROFIT33%A x SupLargeReducImmig	-.001	-.008	.010*
	(.012)	(.012)	(.005)
PROD50%D-PROFIT33%D x SupLargeReducImmig	.005	-.010**	.004
	(.012)	(.005)	(.012)
SupLargeReducImmig	-.019***	.018****	.002
	(.007)	(.004)	(.005)
Wald (p)			
All SupLargeReducImmig int. terms	.0350	.0264	.1084
taste SupLargeReducImmig int. terms	.0105	.0252	.6117
stats SupLargeReducImmig int. terms	.6379	.1243	.1503
all variables	.0000	.0000	.0000
R^2	.293	.400	.398
Obs	5400	5400	5400

Notes: Linear probability models with individual-level random effects, socio-demographic controls, an indicator for decisions about a second discrimination domain in Study 2, and robust standard errors. SupLargeReducImmig is a variable taking values 0 (Oppose) to 4 (Support) according to the answer to the question: Do you generally oppose or support the following types of public or private policies? Large reductions in immigration. $^{*}p < .10$, $^{**}p < .05$, $^{***}p < .01$, $^{****}p < .001$.

Table E9: Differences according to how strict individuals want the enforcement of policies prohibiting LGBTQ+ status discrimination to be

(a) LGBTQ+ status—without monetary stakes

	Anti	Pro-nLGBTQ+	Pro-LGBTQ+
	(1)	(2)	(3)
PROD50%A	-.284****	.296****	-.012
	(.044)	(.042)	(.022)
PROD50%D	-.226****	.014	.212****
	(.044)	(.028)	(.039)
PROD50%A x PreferStrictAntiLgbtqDiscPol	-.036***	.033**	.003
	(.014)	(.013)	(.007)
PROD50%D x PreferStrictAntiLgbtqDiscPol	-.060****	.003	.058****
	(.014)	(.008)	(.013)
PreferStrictAntiLgbtqDiscPol	.042****	-.036****	-.006
	(.009)	(.007)	(.006)
Wald (p)			
All PreferStrictAntiLgbtqDiscPol terms	.0000	.0000	.0000
taste PreferStrictAntiLgbtqDiscPol term	.0000	.0000	.3521
stats PreferStrictAntiLgbtqDiscPol terms	.0000	.0410	.0000
all variables	.0000	.0000	.0000
R^2	.180	.228	.255
Obs	3240	3240	3240

(b) LGBTQ+ status—with monetary stakes

	Anti	Pro-nLGBTQ+	Pro-LGBTQ+
	(1)	(2)	(3)
PROFIT33%A	-.175****	.205****	-.030
	(.035)	(.034)	(.020)
PROFIT33%D	-.173****	-.065**	.238****
	(.035)	(.026)	(.036)
PROD50%A-PROFIT33%A	-.452****	.488****	-.036*
	(.044)	(.043)	(.021)
PROD50%D-PROFIT33%D	-.446****	-.058**	.505****
	(.044)	(.029)	(.043)
PROFIT33%A x PreferStrictAntiLgbtqDiscPol	.009	-.010	.001
	(.011)	(.010)	(.006)
PROFIT33%D x PreferStrictAntiLgbtqDiscPol	.004	.014*	-.017
	(.011)	(.008)	(.011)
PROD50%A-PROFIT33%A x PreferStrictAntiLgbtqDiscPol	-.027**	.024*	.003
	(.014)	(.013)	(.007)
PROD50%D-PROFIT33%D x PreferStrictAntiLgbtqDiscPol	-.036***	.017**	.018
	(.014)	(.008)	(.014)
PreferStrictAntiLgbtqDiscPol	.036****	-.034****	-.002
	(.009)	(.007)	(.006)
Wald (p)			
All PreferStrictAntiLgbtqDiscPol int. terms	.0167	.0339	.0547
taste PreferStrictAntiLgbtqDiscPol int. terms	.5761	.0783	.2258
stats PreferStrictAntiLgbtqDiscPol int. terms	.0334	.0702	.3936
all variables	.0000	.0000	.0000
R^2	.249	.328	.358
Obs	5400	5400	5400

Notes: Linear probability models with individual-level random effects, socio-demographic controls, an indicator for decisions about a second discrimination domain in Study 2, and robust standard errors. PreferStrictAntiLgbtqDiscPol is a variable taking values 0 (Not Strict At All) to 4 (Very Strict) according to the answer to the question: In your opinion, how strict should firms, courts, and the government be in their enforcement of the prohibition of discrimination based on LGBTQ+ status? $^{*}p < .10$, $^{**}p < .05$, $^{***}p < .01$, $^{****}p < .001$.

Table E10: Differences according to how much they oppose or support Affirmative Action programs for LGBTQ+ minorities

(a) LGBTQ+ status—without monetary stakes

	Anti	Pro-nLGBTQ+	Pro-LGBTQ+
	(1)	(2)	(3)
PROD50%A	-.385****	.371****	.014
	(.034)	(.035)	(.015)
PROD50%D	-.368****	-.008	.376****
	(.035)	(.020)	(.032)
PROD50%A x SupAffActLgbtqMin	-.001	.009	-.007
	(.013)	(.013)	(.006)
PROD50%D x SupAffActLgbtqMin	-.014	.013*	.001
	(.013)	(.007)	(.013)
SupAffActLgbtqMin	.026***	-.035****	.009
	(.009)	(.007)	(.006)
Wald (p)			
All SupAffActLgbtqMin terms	.0104	.0000	.3312
taste SupAffActLgbtqMin term	.0044	.0000	.1035
stats SupAffActLgbtqMin terms	.3052	.1619	.4486
all variables	.0000	.0000	.0000
R^2	.178	.227	.246
Obs	3240	3240	3240

(b) LGBTQ+ status—with monetary stakes

	Anti	Pro-nLGBTQ+	Pro-LGBTQ+
	(1)	(2)	(3)
PROFIT33%A	-.192****	.204****	-.012
	(.027)	(.027)	(.013)
PROFIT33%D	-.186****	-.076****	.262****
	(.028)	(.019)	(.028)
PROD50%A-PROFIT33%A	-.542****	.543****	-.000
	(.034)	(.034)	(.013)
PROD50%D-PROFIT33%D	-.533****	-.064***	.597****
	(.035)	(.021)	(.032)
PROFIT33%A x SupAffActLgbtqMin	.020*	-.013	-.007
	(.010)	(.010)	(.005)
PROFIT33%D x SupAffActLgbtqMin	.011	.022****	-.033***
	(.010)	(.007)	(.010)
PROD50%A-PROFIT33%A x SupAffActLgbtqMin	.005	.007	-.011**
	(.013)	(.013)	(.006)
PROD50%D-PROFIT33%D x SupAffActLgbtqMin	-.007	.024****	-.017
	(.013)	(.007)	(.013)
SupAffActLgbtqMin	.026***	-.037****	.011**
	(.009)	(.007)	(.006)
Wald (p)			
All SupAffActLgbtqMin int. terms	.1850	.0013	.0158
taste SupAffActLgbtqMin int. terms	.1223	.0003	.0067
stats SupAffActLgbtqMin int. terms	.3659	.0037	.1058
all variables	.0000	.0000	.0000
R^2	.249	.330	.358
Obs	5400	5400	5400

Notes: Linear probability models with individual-level random effects, socio-demographic controls, an indicator for decisions about a second discrimination domain in Study 2, and robust standard errors. SupAffActLgbtqMin is a variable taking values 0 (Oppose) to 4 (Support) according to the answer to the question: Do you generally oppose or support the following types of public or private policies? Affirmative action programs for sexual and gender minorities such as LGBTQ+ quotas. $^{*}p < .10$, $^{**}p < .05$, $^{***}p < .01$, $^{****}p < .001$.

