Firm Heterogeneity in the Identification and Reward of Inventors

Author: Sabrina Di Addario (Bank of Italy) • Alice Wu (University of Wisconsin - Madison)
Posted: 16 November 2026

Abstract

This paper documents firm heterogeneity in identifying and rewarding inventor talent, using Italian Social Security employment records linked to patent applications. Young new inventors are 20% less likely to file their first patent application at firms in the bottom quartile of the firm wage distribution than similar workers at top-quartile firms. Experienced inventors, however, patent at similar rates across low- and high-wage firms, suggesting that low-wage firms do patent but concentrate their innovation activity among workers of proven ability. Wages rise significantly around a young worker's first patent application, and the increase is largest at low-wage firms. We build a model of employer learning and incentive contracts to explain these findings: low-wage firms invest less in discovering talent but, when firm investment and worker effort are weak complements, set a higher bonus for new inventors.
JEL codes: J24, J31, O31
Keywords: Labor Market for Inventors; Early Career; Employer Learning; Incentive Contracts