Table E11: Differences according to how much they oppose or support same-sex marriage

(a) LGBTQ+ status—without monetary stakes

	Anti	Pro-nLGBTQ+	Pro-LGBTQ+
	(1)	(2)	(3)
PROD50%A	-.196****	.231****	-.036*
	(.052)	(.052)	(.022)
PROD50%D	-.140***	-.002	.141***
	(.053)	(.036)	(.044)
PROD50%A x SupLegSameSexMar	-.058****	.048****	.010*
	(.015)	(.014)	(.006)
PROD50%D x SupLegSameSexMar	-.078****	.007	.071****
	(.015)	(.010)	(.013)
SupLegSameSexMar	.069****	-.059****	-.010
	(.013)	(.011)	(.007)
Wald (p)			
All SupLegSameSexMar terms	.0000	.0000	.0000
taste SupLegSameSexMar term	.0000	.0000	.1351
stats SupLegSameSexMar terms	.0000	.0034	.0000
all variables	.0000	.0000	.0000
R^2	.184	.234	.257
Obs	3240	3240	3240

(b) LGBTQ+ status—with monetary stakes

	Anti	Pro-nLGBTQ+	Pro-LGBTQ+
	(1)	(2)	(3)
PROFIT33%A	-.140***	.175****	-.035
	(.044)	(.040)	(.022)
PROFIT33%D	-.070	-.137****	.208****
	(.047)	(.037)	(.045)
PROD50%A-PROFIT33%A	-.339****	.368****	-.029
	(.051)	(.052)	(.025)
PROD50%D-PROFIT33%D	-.282****	-.116***	.398****
	(.055)	(.037)	(.049)
PROFIT33%A x SupLegSameSexMar	-.002	-.000	.002
	(.012)	(.011)	(.006)
PROFIT33%D x SupLegSameSexMar	-.028**	.033****	-.006
	(.013)	(.010)	(.012)
PROD50%A-PROFIT33%A x SupLegSameSexMar	-.058****	.057****	.001
	(.014)	(.014)	(.007)
PROD50%D-PROFIT33%D x SupLegSameSexMar	-.080****	.032***	.048****
	(.015)	(.010)	(.014)
SupLegSameSexMar	.069****	-.059****	-.010
	(.012)	(.010)	(.007)
Wald (p)			
All SupLegSameSexMar int. terms	.0000	.0000	.0007
taste SupLegSameSexMar int. terms	.0179	.0019	.7497
stats SupLegSameSexMar int. terms	.0000	.0001	.0020
all variables	.0000	.0000	.0000
R^2	.253	.332	.360
Obs	5400	5400	5400

Notes: Linear probability models with individual-level random effects, socio-demographic controls, an indicator for decisions about a second discrimination domain in Study 2, and robust standard errors. SupLegSameSexMar is a variable taking values 0 (Oppose) to 4 (Support) according to the answer to the question: Do you generally oppose or support the following types of public or private policies? Legal same-sex marriage. $^{*}p < .10$, $^{**}p < .05$, $^{***}p < .01$, $^{****}p < .001$.

Table E12: Differences according to how much they oppose or support a simpler process for changing legal gender

(a) LGBTQ+ status—without monetary stakes

	Anti	Pro-nLGBTQ+	Pro-LGBTQ+
	(1)	(2)	(3)
PROD50%A	-.356****	.347****	.009
	(.031)	(.031)	(.014)
PROD50%D	-.320****	.002	.317****
	(.032)	(.019)	(.029)
PROD50%A x SupSimChangeGen	-.015	.020*	-.005
	(.013)	(.012)	(.006)
PROD50%D x SupSimChangeGen	-.037***	.009	.029**
	(.012)	(.007)	(.012)
SupSimChangeGen	.026***	-.033****	.008
	(.008)	(.007)	(.005)
Wald (p)			
All SupSimChangeGen terms	.0009	.0000	.0057
taste SupSimChangeGen term	.0022	.0000	.1283
stats SupSimChangeGen terms	.0035	.1682	.0153
all variables	.0000	.0000	.0000
R^2	.177	.226	.251
Obs	3240	3240	3240

(b) LGBTQ+ status—with monetary stakes

	Anti	Pro-nLGBTQ+	Pro-LGBTQ+
	(1)	(2)	(3)
PROFIT33%A	-.169****	.177****	-.008
	(.024)	(.024)	(.011)
PROFIT33%D	-.146****	-.070****	.216****
	(.025)	(.018)	(.026)
PROD50%A-PROFIT33%A	-.515****	.509****	.006
	(.031)	(.030)	(.013)
PROD50%D-PROFIT33%D	-.477****	-.053**	.529****
	(.032)	(.021)	(.030)
PROFIT33%A x SupSimChangeGen	.010	-.001	-.009*
	(.010)	(.009)	(.005)
PROFIT33%D x SupSimChangeGen	-.007	.020***	-.013
	(.010)	(.006)	(.010)
PROD50%A-PROFIT33%A x SupSimChangeGen	-.008	.023*	-.015***
	(.012)	(.012)	(.005)
PROD50%D-PROFIT33%D x SupSimChangeGen	-.034***	.020***	.014
	(.012)	(.007)	(.012)
SupSimChangeGen	.030****	-.037****	.007
	(.008)	(.007)	(.005)
Wald (p)			
All SupSimChangeGen int. terms	.0010	.0101	.0066
taste SupSimChangeGen int. terms	.0468	.0039	.1611
stats SupSimChangeGen int. terms	.0008	.0105	.0033
all variables	.0000	.0000	.0000
R^2	.247	.328	.358
Obs	5400	5400	5400

Notes: Linear probability models with individual-level random effects, socio-demographic controls, an indicator for decisions about a second discrimination domain in Study 2, and robust standard errors. LegSameSexMar is a variable taking values 0 (Oppose) to 4 (Support) according to the answer to the question: Do you generally oppose or support the following types of public or private policies? Simpler process for changing one's legal gender. $^{*}p < .10$, $^{**}p < .05$, $^{***}p < .01$, $^{****}p < .001$.

F. Gender Wage Gap

The table below shows regression estimates for differences in preferences and in being swayed to engage in discrimination when it becomes profitable, according to the industry-level mean gender gap in hourly pay. Panel (a) is about preferences estimated from decisions without monetary stakes. It mirrors the regressions in Table 2, but the independent variables also include a variable indicating the mean gender gap in hourly pay, along with interactions between this variable and the different decision indicators. Panel (b) is about how making discrimination profitable sways individuals to engage in it. It mirrors the regressions in Table 4, but the independent variables also contain a variable indicating the mean gender gap in hourly pay, and interactions between this variable and the different decision indicators.

Table F1: Differences according to industry-level mean gender gap in hourly pay

(a) Gender—without monetary stakes

	Anti	Pro-Men	Pro-Wom.
	(1)	(2)	(3)
PROD25%A	-.465****	.452****	.013
	(.052)	(.050)	(.016)
PROD50%A	-.547****	.503****	.044**
	(.051)	(.050)	(.018)
PROD25%D	-.459****	.011	.448****
	(.052)	(.015)	(.052)
PROD50%D	-.538****	.023	.516****
	(.049)	(.019)	(.050)
PROD25%A x GenPayGap	.000	.001	-.001
	(.004)	(.004)	(.001)
PROD50%A x GenPayGap	-.001	.005	-.004***
	(.004)	(.004)	(.001)
PROD25%D x GenPayGap	-.001	-.000	.002
	(.004)	(.001)	(.004)
PROD50%D x GenPayGap	-.003	-.001	.004
	(.003)	(.001)	(.004)
GenPayGap	-.003	.000	.003*
	(.002)	(.001)	(.001)
Wald (p)			
All GenPayGap terms	.3919	.7256	.0139
taste GenPayGap term	.1035	.9211	.0744
stats GenPayGap terms	.8556	.5876	.0219
all variables	.0000	.0000	.0000
R^2	.202	.362	.371
Obs	4205	4205	4205

(b) Gender—with monetary stakes

	Anti	Pro-Men	Pro-Wom.
	(1)	(2)	(3)
PROFIT5%A	-.105***	.098***	.007
	(.035)	(.033)	(.016)
PROFIT33%A	-.181****	.178****	.003
	(.044)	(.042)	(.016)
PROFIT5%D	-.110***	.014	.097***
	(.035)	(.016)	(.034)
PROFIT33%D	-.219****	.007	.212****
	(.043)	(.012)	(.043)
PROD25%A-PROFIT5%A	-.462****	.433****	.029
	(.052)	(.049)	(.019)
PROD50%A-PROFIT33%A	-.613****	.601****	.013
	(.047)	(.043)	(.015)
PROD25%D-PROFIT5%D	-.536****	.019	.518****
	(.051)	(.018)	(.052)
PROD50%D-PROFIT33%D	-.649****	-.014	.663****
	(.045)	(.012)	(.045)
PROFIT5%A x GenPayGap	.000	.001	-.002
	(.003)	(.002)	(.001)
PROFIT33%A x GenPayGap	-.000	.002	-.002
	(.003)	(.003)	(.001)
PROFIT5%D x GenPayGap	-.000	-.001	.002
	(.003)	(.001)	(.003)
PROFIT33%D x GenPayGap	.001	-.002**	.001
	(.003)	(.001)	(.003)
PROD25%A-PROFIT5%A x GenPayGap	-.006*	.010***	-.003**
	(.004)	(.003)	(.001)
PROD50%A-PROFIT33%A x GenPayGap	-.005	.008***	-.003**
	(.003)	(.003)	(.001)
PROD25%D-PROFIT5%D x GenPayGap	-.003	-.001	.004
	(.004)	(.001)	(.004)
PROD50%D-PROFIT33%D x GenPayGap	-.004	.000	.004
	(.003)	(.001)	(.003)
GenPayGap	-.002	-.000	.002*
	(.002)	(.001)	(.001)
Wald (p)			
All GenPayGap int. terms	.7655	.0336	.0397
taste GenPayGap int. terms	.9845	.2248	.5138
stats GenPayGap int. terms	.3938	.0369	.0044
all variables	.0000	.0000	.0000
R^2	.302	.434	.437
Obs	7569	7569	7569

Notes: Linear probability models with individual-level random effects, socio-demographic controls, and robust standard errors. We use 2023 data from the Office for National Statistics (ONS) for all workers (full-time and part-time combined). GenPayGap is the industry-level mean difference between men's and women's hourly earnings as a percentage of men's earnings. GenPayGap has a mean of 13.1% (SD=4.8%) with a minimum value of −4.4% in the industry *Water supply; sewerage, waste management and remediation activities* and a maximum value of 24.7% in the industry *Financial and insurance activities*. $^{*}p < .10$, $^{**}p < .05$, $^{***}p < .01$, $^{****}p < .001$.

G. Aggregate Consistency Over Time Between Study 1 and Study 2

In the gender discrimination datasets of Study 1 and Study 2—conducted a year apart with distinct representative samples—we find similar tastes, but less frequent merit-based preferences for statistical discrimination in Study 2. Specifically, the share with a taste for men is lower by 1.4%pt. in Study 2, and the shares with a taste for women or preferences against taste discrimination do not differ significantly. Preferences for statistical discrimination based on merit are less frequent by 8%pt. (from 58% in Study 1) and preferences against it are correspondingly more frequent. Taste discrimination changes with profits in the same way across both studies, and profits less frequently entice individuals to engage in statistical discrimination in Study 2. The analyses are shown in Table G1 (pre-reg. Ext. Suppl. Interest 13).

Table G1: Differences between Study 1 and Study 2

(a) Without monetary stakes

	Anti	Pro-Men	Pro-Women
	(1)	(2)	(3)
PROD50%A	-.576****	.574****	.002
	(.015)	(.015)	(.005)
PROD50%D	-.587****	.009*	.577****
	(.015)	(.005)	(.015)
Study2	-.005	-.014**	.020*
	(.012)	(.006)	(.011)
PROD50%A x Study2	.099****	-.083***	-.016
	(.028)	(.026)	(.010)
PROD50%D x Study2	.060**	.007	-.067**
	(.027)	(.008)	(.027)
Wald (p)			
All Study2 terms	.0031	.0001	.0565
taste Study2 term	.6692	.0113	.0738
stats Study2 terms	.0020	.0036	.0270
all variables	.0000	.0000	.0000
R^2	.294	.415	.407
Obs	5232	5232	5232

(b) With monetary stakes

	Anti	Pro-Men	Pro-Women
	(1)	(2)	(3)
PROFIT33%A	-.184****	.198****	-.013***
	(.012)	(.012)	(.005)
PROFIT33%D	-.208****	-.008**	.216****
	(.013)	(.004)	(.012)
PROD50%A-PROFIT33%A	-.677****	.695****	-.019****
	(.014)	(.014)	(.005)
PROD50%D-PROFIT33%D	-.704****	-.008*	.711****
	(.014)	(.004)	(.014)
PROFIT33%A x Study2	-.006	.025	-.019*
	(.022)	(.021)	(.011)
PROFIT33%D x Study2	.005	.007	-.011
	(.022)	(.006)	(.022)
PROD50%A-PROFIT33%A x Study2	.065**	-.048*	-.017
	(.027)	(.025)	(.011)
PROD50%D-PROFIT33%D x Study2	.056**	.018**	-.075***
	(.026)	(.008)	(.025)
Study2	-.014	-.008	.022**
	(.013)	(.006)	(.011)
Wald (p)			
All Study2 int. terms	.0797	.0063	.0394
taste Study2 int. terms	.7208	.2759	.2103
stats Study2 int. terms	.0475	.0050	.0102
all variables	.0000	.0000	.0000
R^2	.330	.462	.458
Obs	8720	8720	8720

Notes: Linear probability models with individual-level random effects, socio-demographic controls, and robust standard errors. Study2 is an indicator taking values 1 for Study 2 observations and 0 for Study 1. There are 1,212 participants from Study 1 and 567 participants from Study 2. $^{*}p < .10$, $^{**}p < .05$, $^{***}p < .01$, $^{****}p < .001$.

H. Increasing Wage Transparency

We evaluate whether introducing gender wage transparency can reduce (gender-based) taste and statistical discrimination in the experiment. To do so, we included a treatment in Study 1 to add transparency in the bonus-setting process. Specifically, we informed each individual that workers would learn the number of men and women the individual selected (and that the individual knew their gender), then comment on the appropriateness of the selection, and we would forward their comment to the individual.[5] We randomized 384 individuals in that treatment in Study 1, so we can compare them with the other 1,212 Study 1 individuals.

In Table H1a, we can see that transparency does not significantly affect statistical discrimination (the point estimate is a 5%pt. increase). In the same table, the effect on taste discrimination is also not significant (the point estimate is a 2%pt. decrease in preferring a gender, relative to the 5% with tastes). The Wald test on the joint significance of interaction terms between the treatment and decisions in Tables H1a and H1b all have $p > .11$ (pre-reg. Main Interest 4).

Table H1: Differences between the transparency and regular treatments

(a) Gender—without monetary stakes

	Anti	Pro-Men	Pro-Wom.
	(1)	(2)	(3)
PROD25%A	-.481****	.473****	.008
	(.016)	(.015)	(.006)
PROD50%A	-.576****	.574****	.002
	(.015)	(.015)	(.005)
PROD25%D	-.485****	.011**	.474****
	(.015)	(.006)	(.015)
PROD50%D	-.587****	.009*	.577****
	(.015)	(.005)	(.015)
PROD25%A x Transparency	-.054*	.047	.007
	(.031)	(.031)	(.011)
PROD50%A x Transparency	-.047	.049	-.002
	(.030)	(.030)	(.008)
PROD25%D x Transparency	-.048	.013	.035
	(.031)	(.010)	(.031)
PROD50%D x Transparency	-.057*	.004	.053*
	(.029)	(.009)	(.029)
Transparency	.018	-.010	-.008
	(.011)	(.006)	(.009)
Wald (p)			
All Transparency terms	.4104	.3826	.5386
taste Transparency term	.1173	.1295	.3908
stats Transparency terms	.3765	.3647	.4248
all variables	.0000	.0000	.0000
R^2	.208	.381	.381
Obs	7835	7835	7835

(b) Gender—with monetary stakes

	Anti	Pro-Men	Pro-Wom.
	(1)	(2)	(3)
PROFIT5%A	-.104****	.113****	-.009*
	(.010)	(.010)	(.005)
PROFIT33%A	-.184****	.198****	-.013***
	(.012)	(.012)	(.005)
PROFIT5%D	-.117****	.001	.116****
	(.010)	(.004)	(.010)
PROFIT33%D	-.208****	-.008**	.216****
	(.013)	(.004)	(.012)
PROD25%A-PROFIT5%A	-.544****	.551****	-.007
	(.015)	(.015)	(.005)
PROD50%A-PROFIT33%A	-.677****	.695****	-.019****
	(.014)	(.014)	(.005)
PROD25%D-PROFIT5%D	-.577****	.008	.569****
	(.015)	(.005)	(.015)
PROD50%D-PROFIT33%D	-.704****	-.008*	.711****
	(.014)	(.004)	(.014)
Transparency	.020*	-.010	-.010
	(.011)	(.006)	(.009)
PROFIT5%A x Transparency	-.007	.003	.004
	(.020)	(.019)	(.009)
PROFIT33%A x Transparency	.021	-.029	.008
	(.024)	(.023)	(.009)
PROFIT5%D x Transparency	.011	.002	-.013
	(.020)	(.007)	(.020)
PROFIT33%D x Transparency	.028	.006	-.034
	(.025)	(.006)	(.025)
PROD25%A-PROFIT5%A x Transparency	-.045	.027	.017*
	(.030)	(.030)	(.010)
PROD50%A-PROFIT33%A x Transparency	-.054**	.046*	.008
	(.028)	(.027)	(.009)
PROD25%D-PROFIT5%D x Transparency	-.062**	.000	.062**
	(.029)	(.008)	(.030)
PROD50%D-PROFIT33%D x Transparency	-.054**	.013*	.041
	(.027)	(.008)	(.027)
Wald (p)			
All Transparency int. terms	.1665	.2246	.1763
taste Transparency int. terms	.3946	.3068	.4828
stats Transparency int. terms	.2534	.2561	.1563
all variables	.0000	.0000	.0000
R^2	.310	.430	.440
Obs	14103	14103	14103

Notes: Linear probability models with individual-level random effects, socio-demographic controls, and robust standard errors. Transparency is a variable taking values 0 for participants in the regular treatment and 1 for participants in the transparency treatment. The only difference is as follows. In the regular treatment, participants are told in the instructions: *The individuals will not be told anything about how you made your decision.* In the transparency treatment, participants are instead told: *If one of your decisions is selected, the individuals will be told you knew their gender when you selected who receive the bonus in this decision [and] how many men and women you selected in this decision. They will then comment on the appropriateness of your decision. When we pay you, we will pass on their comments to you.* $^{*}p < .10$, $^{**}p < .05$, $^{***}p < .01$, $^{****}p < .001$.

[5]The exact text is "*If one of your decisions is selected, the individuals will be told (1) you knew their gender when you selected who receive the bonus in this decision, [and] (2) how many men and women you selected in this decision. They will then comment on the appropriateness of your decision. When we pay you, we will pass on their comments to you.*" Participants had to correctly answer a comprehension question about this to participate.

I. Engaging in Statistical Discrimination Even When it is Costly

We evaluate whether individuals value engaging in statistical discrimination on merit grounds enough to forgo earnings to do so. For this purpose, Study 2 included two additional STATISTICAL SITUATION decisions with monetary stakes for each discrimination domain, in which productivity and profitability are negatively correlated. Specifically, we added the PROD50%D-PROFIT33%A and PROD50%A-PROFIT33%D decisions. In PROD50%D-PROFIT33%A, individuals earn 33% more from selecting workers from the advantaged group, but where the disadvantaged group is 50% more productive on average. The productivity and profitability of groups are reversed in PROD50%A-PROFIT33%D.

For simplicity, we estimate a lower bound on the aggregate share willing to pay to discriminate statistically for merit reasons. To do so, we measure the increase in the share of individuals favoring the less profitable group when it is on average more productive than the other group, relative to when this less profitable group is equally productive—as those individuals give up earnings to favor the most productive group.[6] That is, we compare the share of pro-disadvantaged choices in PROD50%D-PROFIT33%A vs. PROFIT33%A, and we do the same for the share of pro-advantaged in PROD50%A-PROFIT33%D vs. PROFIT33%D. Using Table I1, we find that such shares increase by 37%pt. on average (from the same table, increases are 39%pt. for gender, 37%pt. for ethnicity, and 37%pt. for LGBTQ+ status, all with $p<.0001$ (pre-reg. Suppl. Interest 8).

Table I1: Differences between taste financial decisions and statistical reverse financial decisions

	Anti	Pro-Advantaged	Pro-Disadvantaged
	(1)	(2)	(3)
PROFIT33%A x Ethnicity	.042**	.198****	-.247****
	(.017)	(.012)	(.018)
PROD50%D-PROFIT33%A x Ethnicity	-.306****	.180****	.120****
	(.020)	(.012)	(.024)
PROFIT33%D x Ethnicity	.028	.007	-.041**
	(.017)	(.006)	(.019)
PROD50%A-PROFIT33%D x Ethnicity	-.308****	.358****	-.057***
	(.020)	(.015)	(.019)
PROFIT33%A x LGBTQ+	.010	.231****	-.242****
	(.017)	(.013)	(.018)
PROD50%D-PROFIT33%A x LGBTQ+	-.336****	.232****	.103****
	(.020)	(.013)	(.024)
PROFIT33%D x LGBTQ+	-.004	.030****	-.027
	(.018)	(.007)	(.019)
PROD50%A-PROFIT33%D x LGBTQ+	-.330****	.358****	-.030
	(.020)	(.015)	(.019)
PROFIT33%A x Gender	.013	.225****	-.237****
	(.011)	(.018)	(.019)
PROD50%D-PROFIT33%A x Gender	-.365****	.205****	.160****
	(.025)	(.018)	(.032)
PROD50%A-PROFIT33%D x Gender	-.338****	.372****	-.034***
	(.024)	(.021)	(.013)
Wald (p)			
PROFIT33%A(D) vs. PROD50%D(A)-PROFIT33%A(D), all domains	.0000	.0000	.0000
PROFIT33%A(D) vs. PROD50%D(A)-PROFIT33%A(D), Ethnicity	.0000	.0000	.0000
PROFIT33%A(D) vs. PROD50%D(A)-PROFIT33%A(D), Gender	.0000	.0000	.0000
PROFIT33%A(D) vs. PROD50%D(A)-PROFIT33%A(D), LGBTQ+	.0000	.0000	.0000
all variables	.0000	.0000	.0000
R^2	.150	.104	.116
Obs	10864	10864	10864

Notes: Linear probability models with individual-level random effects, socio-demographic controls, an indicator for decisions about a second discrimination domain in Study 2, and robust standard errors. $^{*}p<.10$, $^{**}p<.05$, $^{***}p<.01$, $^{****}p<.001$.

[6] This is a lower bound since some may already favor that group when it is equally productive.

J. Distinguishing Neutral Redistributive Preferences

From the 1681 Study 2 individuals, we randomly assigned 570 to make decisions about a neutral domain and one of the three discrimination domains (other individuals made decisions about two of the three discrimination domains). We informed individuals that we "randomly divided [workers] into two artificial groups with equal probability: random group "Circle" and random group "Square." Workers had the same chance of being in one or the other group."

Table J1 reproduces Table 3, but adding the neutral domain from Study 2 and using only the dataset from Study 2 (instead of using the larger dataset from Study 1 for gender and the dataset from Study 2 for ethnicity and LGBTQ+ status).

Table J1: Neutral and discrimination preferences from decisions without monetary stakes using only the Study 2 dataset

Neutral	Pref. against "taste disc."	"Taste" for Square group	"Taste" for Circle group	Pref. against "stats disc."	Merit-based pref. for "stats disc."
Percentage	95	4.0	1.5	42	54
Gender	Pref. against taste disc.	Taste for men	Taste for women	Pref. against stats disc.	Merit-based pref. for stats disc.
Percentage	94	0.7	5.1	44	50
Ethnicity	Pref. against taste disc.	Taste for White workers	Taste for Black workers	Pref. against stats disc.	Merit-based pref. for stats disc.
Percentage	95	2.5	3.6	49	45
LGBTQ+ Status	Pref. against taste disc.	Taste for non-LGBTQ+ workers	Taste for LGBTQ+ workers	Pref. against stats disc.	Merit-based pref. for stats disc.
Percentage	89	6.4	4.5	50	39

Notes: We show the percentage of individuals exhibiting each neutral and discrimination preference in decisions without monetary stakes using Table 2 for ethnicity and LGBTQ+ status using the Study 2 dataset, and equivalent regressions for gender and neutral decisions using the Study 2 dataset (which is smaller than the gender dataset in Study 1, and smaller than the ethnicity and LGBTQ+ status datasets in Study 2). Percentages with preferences for or against statistical discrimination do not sum to one hundred because we do not classify them for a minority, largely for individuals with tastes (see footnote 18 in the main text).

Table M1 provides the results of regressions using the dataset for the three discrimination domains and the neutral domain. We use the same type of regressions as before, but the neutral domain serves as the baseline domain, and we add interactions between the different indicators for decisions and the neutral domain. We show Wald tests on pairwise comparisons of each discrimination domain and the neutral domain.

Figure J1 shows, for all individuals who have a certain preference in the neutral or discrimination domains, (1) the percentage with this preference only for the neutral domain, (2) the percentage with this preference only for the discrimination domain, and (3) the percentage with this preference for both domains. We use only Study 2 individuals who make decisions about the neutral domain and one of the three discrimination domains.

Table J2: Differences between neutral domain and three discrimination domains

(a) Without monetary stakes

	Anti/Equal	Pro-Advant./Circle	Pro-Disadvant./Square
	(1)	(2)	(3)
PROD50%A	-.534****	.520****	.014
	(.024)	(.023)	(.009)
PROD50%D	-.536****	.014	.522****
	(.024)	(.013)	(.023)
Gender	-.011	-.029***	.035***
	(.018)	(.010)	(.012)
PROD50%A x Gender	.058*	-.029	-.029**
	(.032)	(.030)	(.013)
PROD50%D x Gender	.009	.002	-.011
	(.031)	(.014)	(.030)
Ethnicity	-.025*	-.008	.021**
	(.014)	(.010)	(.009)
PROD50%A x Ethnicity	.084***	-.072***	-.013
	(.026)	(.026)	(.011)
PROD50%D x Ethnicity	.084***	-.003	-.081***
	(.026)	(.014)	(.025)
LGBTQ+	-.072****	.027**	.033****
	(.016)	(.011)	(.009)
PROD50%A x LGBTQ+	.146****	-.129****	-.017
	(.027)	(.027)	(.012)
PROD50%D x LGBTQ+	.136****	.007	-.143****
	(.026)	(.015)	(.025)
Wald (p)			
Equality all domains	.0000	.0000	.0000
Taste, equality all domains	.0000	.0000	.0013
Stats, equality all domains	.0000	.0000	.0000
Neutral vs. gender	.1046	.0001	.0103
Taste, Neutral vs. gender	.5260	.0048	.0022
Stats, Neutral vs. gender	.0518	.6063	.0756
Neutral vs. ethn.	.0036	.0004	.0109
Taste, Neutral vs. ethn.	.0764	.3935	.0198
Stats, Neutral vs. ethn.	.0024	.0191	.0053
Neutral vs. LGBTQ+	.0000	.0000	.0000
Taste, Neutral vs. LGBTQ+	.0000	.0187	.0003
Stats, Neutral vs. LGBTQ+	.0000	.0000	.0000
all variables	.0000	.0000	.0000
R^2	.213	.290	.306
Obs	9804	9804	9804

(b) With monetary stakes

	Anti/Equal	Pro-Advant./Circle	Pro-Disadvant./Square
	(1)	(2)	(3)
PROFIT33%A	-.234****	.245****	-.011
	(.020)	(.020)	(.007)
PROFIT33%D	-.225****	-.024***	.248****
	(.019)	(.008)	(.019)
PROD50%A-PROFIT33%A	-.679****	.674****	.005
	(.021)	(.021)	(.008)
PROD50%D-PROFIT33%D	-.685****	-.011	.696****
	(.021)	(.011)	(.020)
PROFIT33%A x Gender	.043*	-.022	-.022*
	(.026)	(.025)	(.012)
PROFIT33%D x Gender	.021	.022**	-.043*
	(.025)	(.009)	(.025)
PROD50%A-PROFIT33%A x Gender	.068**	-.026	-.041****
	(.030)	(.028)	(.013)
PROD50%D-PROFIT33%D x Gender	.037	.022*	-.059**
	(.028)	(.013)	(.028)
Gender	-.008	-.032***	.036***
	(.017)	(.010)	(.011)
Ethnicity	-.010	-.014	.019**
	(.014)	(.010)	(.009)
LGBTQ+	-.054****	.022*	.028***
	(.015)	(.012)	(.009)
PROFIT33%A x Ethnicity	.076****	-.065***	-.011
	(.021)	(.021)	(.009)
PROFIT33%D x Ethnicity	.052**	.012	-.065***
	(.021)	(.009)	(.021)
PROD50%A-PROFIT33%A x Ethnicity	.097****	-.074***	-.023**
	(.024)	(.024)	(.010)
PROD50%D-PROFIT33%D x Ethnicity	.088****	.004	-.092****
	(.024)	(.012)	(.023)
PROFIT33%A x LGBTQ+	.086****	-.070***	-.016*
	(.022)	(.021)	(.009)
PROFIT33%D x LGBTQ+	.063***	-.002	-.060***
	(.021)	(.011)	(.021)
PROD50%A-PROFIT33%A x LGBTQ+	.148****	-.117****	-.031***
	(.024)	(.024)	(.011)
PROD50%D-PROFIT33%D x LGBTQ+	.136****	.002	-.137****
	(.024)	(.014)	(.023)
Wald (p)			
Equality all domains	.0000	.0000	.0000
Taste, equality all domains	.0051	.0001	.0312
Stats, equality all domains	.0000	.0000	.0000
Neutral vs. gender	.0973	.0579	.0071
Taste, Neutral vs. gender	.1780	.0210	.0622
Stats, Neutral vs. gender	.0503	.1061	.0017
Neutral vs. ethn.	.0001	.0002	.0002
Taste, Neutral vs. ethn.	.0015	.0009	.0074
Stats, Neutral vs. ethn.	.0002	.0040	.0001
Neutral vs. LGBTQ+	.0000	.0000	.0000
Taste, Neutral vs. LGBTQ+	.0004	.0041	.0082
Stats, Neutral vs. LGBTQ+	.0000	.0000	.0000
all variables	.0000	.0000	.0000
R^2	.278	.379	.396
Obs	16340	16340	16340

Notes: Linear probability models with individual-level random effects, socio-demographic controls, an indicator for decisions about a second discrimination domain in Study 2, and robust standard errors. Neutral decisions serve as baseline. Gender, Ethnicity, and LGBTQ+ are indicators for decisions in the gender domain, in the ethnicity domain, and in the LGBTQ+ domain, respectively. $^{*}p < .10$, $^{**}p < .05$, $^{***}p < .01$, $^{****}p < .001$.

Figure J1: Within-Individual Preferences for Neutral and Discrimination Domains

(a) Taste discrimination



(b) Statistical discrimination



Notes. We show, for all individuals who have a certain preference in the neutral or discrimination domains, the joint distribution of preferences, i.e., the percentages that have it (1) only for the neutral domain, (2) only for the discrimination domain, and (3) for both the neutral and the discrimination domains. Panel (a) is for taste discrimination, and panel (b) for statistical discrimination. We use only the sub-sample of Study 2 where individuals make decisions about the neutral domain and a single one of the three discrimination domains.

K. Experimenter Demand and Social Desirability

To estimate possible effects of experimenter demand and social desirability, we conducted a reduced version of Study 1 where, adapting the technique of De Quidt et al. (2018), we informed half of 260 individuals that we expect them to select more workers of their gender, which plainly sets our expectations that they will discriminate and reduces the stigma that individuals may think we associate with discrimination. In Table K1, we show that we estimate that informing individuals about our expectations increases the gender discrimination we detect (pro-men/women choices combined) by 6%pt. (standard errors of 3%pt.) across decisions ($p<.05$; pre-reg. Bound Exp. Main Interest). This is consistent with a 6%pt. increase in the frequency of tastes. The point estimate highlights that we may underestimate tastes as the manipulation doubles the share of tastes, which, although not negligible, would not alter our main results (using the upper bound of the 95% confidence interval, 11%pt., would also not alter our conclusions about the broad patterns of preferences).

Table K1: Difference in the share of anti-discrimination choices in bounds vs. regular treatments, for 13 gender moral and financial decisions

	Anti
	(1)
Bounds Treatment	-.060**
	(.028)
Wald (p) — all variables	.0000
R^2	.339
Obs	3380

Notes: Pre-registered linear probability models with individual-level random effects, 12 indicators for 12 of the 13 decisions, four socio-demographic controls (age, ethnicity, gender, and number of previous studies), and individual-level clustered standard errors. $^{*}p < .10$, $^{**}p < .05$, $^{***}p < .01$, $^{****}p < .001$.

L. Hypothetical Wage Valuation

We deviated from the pre-registration when calculating the wage value of no taste discrimination vs. taste discrimination for a minority of individuals. For those preferring to work for a firm favoring a group over another rather than a firm with no taste discrimination, we forgot to ask for their value of working for a firm with no taste discrimination rather than a firm favoring the other group. To approximate this value, we took the value they assign to working for a firm favoring their preferred group rather than a firm with no taste discrimination.

Note that wage valuations of hiring practices may vary across domains because they also depend on factors beyond discrimination preferences themselves (which we exclude or minimize by design in the experiments). Those factors include beliefs about the productivity of different groups (and so who may benefit from statistical discrimination), beliefs about the prevalence of actual labor discrimination against different groups, and the sizes of different groups in the population.

Table L1: Shares of individual preferences regarding working in a firm with or without taste discrimination

	Percentage		
	Gender	Ethnicity	LGBTQ+ status
Indifferent	15.70	23.92	39.42
Prefer a firm without taste disc.	76.90	58.63	30.92
Prefer a firm with taste disc. favoring men/White/non-LGBTQ+ ind.	1.44	2.88	5.24
Prefer a firm with taste disc. favoring women/ethnic minority/LGBTQ+ ind.	5.96	14.57	24.41
N	554	556	553

Notes: We indicate the shares for the four possible answers. The question for taste discrimination was: *The following questions concern hypothetical firms that are identical in all respects except for the information we provide. We ask you at which of the firms you would prefer to work. The statements below describe the firms' treatment of equally-productive job applicants. Which of these firms would you prefer to work at? - I am indifferent between the firms, - a firm that does not consider [gender/ethnicity/LGBTQ+ status] among such applicants, - a firm that typically hires [men/ethnic White individuals/non-LGBTQ+ individuals] among such applicants, - a firm that typically hires [women/ethnic minority individuals/LGBTQ+ individuals] among such applicants.*

Table L2: Shares of individual preferences regarding working in a firm with or without statistical discrimination

	Percentage		
	Gender	Ethnicity	LGBTQ+ status
Indifferent	18.02	24.68	44.58
Prefer a firm without statistical disc.	60.72	56.94	25.09
Prefer a firm with statistical disc.	21.26	18.38	30.32
N	555	555	554

Notes: We indicate the shares for the three possible answers. The question for statistical discrimination was: *The following questions concern hypothetical firms that are identical in all respects except for the information we provide. We ask you at which of the firms you would prefer to work. The statements below describe the firms' treatment of job applicants with unclear productivity when it knows that [women/ethnic minority individuals/LGBTQ+ individuals] or [men/ethnic White individuals/non-LGBTQ+ individuals] are generally (but not always) more productive for the job. Which of these firms would you prefer to work at? - a firm that does not consider [gender/ethnicity/LGBTQ+ status] among such applicants, - a firm that typically hires individuals with the [gender/ethnicity/LGBTQ+ status] (either [women/ethnic minority individuals/LGBTQ+ individuals] or [men/ethnic White individuals/non-LGBTQ+ individuals]) it knows to be generally more productive among such applicants, and does not consider [gender/ethnicity/LGBTQ+ status] otherwise, - I am indifferent between the firms.*

Table L3: Wage value of working in a firm with or without taste discrimination for different individuals

	Gender			Ethnicity			LGBTQ+ status		
	Mean	SD	*N*	Mean	SD	*N*	Mean	SD	*N*
1. Value of a firm without relative to with taste disc. favoring men/White/non-LGBTQ+ ind., for ind. who prefer a firm without taste disc	11.49	8.75	425	10.19	9.06	324	8.12	8.96	170
2. Value of a firm without relative to with taste disc. favoring women/ethnic minority/LGBTQ+ ind., for ind. who prefer a firm without taste disc	9.15	8.61	426	8.28	8.71	325	7.36	8.63	171
3. Value of a firm with relative to without taste disc. favoring men/White/non-LGBTQ+ ind., for ind. who prefer a firm with taste disc. favoring men/White/non-LGBTQ+ ind.	8.75	5.82	8	10.00	8.76	16	9.34	8.03	29
4. Value of a firm with relative to without taste disc. favoring women/ethnic minority/LGBTQ+ ind., for ind. who prefer a firm with taste disc. favoring women/ethnic minority/LGBTQ+ ind.	9.55	8.33	33	10.22	8.37	81	11.34	8.71	134

Notes: The value is indicated as a percentage of one's wage.

Table L4: Wage value of working in a firm with or without statistical discrimination for different individuals

	Gender			Ethnicity			LGBTQ+ status		
	Mean	SD	*N*	Mean	SD	*N*	Mean	SD	*N*
1. Value of a firm without relative to with stats disc., for ind. who prefer a firm without stats disc	11.76	8.25	337	11.28	8.36	316	8.29	8.50	139
2. Value of a firm with relative to without stats disc., for ind. who prefer a firm with stats disc	6.99	7.12	118	7.63	7.82	102	9.87	8.65	168

Notes: The value is indicated as a percentage of one's wage.

Table L5: Value of working in a firm without vs. with taste discrimination

	Gender			Ethnicity			LGBTQ+ status		
	Mean	SD	*t-test (p)*	Mean	SD	*t-test (p)*	Mean	SD	*t-test (p)*
Value no taste disc. favoring men/White/n-LGBTQ+ ind.	9.27	9.23	.0000	7.17	9.37	.0000	4.77	8.93	.0000
Value no taste disc. favoring women/ethnic minority/LGBTQ+ ind.	6.60	9.43	.0000	3.64	10.08	.0000	.02	9.86	.9621
t-test (p) — difference	.0000	.	.	.0000	.	.	.0000	.	.

Notes: The value is indicated as a percentage of one's wage. The column one-sample *t*-test is on the mean value being zero, and the row two-sample *t*-test is the two means in a column being equal.

Table L6: Percentages of individuals with a negative, zero, or positive value of working in a firm without vs. with taste discrimination

	Percentage with certain values of no taste disc. favoring					
	Men	Women	White ind.	Ethnic minority ind.	Non-LGBTQ+ ind.	LGBTQ+ ind.
Negative value	1.27	4.15	1.99	11.17	4.17	18.48
Zero value	37.79	44.58	48.92	53.69	60.62	61.59
Positive value	60.94	51.26	49.10	35.14	35.21	19.93
N	553	554	554	555	551	552
Goodness of Fit test (p) — difference	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0000
Prop. test (p) — pos. vs. zero	.0000	.1083	.9658	.0000	.0000	.0000
Prop. test (p) — neg. vs. zero	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0000
Prop. test (p) — neg. vs. pos.	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0000	.5827

Notes: The percentage of individuals with zero value of no taste discrimination includes those with zero value and those with a value between infinitely small and less in absolute value than -2% or 2% of their wage. The Goodness of Fit test is on the equality of the three percentages, and the Proportion test is on pairwise equality of the percentages.

Table L7: Value of working in a firm without vs. with stats discrimination

	Gender			Ethnicity			LGBTQ+ status		
	Mean	SD	*t-test (p)*	Mean	SD	*t-test (p)*	Mean	SD	*t-test (p)*
Value no stats disc.	5.65	10.70	.0000	5.02	10.44	.0000	-.91	9.31	.0216

Notes: The value is indicated as a percentage of one's wage. The column one-sample *t*-test is on the mean value being zero.

Table L8: Percentages of individuals with a negative, zero, or positive value of working in a firm without vs. with stats discrimination

	Percentage with certain values of no stats disc.		
	Gender	Ethnicity	LGBTQ+ status
Negative value	13.69	11.71	21.12
Zero value	38.20	45.23	63.90
Positive value	48.11	43.06	14.98
N	555	555	554
Goodness of Fit test (p) — difference	.0000	.0000	.0000
Prop. test (p) — pos. vs. zero	.0120	.5877	.0000
Prop. test (p) — neg. vs. zero	.0000	.0000	.0000
Prop. test (p) — neg. vs. pos.	.0000	.0000	.0162

Notes: The percentage of individuals with zero value of no stats discrimination includes those with zero value and those with a value between infinitely small and less in absolute value than -2% or 2% of their wage. The Goodness of Fit test is on the equality of the three percentages, and the Proportion test is on pairwise equality of the percentages.

Table L9: Comparisons of the mean value of working in a firm without taste discrimination vs. without statistical discrimination (*p*-values)

	Value no stats disc.		
	Gender	Ethnicity	LGBTQ+ status
Value no taste disc. favoring men/White/n-LGBTQ+ ind.	.0000	.0000	.0000
Value no taste disc. favoring women/ethnic minority/LGBTQ+ ind.	.0622	.0066	.0294

Notes: We present *p*-value of paired *t*-test for each pairwise comparison.

Table L10: Differences in the value of working in a firm without taste discrimination across the three domains

	Value	Value
	(1)	(2)
LGBTQ+ status	-4.502****	-6.578****
	(.547)	(.581)
Ethnicity	-2.105****	-2.954****
	(.560)	(.587)
Constant	9.271****	6.597****
	(.393)	(.401)
Wald (p)		
All Three Domains	.0000	.0000
Gender vs. Ethnicity	.0002	.0000
Gender vs. LGBTQ+ status	.0000	.0000
Ethnicity vs. LGBTQ+ status	.0000	.0000
R^2	.039	.070
Obs	1658	1661

Notes: Pre-registered linear probability models with (HC3) robust standard errors. One observation per individual. Ethnicity and LGBTQ+ status are both indicators, so that gender is the domain that serves as baseline. $^{*}p < .10$, $^{**}p < .05$, $^{***}p < .01$, $^{****}p < .001$.

Table L11: Differences in the value of working in a firm without statistical discrimination across the three domains

	Value
	(1)
LGBTQ+ status	-6.564****
	(.603)
Ethnicity	-.629
	(.635)
Constant	5.652****
	(.455)
Wald (p)	
All Three Domains	.0000
Gender vs. Ethnicity	.3223
Gender vs. LGBTQ+ status	.0000
Ethnicity vs. LGBTQ+ status	.0000
R^2	.078
Obs	1664

Notes: Pre-registered linear probability model with (HC3) robust standard errors. One observation per individual. Ethnicity and LGBTQ+ status are both indicators, so that gender is the domain that serves as baseline. $^{*}p < .10$, $^{**}p < .05$, $^{***}p < .01$, $^{****}p < .001$.

M. Survey of Discrimination Experience

Table M1: Differences between individuals who report (1) having personally engaged/opposed discrimination in their workplace and (2) not having done so

(a) Without monetary stakes

	Anti	Pro-Advantaged	Pro-Disadvantaged
	(1)	(2)	(3)
PROD50%A	-.433****	.433****	-.001
	(.014)	(.013)	(.004)
PROD50%D	-.442****	.015***	.427****
	(.014)	(.005)	(.013)
EngagedTasteDisc	-.042***	.015	.026**
	(.015)	(.010)	(.011)
EngagedStatsDisc	-.030	.007	.022
	(.026)	(.019)	(.019)
OpposedTasteDisc	.003	-.001	-.004
	(.015)	(.008)	(.010)
OpposedStatsDisc	.022	-.007	-.012
	(.015)	(.009)	(.012)
PROD50%A x EngagedTasteDisc	.096****	-.079***	-.017
	(.027)	(.025)	(.013)
PROD50%D x EngagedTasteDisc	.067***	-.002	-.065***
	(.026)	(.010)	(.024)
PROD50%A x EngagedStatsDisc	-.034	.034	-.000
	(.045)	(.043)	(.021)
PROD50%D x EngagedStatsDisc	.005	.012	-.017
	(.048)	(.020)	(.047)
PROD50%A x OpposedTasteDisc	-.073**	.088****	-.015
	(.029)	(.027)	(.012)
PROD50%D x OpposedTasteDisc	-.094***	.004	.090***
	(.030)	(.010)	(.029)
PROD50%A x OpposedStatsDisc	.010	-.027	.016
	(.031)	(.029)	(.011)
PROD50%D x OpposedStatsDisc	.003	.002	-.005
	(.032)	(.011)	(.032)
Wald (p)			
All Eng./Opp. terms	.0004	.0200	.0033
taste Eng./Opp. terms	.0079	.5156	.0248
stats Eng./Opp. terms	.0005	.0037	.0020
all variables	.0000	.0000	.0000
R^2	.204	.280	.292
Obs	8097	8097	8097

(b) With monetary stakes

	Anti	Pro-Advantaged	Pro-Disadvantaged
	(1)	(2)	(3)
PROFIT33%A	.157****	.032***	-.189****
	(.012)	(.011)	(.004)
PROFIT33%D	.146****	-.184****	.038****
	(.012)	(.005)	(.011)
PROD50%A-PROFIT33%A	-.256****	.439****	-.183****
	(.007)	(.009)	(.005)
PROD50%D-PROFIT33%D	-.274****	-.173****	.446****
	(.007)	(.005)	(.009)
PROFIT33%A x EngagedTasteDisc	-.032	.020	.012
	(.021)	(.019)	(.010)
PROFIT33%D x EngagedTasteDisc	-.022	.018**	.005
	(.021)	(.009)	(.019)
PROFIT33%A x EngagedStatsDisc	-.018	.024	-.006
	(.036)	(.032)	(.014)
PROFIT33%D x EngagedStatsDisc	-.013	-.017	.030
	(.039)	(.021)	(.035)
PROFIT33%A x OpposedTasteDisc	.017	-.005	-.012
	(.025)	(.023)	(.009)
PROFIT33%D x OpposedTasteDisc	-.005	-.004	.009
	(.026)	(.010)	(.024)
PROFIT33%A x OpposedStatsDisc	.032	-.036*	.005
	(.025)	(.022)	(.009)
PROFIT33%D x OpposedStatsDisc	.054**	-.007	-.047**
	(.026)	(.011)	(.023)
PROD50%A-PROFIT33%A x EngagedTasteDisc	.030*	-.033*	.003
	(.015)	(.019)	(.010)
PROD50%D-PROFIT33%D x EngagedTasteDisc	.013	.024**	-.037**
	(.015)	(.011)	(.018)
PROD50%A-PROFIT33%A x EngagedStatsDisc	-.025	.041	-.016
	(.027)	(.031)	(.014)
PROD50%D-PROFIT33%D x EngagedStatsDisc	.015	-.033*	.018
	(.028)	(.018)	(.034)
PROD50%A-PROFIT33%A x OpposedTasteDisc	-.019	.032	-.013
	(.016)	(.020)	(.010)
PROD50%D-PROFIT33%D x OpposedTasteDisc	-.008	-.016	.024
	(.017)	(.011)	(.020)
PROD50%A-PROFIT33%A x OpposedStatsDisc	.010	-.017	.007
	(.018)	(.021)	(.009)
PROD50%D-PROFIT33%D x OpposedStatsDisc	-.011	.011	-.000
	(.020)	(.014)	(.022)
EngagedTasteDisc	.010	-.007	-.002
	(.012)	(.008)	(.008)
EngagedStatsDisc	-.040*	.015	.025
	(.024)	(.015)	(.016)
OpposedTasteDisc	-.020	.007	.013
	(.015)	(.009)	(.008)
OpposedStatsDisc	.007	.002	-.008
	(.018)	(.011)	(.010)
Wald (p)			
All Eng./Opp. int. terms	.2422	.1387	.1373
taste Eng./Opp. int. terms	.2133	.2553	.3084
stats Eng./Opp. int. terms	.4556	.2165	.2759
all variables	.0000	.0000	.0000
R^2	.091	.159	.169
Obs	32480	32480	32480

Notes: Linear probability models with individual-level random effects, socio-demographic controls, an indicator for decisions about a second discrimination domain in Study 2, and robust standard errors. EngagedTasteDisc (EngagedStatsDisc) is a variable for having engaged in taste (statistical) discrimination in the workplace in the past ten years: 0 for *No*, 1 for *Yes, a few times (1 to 5)*, 2 for *Yes, several times (6 to 10)*, 3 for *Yes, many times (more than 10)*. OpposedTasteDisc (OpposedStatsDisc) is an equivalent variable for having refused to engage in taste (statistical) discrimination or prevented someone else from doing it. $^{*}p < .10$, $^{**}p < .05$, $^{***}p < .01$, $^{****}p < .001$.

N. Instructions

Page 1.

Welcome to this economic experiment.

Please be aware that we adhere to a strict policy of not deceiving participants. Prolific requires debriefing at the end when studies use deception (see Prolific policy here), and we guarantee that there will be no debriefing since everything we tell you is true. Unlike in traditional surveys where questions are hypothetical, all individuals and decisions here are real. All your decisions and answers are anonymous.

You are asked to make a series of decisions about other individuals and then complete a questionnaire. You will earn £1.90 as compensation. In addition, there is a 5% chance that one of your decisions is randomly selected to determine payments: your payment and the payment of other individuals. In this case, you will receive between £22.50 and £30 as payment on top of your compensation.

Page 2, part 1.

We recently hired Prolific individuals to work on the same individual assignment. We recruited them based on demographics to obtain a sample of men and women. The assignment can be completed correctly by anyone, it simply requires that individuals exert a moderate effort. They have worked on the assignment and we have already paid each of them £0.50 as compensation. They were told before they worked that another person would later decide whether we would also pay them a bonus of £2. They are not paid anything else.

You are this other person who makes decisions about whether they receive the £2 bonus. We ask you to make 14 such decisions. In each decision, we present you with many individuals and you must select one of several options regarding who receive the bonus.

We present you different individuals in each decision, so that you do not make two decisions about the same individuals. Should your decision be randomly selected for payment, nobody else than you determines whether the individuals in your decision receive the bonus.

We pay you an amount in pounds for each option that you can choose. This amount is indicated with each option.

You cannot select individuals directly. Instead, you must select one of several options that determines the number of men and women who receive the £2 bonus. You also have the option to randomly draw workers, without taking into account their gender, to receive the bonus.

The individuals will not be told anything about how you made your decision.

Page 2, part 2.

Here is an example of a decision:

The following 16 individuals each had the same assignment.

- 8 women: all 8 completed ***half*** of the assignment correctly.
- 8 men: 4 completed ***three quarters*** of the assignment correctly, 4 completed ***one quarter*** of it correctly.

You must select the number of men and women who receive the £2 bonus. You cannot select specific individuals, only the number of men and women. Then, a lottery randomly picks this number of men from all 8 men (each man has the same chance to be picked), and the same holds for women.

You also have the option to randomly draw 6 out of the 16 workers, irrespective of their gender, to receive the £2 bonus.

You can select one of these options:

1. *0 men and 6 women receive £2 each; you receive £12*
2. *1 man and 5 women receive £2 each; you receive £16*
3. *2 men and 4 women receive £2 each; you receive £20*
4. *3 men and 3 women receive £2 each; you receive £24*
5. *4 men and 2 women receive £2 each; you receive £28*
6. *5 men and 1 woman receive £2 each; you receive £32*
7. *6 men and 0 women receive £2 each; you receive £36*
8. *randomly draw 6 workers to receive £2 each; you receive £24*

Imagine that you select option 6 (that is, 5 men and 1 woman receive £2 each; you receive £32). Then, we proceed as follows:

- The lottery randomly picks 5 of the 8 men and 1 of the 8 women. We pay the £2 bonus to each of these 5 men and 1 woman (we do not pay any bonus to the 3 men and 7 women not picked).
- We pay you £32.

Before you start your 14 decisions, we ask you to go through five simple comprehension questions. You have three attempts to answer each question. If you fail one question three times, you cannot participate and the study automatically ends.